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 Sexual minorities (i.e. lesbians and gay men) experience systemic discrimination 
throughout the United States.  Prior to the Supreme Court ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges 
(2015), in many states, same-sex couples could not marry and sexual minorities were not 
protected from sexual orientation housing discrimination (Human Rights Campaign, 
2015).  The current, two-experiment study applied Jost and Banaji’s (1994) System 
Justification Theory to marriage and housing discrimination.  When sexual minorities 
question dissimilar treatment, thereby threatening the status quo, members of the 
heterosexual majority rationalize sexual minority discrimination to maintain their 
dominant status (Alexander, 2001; Brescoll, Uhlmann, & Newman, 2013; Citizens for 
Equal Protection v. Bruning, 2006; Jackson v. Abercrombie, 2012; Jost, Banaji, & 
Nosek, 2004; Rahman, 2004; Sevcik v. Sandoval, 2012).  After sexual minority groups 
gained equality victories (i.e. Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 2003; Romer v. 
Evans, 1996), heterosexual majority group members passed anti-marriage equality laws 
and did not pass sexual orientation discrimination protection (Alexander, 2001; Bishop v. 
Smith, tenth circuit, 2014; Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 2014; Goldberg-Hiller & Milner, 2003; 
Henry & Reyna, 2007; Kitchen v. Herbert, district court, 2013; Wardle, 2005).  
Justifications for rights deprivation include stereotypes specific to the legal question (e.g., 
  
“special rights” discourse) as well as basic sexual stigma (Bruning, 2006; Herek & 
Garnets, 2007; Herek, 2004; Jackson, 2012; Rahman, 2004; Sevcik, 2012).  However, 
once a new status quo becomes likely, both majority and minority group members 
support the new status quo (Eidelman, Crandall, & Pattershall, 2009; Kay, Jimenez, & 
Jost, 2002).   
The present research examined whether threats and new status quo likelihood 
impact heterosexual individuals’ sexual orientation equality ballot decisions.  The 
experiments manipulated current status quo by affirming or threatening it and status quo 
likelihood by telling participants that experts believed nationwide equality was 10% (or 
30% or 60% or 90%) likely to occur by 2016.  Experimental findings provide mixed 
support for system justification theory as an explanation for sexual stigma and 
discrimination in that individual differences variables determined participants’ equality 
ballot decisions.  However, threat and uncertainty disrupted this effect.  Thus, the current 
research informs future system justification research within the sexual minority context. 
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Introduction 
 Objectives of the current research.  Sexual minorities (i.e. lesbians and gay men) 
experience systemic discrimination throughout the United States (US).  Specifically, prior 
to the United States Supreme Court ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), in many 
states, lesbians and gay men could not marry the person of their choice and, currently, are 
not protected from housing discrimination based upon their sexual orientation (Human 
Rights Campaign (HRC), 2015).  The current research explored (1) how the court battles 
involving marriage equality provide the basic blueprint for sexual minority discrimination 
in other contexts, (2) that system justification theory partially explains the rationalizations 
used, (3) that, therefore, system justification theory points the way for other forms of 
sexual minority discrimination, and (4) that, although various forms of discrimination 
exist (e.g., employment, education, and so on), housing constitutes a more basic and 
important form of discrimination due to its pervasive effects upon people’s lives.  The 
current research showed (5) how system justification theory provides a partial 
explanation for the past and current aspects of marriage equality and applied this logic to 
housing discrimination.  Finally, (6) the current research tested this model of system 
justification theory in the contexts of marriage and housing equality.   
To understand the current marriage and housing equality context, one must 
examine the legal precedents and legislative acts that impact sexual minority rights.  
Therefore, this discussion begins with a legal analysis covering the (1) the current rights 
enjoyed by sexual minorities under United States Supreme Court precedent; (2) the 
substantive rights of sexual minorities both within the court system and through potential 
legislative action; (3) the equal protection rights of sexual minorities under the Fourteenth 
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Amendment; and (4) how the state interests and levels of scrutiny through which courts 
analyze these rights constitute justifications for maintaining the current system of sexual 
minority inequality.  The Psychological component of the current paper discusses (1) the 
different aspects of system justification theory; (2) how alternative theories used to 
understand sexual minority stigma fail to explain key aspects of marriage and housing 
discrimination; how, (3) although threatening the status quo leads persons to defend the 
system, (4) once it appears likely that a new status quo will replace the current system, 
persons endorse justifications that promote the new status quo; and (5) how system 
justification explains the treatment of sexual minorities within the marriage context and 
can be applied to sexual minority housing discrimination.  Finally, the current study tests 
this model of system justification theory by varying the threat participants experience and 
the likelihood that the nation will experience a new status quo in either marriage (Study 
1) or housing (Study 2) equality. 
Sexual orientation discrimination and system justification. Within the marriage 
equality context, when sexual minorities question dissimilar treatment, members of the 
heterosexual majority rationalize sexual minority discrimination (Alexander, 2001; Baker 
v. Nelson, 1971; Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning, 2006; Hernandez v. Robles, 
2006; Jackson v. Abercrombie, 2012; Morrison v. Sadler, 2005; Price, Nir, & Cappella, 
2005; Rahman, 2004; Robicheaux v. Caldwell, 2014; Sevcik v. Sandoval, 2012).  
According to system justification theory, members of majority groups use these 
rationalizations to support the status quo because they are motivated to maintain their 
dominant status (Jost & Banaji, 1994).  When minority groups question the status quo, 
they threaten the current hierarchical system (Brescoll, Uhlmann, & Newman, 2013; Jost 
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& Banaji, 1994; Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; Jost & Burgess, 2000; Jost, Kivetz, Rubini, 
Guermandi, & Mosso, 2005).  In the sexual minority context, heterosexual majority 
group members reacted to this threat by passing anti-marriage equality laws designed to 
keep same-sex couples from marrying and by not including sexual orientation as a 
protected class for purposes of discrimination (Alexander, 2001; Bishop v. Smith, tenth 
circuit, 2014; Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 2014; Goldberg-Hiller & Milner, 2003; Henry & 
Reyna, 2007; Kitchen v. Herbert, district court, 2013; Wardle, 2005).  Justifications for 
rights deprivation include stereotypes specific to the legal question (e.g., marriage-centric 
reasons or “special rights” discourse) as well as basic sexual stigma (Baker, 1971; 
Bruning, 2006; Herek & Garnets, 2007; Herek, 2004, 2007; Hernandez, 2006; Jackson, 
2012; Morrison, 2005; Price et al., 2005; Rahman, 2004; Robicheaux, 2014; Sevcik, 
2012).  However, according to system justification theory, once it becomes likely that a 
new status quo will be achieved, both majority and minority group members should 
support the new status quo by endorsing different rationalizations that justify it 
(Eidelman, Crandall, & Pattershall, 2009; Kay, Jimenez, & Jost, 2002).  The current 
research examined how threats to the current status quo and the likelihood of becoming 
the new status quo impact heterosexual individuals’ tendency to vote for and support 
greater sexual orientation equality. 
 Current status of civil rights. Marriage and housing represent important rights 
within the United States (Armstrong, 2013; Campbell & Wright, 2010; Cherlin, 2004; 
Freeman, 1999; Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 2003; Turner v. Safley, 1987; 
Zablocki v. Redhail, 1978).  Prior to 2004, when Massachusetts became the first state to 
recognize the inherent right of same-sex couples to marriage, same-sex couples could not 
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marry within the United States (HRC, 2015).  As of the time in which this research was 
conducted (April 20 through June 11, 2015), in thirteen states, same-sex couples still 
could not marry (HRC, 2015).  Exclusion from marriage negatively affects sexual 
minorities in multiple ways, including denying them social and economic benefits 
available to heterosexual couples and increasing the experience of negative outcomes for 
sexual minority individuals (Badgett, 2010; Goodridge, 2003; Riggle, Rostosky, & 
Horne, 2010; Rostosky, Riggle, Horne, Denton, & Huellemeier, 2010; Rostosky, Riggle, 
Horne, & Miller, 2009).  For example, Riggle and colleagues (2010) found that 
Lesbian/Gay/Bisexual (LGB) individuals in legally recognized relationships were 
significantly less likely to experience depression, stress, and internalized homophobia and 
more likely to experience life as meaningful as compared to single, dating (but not 
committed), or committed but not married LGB individuals.   
Twenty-nine states have not passed statewide nondiscrimination laws that protect 
sexual minorities from housing discrimination (National LGBTQ Task Force, 2015).  
Although, according to Herek (2009), only 6.5% of gay men and 5.1% of lesbians report 
experiencing housing discrimination, multiple experimental studies indicate that same-
sex couples experience housing discrimination (Ahmed, Andersson, & Hammarstedt, 
2008; Ahmed & Hammarstedt, 2009; Fair Housing Centers of Michigan, 2007; Friedman, 
Reynolds, Scovill, Brassier, Campbell, & Ballou, 2013; Lauster & Easterbrook, 2011).  
For example, the US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) (Friedman 
et al., 2013) conducted 6,833 matched-pair correspondence tests across 50 housing 
markets throughout the US.  Friedman and colleagues sent two emails to each housing 
provider that asked about the availability of advertised units.  The emails were identical 
5 
 
except for couple composition, i.e. one email was from a same-sex couple and one was 
from a heterosexual couple (with 3,424 tests involving gay men and 3,409 tests involving 
lesbians).  The researchers found that both male and female same-sex couples were less 
likely to receive a response to their inquiry than heterosexual couples.  These results 
match the findings of the Fair Housing Centers of Michigan (2007), who found that 
heterosexual couples were favored in field studies 27% of the time.  Interestingly, in the 
Friedman et al. study, the favorable treatment of heterosexual couples disappeared in 
states that had nondiscrimination legislation, but only for lesbian couples (i.e. gay male 
couples received discriminatory treatment regardless of their state’s nondiscrimination 
policy).  This finding also matches other research that shows that female same-sex 
couples do not experience as much housing discrimination as male same-sex couples 
(Ahmed et al., 2008; Ahmed & Hammarstedt, 2009; Lauster & Easterbrook, 2011).  
However, as Ahmed and colleagues’ (2008, 2009) and Lauster and Easterbrook’s (2011) 
conducted their research outside of the U.S. (in Sweden and Canada, respectively), 
possible cultural differences may have impacted these results.   
Importantly, marriage exclusion and lack of housing protection reinforce sexual 
stigma, i.e. “socially shared knowledge about homosexuality’s devalued status in society” 
(Herek & Garnets, 2007; see also Herek, 2004, 2007, 2008).  Sexual stigma explains the 
dominant-subordinate relationship between heterosexual individuals and sexual 
minorities (Herek, 2004, 2007, 2008).  System justification theory explains how the 
dominant-subordinate relationship is maintained in society.  According to system 
justification theory, individuals (both dominant and subordinate) support the current 
status quo by rationalizing differences in power and status using stereotypes (Jost & 
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Banaji, 1994; Jost et al., 2004).  Because of the shared knowledge of sexual stigma, both 
dominant and subordinate group members stereotype sexual minority individuals as sick, 
immoral, unnatural, and “less than” heterosexual individuals, i.e. as inferior (Herek, 
2002, 2004, 2007).  Anti-marriage equality proponents and judges use these stereotypes 
to rationalize the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage (Baker, 1971; Bishop v. 
Holder, district court, 2014; Bruning, 2006; DeBoer v. Snyder, district court, 2014; 
Geiger, 2014; Hernandez, 2006; Jackson, 2012; Kitchen, district court, 2013; Lewis v. 
Harris, 2006; Sevcik, 2012), which reinforces the status quo of heterosexual couple only 
marriage.  As both heterosexual and sexual minority individuals value marriage, which 
has many benefits besides social acceptance, restricting marriage to the sexual minority 
reinforces heterosexual dominance (Geiger, 2014).   
When same-sex couples question the constitutionality of heterosexual couple only 
marriage, thereby threatening the status quo, they may engender backlash from members 
of the dominant group (Bishop, district court, 2014; Kitchen, district court, 2013; Wardle, 
2005).  This backlash takes the form of anti-marriage equality statutes, amendments, and 
arguments against same-sex marriage within court cases, all justified using stereotypic 
rationalizations regarding sexual minorities and marriage (Bishop, district court, 2014; 
Bruning, 2006; DeBoer, district court, 2014; Geiger, 2014; Kitchen, district court, 2013; 
Lewis, 2006).  For example, after the Supreme Court of Hawaii (Baehr v. Lewin, 1993) 
held that denial of marriage licenses to same-sex couples violated the equal protection 
clause of Hawaii’s constitution, twenty-seven states and the federal government enacted 
statutes and state amendments that explicitly prohibited same-sex couples from marrying 
(Bourke v. Beshear, 2014; In re Marriage Cases, 2008; Jackson, 2012; Latta v. Otter, 
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district court, 2014; Whitewood v. Wolf, 2014).  Then, after the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts (Goodridge, 2003) held that the state’s denial of marriage to same-sex 
couples represented a violation of Massachusetts’ state equal protection articles of their 
constitution, twenty-seven states amended their constitutions to exclude same-sex couples 
from marriage (Bishop, district court, 2014; Bourke, 2014; In re Marriage Cases, 2008; 
Kitchen, district court, 2013; Latta, district court, 2014).  Thus, after both Baehr and 
Goodridge, when the status quo for marriage was threatened, persons within different 
states took steps to preserve the status quo.  However, when a change to the status quo 
appears likely, individuals provide rationalizations to justify the new status quo (Kay et 
al., 2002).  Thus, system justification explains the history of the marriage equality 
movement, from backlash to the tipping point of United States v. Windsor (2013) to 
potential nationwide acceptance.  Prior to Windsor, several lower courts held that bans 
against same-sex marriage did not violate the Constitution (Baker, 1971; Bruning, 2006; 
Hernandez, 2006; Jackson, 2012; Sevcik, 2012).  After Windsor, courts representing 
thirty-two states held that bans on same-sex marriage violate the Constitution (HRC, 
2015).  As such, the litigation after Windsor provides a template for additional civil rights 
reform for sexual minorities. 
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CHAPTER 1 
LEGAL ANALYSIS  
Definitional concerns. As an initial note, the term sexual minorities, within this 
paper, refers to individuals who self-identify as lesbian or gay, i.e. their sexual orientation 
involves affectional, sexual, and relational tendencies towards individuals who identify as 
having the same sex or gender (Moradi, Mohr, Worthington, & Fassinger, 2009).  
Admittedly, this definition lacks the sophistication needed to fully understand the 
complex, overlapping aspects of gender and sex, e.g., the social construction of both 
terms, the assumption of sex and gender binaries, sexual orientation fluidity, etc. (Moradi 
et al., 2009; Savin-Williams, 2008; Yarhouse, 2001).  Additionally, bisexual and 
transgender individuals (often included within the term sexual minority) are not the main 
focus of this paper.  The current research limits sexual minority to self-identified lesbians 
and gay men because marriage equality law focuses almost exclusively upon the gender 
composition of couples (i.e. defining marriage as between a man and a woman) (Bostic v. 
Schaefer, fourth circuit, 2014; DeBoer v. Snyder, sixth circuit, 2014; Windsor, 2013).  
Even those marriage equality cases that describe marriage as an individual’s fundamental, 
substantive due process right still focus upon the gender or sex of the partner whom the 
individual wants to marry because the relevant law impedes marrying the person of one’s 
choice (Bishop, tenth circuit, 2014; Bostic, fourth circuit, 2014; Kitchen v. Herbert, tenth 
circuit, 2014; Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 2010).   
In addition, equal protection suspect and quasi-suspect classification analyses also 
focus on the characteristics of the members of the proposed class, who tend to be lesbians 
or gay men in cases involving sexual minorities (Baskin v. Bogan, seventh circuit, 2014; 
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Whitewood, 2014).  In equal protection cases, courts ask whether there are sufficient 
reasons to treat groups of persons differently for the purposes of a law (City of Cleburne, 
TX v. Cleburne Living Center, 1985).  However, when laws make classifications based 
upon characteristics that could not rationally further a legitimate state purpose (e.g., race, 
national origin, or alienage), the law is considered to be constitutionally suspect and must 
meet a higher standard of review to remain in effect (Baskin, seventh circuit, 2014; 
Cleburne, 1985; Whitewood, 2014).  As couples usually claim that marriage equality bans 
violate their Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection under the law, courts ask 
whether the current law treats individual plaintiffs differently based upon their sexual 
orientation (Baskin, seventh circuit, 2014; Varnum v. Brien, 2009; Whitewood, 2014).   
In treating sexual orientation and gender in ways similar to race and ethnicity by 
requiring individuals to belong to concrete, identifiable groups, courts reinforce the 
notion of gender and sexual orientation as binary constructs (Moradi et al., 2009; Savin-
Williams, 2008).  Although this paper acknowledges the importance of encompassing a 
broader, more nuanced interpretation of sexual minority, it focuses on how dominant 
groups reinforce the status quo through system justification (i.e. how members of the 
heterosexual majority create and sustain a subordinate, sexual minority class).  Therefore, 
I will make use of the terms utilized within the relevant legal contexts (i.e. marriage and 
housing equality).  Thus, although great fluidity exists within the concepts of gender and 
sexual orientation, the current paper limits the discussion to the terminology within the 
marriage equality context.  As housing equality remains an underdeveloped area of law 
and the current study seeks to apply system justification concepts initially constructed 
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within the marriage equality context to the housing context, the current paper will limit 
its analysis to sexual minorities who self-identify as lesbian or gay. 
Legal Status Quo for Sexual Minority Rights 
 The current state of the law puts lesbian and gay (LG, or sexual minority) people 
in a precarious position with regard to their civil rights.  Sexual minority individuals lack 
the protection that the Civil Rights Act (CRA) of 1964 grants to many other similarly 
situated groups because they are not explicitly listed as a protected group.  Additionally, 
most courts have held that the CRA’s prohibition against sex discrimination does not 
include sexual orientation discrimination, although it does include gender discrimination, 
i.e. individuals cannot be discriminated against for failing to conform to stereotypes of 
sex or gender (Centola v. Potter, 2002; Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 1999; 
Ianetta v. Putnam Investments, Inc., 2001; Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 
1996; Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust Co., 2000; Simonton v. Runyon, 2000).  Currently, 
only the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr., Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009, 
which criminalizes hate crimes, provides sexual minorities with nationwide, federal 
protection from dissimilar treatment based solely on their sexual orientation.   
 Marriage equality status quo. 
Although, as of April 2015, thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia 
(D.C.) had granted marriage equality to same-sex couples (including only those states in 
which same-sex couples may currently wed), thirteen states did not afford them this right 
(HRC, 2015).  The Supreme Court’s refusal to hear five same-sex marriage cases from 
Indiana, Oklahoma, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin allowed the lower rulings to stand (all 
of which were for same-sex marriage) (Baskin, seventh circuit, 2014; Bishop, tenth 
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circuit, 2014; Bostic, fourth circuit, 2014; Fantz & Mears, 2014; Kitchen, tenth circuit, 
2014; Wolf v. Walker, seventh circuit, 2014).  Thus, although these cases appeared to 
affect only five states, the three circuit court precedents (North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Virginia, and West Virginia for the fourth circuit (Maryland already has marriage 
equality) affect eleven states; Indiana and Wisconsin for the seventh circuit (Illinois 
already has marriage equality); and Colorado, Kansas, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming 
for the tenth circuit (New Mexico already has marriage equality)) (Fantz & Mears, 2014).  
In addition, on October 7, 2014, the Court of Appeals for the ninth circuit held that the 
same-sex marriage bans in Idaho and Nevada violated the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment (combined opinion of Latta v. Otter and Sevcik v. Sandoval).  In 
contrast to the trend for marriage equality within other circuits, the Court of Appeals for 
the sixth circuit held that state bans in Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee on 
same-sex marriage and recognition do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s due 
process or equal protection clauses (DeBoer, 2014).  The sixth circuit ruling prevented 
same-sex couples within the four states in which same-sex marriage is not recognized 
from enjoying some of the same rights as their heterosexual couple counterparts, e.g., 
hospital visitation rights, access to partner’s health insurance, ability to file joint tax 
returns and tax benefits, spousal rights upon the death of one partner, and joint parenting 
rights (Goodridge, 2003; Hernandez, 2006; Marriage Equality USA, 2015).   
The recent Supreme Court decision on same-sex marriage (Obergefell, 2015) held 
that the fundamental, substantive Due Process clause right to marry includes same-sex 
couples.  The Court discussed the facets of the fundamental right to marriage, including 
the right to choose one’s spouse; the nature of marriage as a unique, intimate institution 
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within the United States; marriage’s importance within the realm of childrearing and 
family creation; and marriage’s position as the building block of society.  By then 
affirming that same-sex couples do not differ substantially from opposite-sex couples in 
any of the key characteristics associated with the right to marriage, the Court held that 
denial of the right to marriage to same-sex couples violates the Constitution.  Without 
engaging in a thorough Equal Protection clause analysis, the Court held that denial of the 
right to marry infringed upon guarantees of equal protection.  By focusing upon the lack 
of equal protection within the context of marriage, the Court avoided the larger 
constitutional question of whether sexual minorities constitute a protected or suspect 
class.  Thus, although sexual minorities have the right to marry the person of their choice, 
the equality concepts contained in Obergefell (2015) apply only within the context of the 
fundamental right to marriage. 
Although not the focus of this piece, it is important to acknowledge that 
transgender individuals’ marriage rights are also largely uncertain, depending, in many 
cases, upon an individual’s assigned sex at birth, their partner’s sex, and both individuals’ 
sexes at the time they apply for a marriage license (Lambda Legal, 2015).  Whether a 
transgender individual has transitioned (i.e. is living as the gender with which they 
identify, as opposed to the sex they were assigned at birth) before or after applying for a 
marriage license often impacts their marriage rights (HRC, 2015; Lambda Legal, 2015).  
According to Lambda Legal, the way states identify the sexes of the members of the 
couple (although this determination may not match the sex with which individuals 
identify), determines whether the couple constitutes a heterosexual or same-sex couple, 
and, therefore, whether the state can apply the marriage laws in place for same-sex and 
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heterosexual couples (2015).  Thus, the analysis for same-sex marriage applies to 
transgender individuals when states have identified them as belonging to a same-sex 
couple seeking marriage. 
 Prior to the Supreme Court ruling in Obergefell (2015), thirteen states prohibited 
marriage equality through state constitutional amendments (HRC, 2015).  Whether the 
prohibition on marriage equality applied to domestic partnerships and civil unions 
depended upon the wording of the legislation involved (Howenstine, 2006).  For 
example, the wording of the Georgia constitutional marriage amendment restricted the 
definition of marriage to heterosexual couples and prohibited granting the same benefits 
to same-sex couples as marriage for heterosexual, married couples (Constitution of the 
State of Georgia, 2007).  In contrast, Arkansas merely denied same-sex couples the same 
legal status as marriages between heterosexual couples (Constitution of the State of 
Arkansas of 1874, 2004).  Arkansas law could provide same-sex couples with some 
rights (i.e. domestic partnership rights), as long as the scope or effects of the rights 
granted did not approximate those of marriage.  The wording of these kinds of 
amendments varied the exclusiveness of coverage for same-sex couples and, as a result, 
the extent of the prohibition on partnership rights was, often, a matter of judicial 
interpretation at the district court or appellate level (Howenstine, 2006).  Thus, the state 
partnership rights of individuals in same-sex relationships depended upon their state of 
residency and the judicial interpretation of jurisdictional courts.   
Additionally, although same-sex couples could marry in one state, other states 
might not recognize their marriages (HRC, 2015).  Within the US, the rule of lex loci 
contractus provides that states will recognize out-of-state marriages as valid as long as 
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the marriages were valid in the states in which they were performed (Obergefell v. 
Wymyslo, 2013; Henry v. Himes, 2014).  However, some states refused to recognize the 
relationship statuses (whether marriage, domestic partnership, or civil union) in the 
instance of same-sex couples (DeBoer, sixth circuit, 2014; HRC, 2015).  Although, after 
Windsor, the federal government provides some federal benefits to married same-sex 
couples (e.g., Family and Medical Leave Act coverage), some federal benefits depend 
upon the state in which the married couple lives (Bernard, 2014).  For example, the 
Social Security Administration must follow the law of the state in which the couple 
resides, not where they married, to determine marriage validity (LaVelle, 2014).  
Similarly, the US Department of Veterans Affairs (2015) determines spousal eligibility 
for services and benefits by whether the state in which the spouse lived during their 
marriage recognized the couple as married or if the state in which the spouse lived when 
they filed a claim recognized the couple as married.  In addition, states determine whether 
various economic benefits (e.g. health insurance, inheritance tax exemptions) and 
personal rights (e.g. presumption of parentage and the right to make decisions for 
children within the family unit) available to heterosexual, married couples are also 
available to same-sex married couples according to whether the state does or does not 
recognize a couple as married (Bourke, 2014; Henry, 2014; Obergefell, 2013; Tanco v. 
Haslam, 2014).  Therefore, prior to Obergefell (2015), the rights of married same-sex 
couples varied according to the laws of each state. 
Housing equality status quo. 
In most jurisdictions within the United States, sexual minorities lack protection 
from housing discrimination (HRC, 2015).  At the federal level, the Fair Housing Act 
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(Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968) does not include sexual orientation within its 
list of protected classes (Armstrong, 2013).  However, as of 2012, the US Department of 
Housing and Human Development (HUD) prohibits housing discrimination against 
individuals based upon sexual orientation or gender identity in HUD-funded housing 
(Equal Access to Housing in HUD Programs Regardless of Sexual Orientation or Gender 
Identity, 24 C.F.R. § 5.105(a)(2)(ii)).  Eighteen states (California, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, 
New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington) and the 
District of Columbia (D.C.) prohibit housing discrimination based upon both gender 
identity and sexual orientation (HRC, 2015).  In addition, New Hampshire, New York, 
and Wisconsin prohibit housing discrimination based upon only sexual orientation.  Thus, 
twenty-nine states currently lack statewide housing protection for sexual minorities.   
Local municipalities differ as to the amount and kind of protection they provide.  
In nine states (Alabama, Alaska, Mississippi, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, 
South Dakota, Tennessee, and Wyoming), none of the local municipalities offer housing 
non-discrimination protection (Movement Advancement Project (MAP), 2015).  Of the 
remaining twenty-three states that do not offer both sexual orientation and gender identity 
statewide housing protection, local municipalities in seven states (Florida, Indiana, New 
Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Virginia, and Wisconsin) distinguish between sexual 
orientation and gender identity housing protection, with sexual orientation garnering 
greater protection than gender identity.  In the sixteen states in which sexual orientation 
and gender identity receive the same amount of housing non-discrimination protection 
from local municipalities, the percentage of state populations protected varies greatly by 
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state.  For example, whereas 54% of the state population of Utah is protected from 
housing discrimination (representing the state with the greatest amount of protection for 
all sexual minorities), only 1% of the state population of South Carolina is protected from 
housing discrimination.  Overall, of the LGBT population, 39% currently lives in a state 
that prohibits housing discrimination based upon gender identity and sexual orientation, 
48% lives in a state that prohibits only sexual orientation housing discrimination, and 
52% lives in a state that does not prohibit housing discrimination based on either gender 
identity or sexual orientation at a state level (MAP, 2015).   
United States Supreme Court Analysis of Sexual Minority Rights (Bowers v. 
Hardwick through Lawrence v. Texas) 
By analyzing the legal precedents and legislative actions that impact sexual 
minorities, one can understand how the current context of inequality for sexual minorities 
arose.  Within the context of sexual minority rights cases, the United States Supreme 
Court’s views on fundamental liberties have broadened substantially.  Initially, in Bowers 
v. Hardwick (1986), the Court held that the fundamental substantive liberties protected by 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ due process clauses only included those rights 
historically protected (see also Moore v. East Cleveland, 1977).  The Court found that 
because throughout much of our history, the US and many of the States outlawed sodomy 
(regardless of the sexual orientation or sex of the individuals involved) that a 
fundamental liberty did not exist.  Therefore, a state only needed a rational basis for 
establishing anti-sodomy laws.  Thus, after the Bowers decision, state and federal law 
prohibiting homosexual sexual conduct did not violate the US Constitution. 
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After Bowers, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on this issue slowly evolved, 
providing more rights to sexual minorities.  First, in Romer v. Evans (1996) the justices 
considered whether an amendment to the Colorado constitution that withdrew protections 
previously established for LGB individuals in specific municipalities within Colorado 
and prevented those municipalities from providing protection in the future violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause (Romer, 1996; US Constitution, 
Amendment 14).  The Court held that the statute did not pass the rational basis test 
because it targeted a specific group (sexual minority individuals) and therefore showed 
animus on the part of the people of Colorado when they enacted this statute.  Statutes 
motivated by animus alone, i.e. those that target specific, unpopular minorities, “cannot 
constitute a legitimate governmental interest” and therefore violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection clause under rational basis scrutiny (p. 634; see also 
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 1973). 
On the heels of Romer, the Court struck down anti-sodomy statutes altogether, 
reversing Bowers (Lawrence v. Texas, 2003).  Drawing from Griswold v. Connecticut 
(1965), Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972), and Roe v. Wade (1973), Lawrence held that anti-
sodomy criminal statutes violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process 
liberty interest in privacy.  The Court recognized that the statute constituted a violation of 
the plaintiffs’ liberty interest in privacy by regulating, through criminal law, the private 
lives of individuals in matters related to sexual intimacy.  The Court held that the state 
did not have a legitimate interest in denying to individuals their choices in adult, 
consenting, sexual partners.  Thus, sexual minority sexual conduct between consenting 
adults carried out in one’s home is protected because it exists within a sphere of privacy.  
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Although the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process clause protects sexual 
conduct between consenting adults within the privacy of one’s home, the Supreme Court 
only recently ruled whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process right to 
marriage includes same-sex couples (Obergefell, 2015). 
Substantive Rights for Sexual Minorities  
Marriage as a fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment due 
process clause. 
 Supreme Court analysis. 
 Although, prior to Obergefell (2015), protection for sexual minority individuals 
for same-sex marriage did not exist nationwide, several cases indicated that same-sex 
marriage may be included within the fundamental right to marry.  To understand how the 
trend has evolved, it is necessary to consider Loving v. Virginia (1967), where the court 
struck down anti-miscegenation statutes that prohibited individuals of different races 
(specifically, white and black) from marrying.  The court held that the statute in question 
violated both the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection and due process clauses.  
Regarding the equal protection clause, the statute did not survive the “most rigid 
scrutiny” (i.e., the strict scrutiny test) required for racial classifications because the state 
failed to show how the statute was “necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible 
state objective” (11; see also, Korematsu v. United States, 1944), that is, the state failed to 
show a compelling interest to support its anti-miscegenation statutes.  Furthermore, the 
Court recognized marriage as one of the “‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our 
very existence and survival” (12; see also Skinner v. Oklahoma, 1942) and, therefore, 
held that the statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause by denying 
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the Lovings their liberty without due process of law.  Thus, the Loving case established a 
substantive due process right to marriage, although it did not extend the right to sexual 
minorities. 
 In contrast to the court’s expansive language in Loving, in 1996, the federal 
government enacted the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which prohibited same-sex 
couples from accessing federal rights and privileges given to citizens based upon 
marriage (Pub. L. 104-199).  In 2013, the Court struck down the part of DOMA that 
defined marriage as only existing between heterosexual couples (Windsor).  The Court 
held that the Fifth Amendment due process clause included an implied equal protection 
aspect, based on cases like Bolling v. Sharpe (1954) and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Pena (1995), and that statutes motivated by animus towards an unpopular group could 
not serve a legitimate governmental interest (Romer, 1996).  In Bolling (1954), the Court 
held that school segregation within Washington, DC, violated the Fifth Amendment due 
process clause because the state could not restrict the liberty component of the clause 
could without a “proper governmental objective”, which did not include segregation.  
Furthermore, the Court concluded that the federal government needed to secure the same 
level of equality as did the states.  In Adarand (1995), the Court reaffirmed that equal 
protection claims under either the state (through the Fourteenth Amendment) or federal 
framework (through the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause) should be treated exactly 
the same for constitutional purposes.  Thus, because DOMA singled out a specific group 
(same-sex married couples) for dissimilar and detrimental treatment, it could not 
withstand rational basis review.   
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 Same-sex marriage context: Precedential impact of Baker v. Nelson. 
In Baker v. Nelson (1971), the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that barring 
same-sex couples from marriage did not violate either the Fourteenth Amendment’s due 
process or equal protection clause.  The US Supreme Court summarily dismissed the 
Baker appeal for “want of a substantial federal question” (Baker, 1972; see also Hicks v. 
Miranda, 1975; Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 1979; Mandel v. 
Bradley, 1977).  The Supreme Court dismissal acted as a decision on the merits of Baker 
because an appellate dismissal requires lower courts to follow the conclusions that were 
decided in the case (Mandel, 1977).  According to Hicks v. Miranda, “unless and until the 
Supreme Court should instruct otherwise, inferior federal courts had best adhere to the 
view that if the Court has branded a question as unsubstantial, it remains so except when 
doctrinal developments indicate otherwise…” (Jackson, 2012, quoting Hicks, 1975).  
Accordingly, because the higher court did not rule on the specific challenge presented in 
Baker and because sufficient doctrinal developments did not indicate that the question 
was substantial, lower courts may not consider deciding in a way contrary to the original 
holding (i.e. in favor of same-sex marriage and against precedent) (Baskin, seventh 
circuit, 2014; Bishop, tenth circuit, 2014; Bostic, fourth circuit 2014; Brenner v. Scott, 
2014; Costanza v. Caldwell, 2014; De Leon v. Perry, 2014; DeBoer, sixth circuit, 2014; 
Geiger, 2014; Hernandez, 2006; Jackson, 2012; Kitchen, tenth circuit, 2014; Latta, ninth 
circuit, 2014; Love v. Beshear, 2014; McGee v. Cole, 2014; Morrison, 2005; Wilson v. 
Ake, 2014; Wright v. Arkansas, 2014).  Following the precedent established in Baker, the 
US District Courts in Jackson (2012) and Sevcik (2012) held that the heterosexual 
marriage legislation excluding gays and lesbians did not violate the equal protection 
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clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (see also Hernandez, 2006; Wilson, 2005).  In 
addition, the court in Jackson and in DeBoer (sixth circuit, 2014) also ruled that Baker 
precedent applied to the plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claim (2012).  In 
the alternative, each court ruled that the plaintiffs’ cases failed on their merits.   
Unlike the courts in Jackson, Sevcik, and DeBoer, most courts that have 
considered same-sex marriage after Windsor held that, due to the significant doctrinal 
developments that have occurred in equal protection and substantive due process law 
since the Baker dismissal, it is proper to set aside the precedent in Baker and decide the 
issues regarding same-sex marriage (Baskin, seventh circuit, 2014; Bishop, tenth circuit, 
2014; Bostic, fourth circuit, 2014; Brenner, 2014; De Leon, 2014; Geiger, 2014; Kitchen, 
tenth circuit, 2014; Latta, ninth circuit, 2014; McGee, 2014; Love, 2014; Whitewood, 
2014; Wright, 2014).  The significant doctrinal developments include the creation of 
intermediate scrutiny for quasi-suspect classes involving illegitimacy and sex (Craig v. 
Boren, 1976, Rehnquist, J., dissenting; Frontiero v. Richardson, 1973; Lalli v. Lalli, 
1978), the rejection of statutes that make discriminatory class distinctions based solely on 
sexuality (Romer, 1996), and the rejection of statutes that criminalize consenting, adult 
sexual intimacy (Lawrence, 2003).  Most importantly, the Supreme Court’s recognition 
of the violation of Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection clauses for 
those marriages permitted by the states (Windsor, 2013) may constitute doctrinal 
development with the potential for far reaching changes in broad areas of sexual 
orientation and sexual identity law.  Indeed, these doctrinal developments led the 
Supreme Court to overturn Baker (Obergefell, 2015), thereby establishing that the 
protection guaranteed by the fundamental right to marriage includes same-sex couples.  
22 
 
 Defining the fundamental right to marriage. 
 Prior to Obergefell (2015), in applying the substantive aspect of the due process 
clause, courts disagreed as to whether same-sex marriage fell within the fundamental 
right to marriage established in Loving or constituted a new right.  When a law infringes 
upon a fundamental right, it must pass strict scrutiny, i.e. it must be narrowly tailored to 
serve a compelling state interest (Washington v. Glucksberg, 1997; see also Moore, 1977, 
and Reno v. Flores, 1993).  By requiring strict scrutiny analysis for laws that infringe 
upon fundamental rights, the Supreme Court makes it more likely that these laws will be 
struck down as unconstitutional because the laws need to pass a much more difficult test 
than the rational basis test that measures most laws.  Therefore, the Court only declares 
fundamental those rights that are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” 
(Moore, 1977, p. 503; see also Snyder v. Massachusetts, 1934) and “implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty,” to the extent that “neither liberty nor justice would exist if 
they were sacrificed” (Palko v. Connecticut, 1937).  If the law does not infringe upon a 
fundamental right, nor involve a suspect classification (Equal Protection Analysis, see 
below), courts apply the rational basis test (DeBoer, sixth circuit, 2014; Jackson, 2012; 
Robicheaux, 2014).   
The crucial aspect for substantive due process analysis is whether the fundamental 
right asserted involves marriage (broadly) or same-sex marriage (specifically).  Both 
Loving (1967) and Zablocki (1978) established that a fundamental right to marry exists 
within the substantive aspect of the due process clause.  What, then, constitutes marriage?  
In Goodridge (2003), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated that the right to 
marry must include the right to choose whom to marry.  In the case of lesbians and gay 
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men, this entails the right to marry someone of the same sex.  Similarly, in Kitchen 
(2013), the US District Court for the District of Utah weighed the interests of the state in 
regulating marriage against the rights of the individual under the US Constitution.  The 
District Court found that the fundamental right to marry is a substantive part of the 
liberty, privacy, and association rights contained within the Fourteenth Amendment’s due 
process clause and that when the state tried to limit marriage to heterosexual couples, it 
infringed upon this right to marry (Kitchen, district court, 2013).  Following the reasoning 
of Loving, the District Court defined marriage as “the right to make a public commitment 
to form an exclusive relationship and create a family with a partner with whom the 
person shares an intimate and sustaining emotional bond”, i.e. the companion model of 
marriage (Kitchen, district court, 2013, p. 1202-1203; Bishop, district court, 2014; 
Goodridge, 2003).  Thus, for those courts that held that marriage included “same-sex 
marriage”, the essential aspects of marriage only include the forming of a committed 
relationship based upon intimacy and love between two consenting adults for the purpose 
of creating one household with the desire to have the state recognize this relationship 
(Bishop, district court, 2014; Goodridge, 2003; Kitchen, district court, 2013; Perry, 
2010).  As discussed in Perry v. Schwarzenegger (2010), this definition of marriage is 
deeply rooted in the traditions and history of this Nation and is implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty.  Although the Supreme Court followed the companion model of marriage 
in Obergefell (2015), it also distinguished the fundamental right to marriage from other 
fundamental rights by citing Supreme Court precedent that established a broader 
conception of the right to marry.  According to the Court, precedent established that the 
right to marry did not require a “careful description” of the right at stake (as required 
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when determining whether a fundamental right is at stake under Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 1997).  Loving (1967), Zablocki (1978), and Turner (1987) only inquired as 
to whether those plaintiffs still had a fundamental right to marry in cases where their 
states had denied them that right due to their specific circumstances.  Thus, the Court 
determined that the right to marry encompasses a broad right not to be limited in the same 
way as other rights when conducting fundamental rights analysis.  
In contrast, other courts ruled that the substantive due process right to marriage 
excludes same-sex couples because, prior to Goodridge (2003), same-sex marriage did 
not exist within the US (Freedom to Marry, 2015; HRC, 2015).  When analyzing whether 
this right is fundamental, such that it falls within the substantive due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, these courts narrowed the right to one involving only same-sex 
marriage, rather than marriage in general (Baehr, 1993; Baker, 1971; DeBoer, sixth 
circuit, 2014; Hernandez, 2006; Jackson, 2012; Lewis, 2006; and Robicheaux, 2014).  
Baehr and Baker relied upon the reasoning in Griswold (1965) for the notion that 
marriage as a union between heterosexual individuals, being a traditional institution, is 
the fundamental right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.  DeBoer (sixth circuit), 
Hernandez, Jackson, Lewis, and Robicheaux followed the reasoning in Glucksberg that 
Courts must carefully define the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right 
brought forth by petitioners to keep from making constitutional law in accordance with 
judicial preferences (see also Baker, 1971; Collins v. Harker Heights, 1992; and Reno, 
1993).  The courts remained reticent in expanding Fourteenth Amendment substantive 
due process rights because declaring a right to be constitutionally protected removes the 
right from the democratic process, i.e. unlike other legislation, the right cannot be 
25 
 
repealed through the traditional legislative process (Glucksberg, 1997; Marbury v. 
Madison, 1803).  A constitutionally protected right may not lose its constitutional 
protection without a federal constitutional amendment (The Constitution of the United 
States, Article 5, 1787).  Additionally, laws that infringe upon this right are subject to 
strict scrutiny, thereby making it difficult for these laws to pass constitutional muster 
(Glucksberg, 1997; Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 1992; Reno, 
1993).  If courts ruled that the fundamental right to marriage included same-sex marriage, 
it would be difficult for the state to remove this greater level of protection.  Thus, wary of 
putting their own values before those of the populace, judges often hesitate to place a 
right within the substantive due process realm unless it is deeply rooted within US history 
(Collins, 1992; Glucksberg, 1997; Moore, 1977; Snyder, 1934).  Following the doctrine 
of judicial restraint, the right defined in the anti-marriage equality cases involved only the 
right to same-sex marriage (Lewis, 2006, p. 436).   
Then, according to the reasoning in Glucksberg, courts must analyze whether the 
right asserted is fundamental (Moore, 1977; Palko, 1937; Snyder, 1934; United States v. 
Salerno, 1987; Reno, 1993).  In DeBoer, Lewis, Jackson, and Robicheaux, the Court of 
Appeals for the sixth circuit, the New Jersey Supreme Court, the US District Court for 
the District of Hawaii, and the US District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, 
respectively, noted that, though the US Supreme Court held that there is a fundamental 
right to marriage, all of the couples involved in Supreme Court marriage cases have been 
heterosexual couples (Loving, 1967; Skinner, 1942; Zablocki, 1978; and Turner, 1987).  
Lewis (2006), then, discussed how the intent of the framers of the New Jersey 
Constitution and the drafters of New Jersey’s marriage statutes did not envision marriage 
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to include same-sex couples.  Additionally, the court in Jackson discussed how judicial 
precedent regarding the right to marriage has, often, turned on procreation, implying that 
same-sex marriage cannot be a fundamental right because procreation cannot occur in a 
same-sex relationship (2012; see also DeBoer, sixth circuit, 2014).  All three courts, and 
the District Court in Robicheaux, relied upon the language in Lawrence (2003) to show 
that the US Supreme Court, in determining that lesbian and gay individuals have a 
Fourteenth Amendment due process substantive liberty right to engage in private, sexual 
conduct, explicitly stated that their holding did not necessarily imply whether states had 
to give recognition to same-sex relationships.  In addition, DeBoer (sixth circuit), 
Jackson, and Sevcik distinguished Loving from the same-sex marriage cases because 
Loving still involved a marriage between heterosexual individuals, which the courts 
considered to be the traditional conception of marriage.  Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justices Scalia and Alito, in their dissents in Obergefell (2015) echoed these concerns 
when they stated that they would have held that same-sex couples do not fall within the 
fundamental right to marriage; rather, these justices opined that states should decide 
whether to allow same-sex marriage as only those rights “deeply rooted in this Nations’ 
history and tradition” should be withdrawn from the traditional legislative process 
(Glucksberg, 1997).  I will analyze the state interest within rational basis scrutiny in the 
“Equal Protection Analysis of Sexual Minorities within Marriage Context” section 
(below). 
In contrast, some courts that ruled for same-sex marriage held that it falls within 
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process clause protection as part of the 
fundamental right to marriage (Baskin, seventh circuit, 2014; Bostic, fourth circuit, 2014; 
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Brenner, 2014; Brinkman v. Long, 2014; Burns v. Hickenlooper, 2014; De Leon, 2014; 
Goodridge, 2003; Kitchen, tenth circuit, 2014; Latta, district court, 2014; Lee v. Orr, 
2014; Perry, 2010;  Whitewood, 2014).  Also, the Circuit Court of Pulaski County, 
Arkansas, Second Division, granted summary judgment for the same-sex couple 
plaintiffs, holding that the marriage statute and amendment in Arkansas violated the 
plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right to privacy and right to 
equal protection (Wright, 2014).  These courts held that marriage includes the right to 
choose whom to marry (Baskin, seventh circuit, 2014; Bostic, fourth circuit, 2014; 
Goodridge, 2003; Griego v. Oliver, 2013; In re Marriage Cases, 2008; Kerrigan v. 
Commissioner of Public Health, 2008; Latta, ninth circuit, 2014; Perry, 2010; 
Whitewood, 2014).   
For example, Bostic (fourth circuit, 2014) held that Glucksberg’s requirement of a 
careful analysis before defining a right as falling within the substantive aspect of the due 
process clause does not apply within the same-sex marriage cases because Glucksberg 
analysis only applies in cases where individuals seek recognition of a new fundamental 
right (see also Latta and Sevcik, ninth circuit, 2014; Whitewood, 2014).  Upon 
considering the “marriage as a fundamental right” cases (i.e., Loving, Zablocki, and 
Turner) courts held that marriage constitutes a broad, individual right that depends upon 
choice (Bostic, fourth circuit, 2014; Goodridge, 2003; Griego, 2013; Kerrigan, 2008; 
Latta, ninth circuit, 2014; Love, 2014; Perry, 2010; Whitewood, 2014).  Courts went on to 
rely upon the reasoning in Lawrence (2003) that Bowers v. Hardwick (1986) (in which 
the Court held that there was not a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy) 
was wrongly decided because it too narrowly defined the liberty interest (Bostic, fourth 
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circuit, 2014; Hamby v. Parnell, 2014; In re Marriage Cases, 2008; Kerrigan, 2008; 
Latta, ninth circuit, 2014).  Thus, as the liberty interest in Lawrence involved a broad 
right to choose with whom to be intimate, the liberty interest described in same-sex 
marriage cases involves a broad right to choose whom to marry (Bostic, fourth circuit, 
2014; Goodridge, 2003; Hamby, 2014; In re Marriage Cases, 2008; Latta, ninth circuit, 
2014; Whitewood, 2014).  In Obergefell (2015), the Supreme Court agreed with the lower 
courts by holding that the right to marry is broad in scope.  Because same-sex marriage 
involves the fundamental right to marry, protected by the substantive aspect of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, some courts have held that states 
prohibiting access or recognition of same-sex marriage must pass strict scrutiny analysis 
by providing a compelling state interest for the law and by showing that the law is 
narrowly tailored to accomplish the compelling interest (Bostic, fourth circuit, 2014; 
Brenner, 2014; Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 1977; In re Marriage Cases, 2008; 
Perry, 2010).  Other courts have evaluated marriage bans using heightened (intermediate) 
scrutiny or rational basis scrutiny (Bourke, 2014; Griego, 2013; Hamby, 2014; Henry, 
2014).  The Supreme Court did not expressly discuss the level of scrutiny required for 
analyzing whether same-sex couples fall within the right to marry; rather, the Court stated 
that the right was fundamental and that, because same-sex couples did not differ from 
opposite-sex couples in the aspects of marriage that make the right fundamental, same-
sex couples may marry (Obergefell, 2015).  I will discuss whether these state interests are 
compelling (strict scrutiny), important (intermediate scrutiny), or rational and whether the 
laws created to accomplish these state objectives are narrowly tailored, substantively 
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related, or rationally related in the “State Interests and Levels of Scrutiny Application 
within Marriage Context” section (below). 
 Housing as a substantive right. 
 Protection from housing discrimination for sexual minorities represents an 
underdeveloped area of law, and as a result, is an area ripe for new empirical research.  
Unlike the marriage equality cases, the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause does 
not contain a substantive right to housing (Jaimes v. Toledo Metropolitan Housing 
Authority, 1985; Lindsey v. Normet, 1972).  However, sexual minorities may have a valid 
claim of housing discrimination under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) (1968) if Congress 
extended it to include sexual orientation.  The FHA makes it illegal to discriminate 
against persons based upon their color, race, sex, religion, national origin, familial status, 
or handicap in the rental or sale of a dwelling (42 U.S.C. § 3604).  In 2012, the US 
Department of Housing and Human Development (HUD) prohibited housing 
discrimination against individuals based upon sexual orientation or gender identity in 
HUD-funded or insured housing (Equal Access to Housing in HUD Programs Regardless 
of Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity, 24 C.F.R. § 5.105(a)(2)(ii)).  Although HUD 
prohibits sexual minority housing discrimination within HUD-funded and insured 
housing, this protection only covers approximately seven million households and does 
not extend to the large majority of housing options, i.e. privately owned housing 
(Armstrong, 2013; Kravis, 2012).  If Congress included sexual orientation as a protected 
class under the FHA, then there would exist a statutory right not to be discriminated 
against within both the public and private housing context for sexual minorities. 
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Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Rights for Sexual Minorities 
 Sexual minorities as a suspect or quasi-suspect class. 
 Although substantive rights provide a potential remedy for sexual minority 
discrimination, equal protection arguments afford an alternative legal avenue.  Courts, 
traditionally, apply a specific test when conducting an equal protection analysis.  Laws 
may not distinguish between similarly situated classes of individuals for the purposes of 
that law (City of Cleburne, TX v. Cleburne Living Center, 1985; Kerrigan, 2008; Plyler v. 
Doe, 1982).  In Cleburne (1985), the US Supreme Court stated that classifications based 
upon alienage, race, or national origin are suspect classes subject to strict scrutiny.  The 
Court also applies an intermediate (or, heightened) standard of review for classifications 
based upon gender/sex or illegitimacy, i.e. quasi-suspect classes, but declined to extend 
this protection to the mentally handicapped and aged (Cleburne, 1985; Massachusetts 
Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 1976).  Although the Supreme Court declined to extend 
suspect or quasi-suspect class protection to the mentally handicapped and aged, these 
groups enjoy some protection in certain situations under statutory law (e.g., the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 1990, and the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA), 1967).  Unlike these groups, sexual minorities do not have 
federal legislative protection against discrimination.   
Specifically, the US Supreme Court has not determined whether sexual 
orientation constitutes a suspect, quasi-suspect, or unprotected class for purposes of equal 
protection, though it used a form of somewhat elevated rational basis scrutiny for laws 
that are directed at sexual minorities when animus motivates the substance of those state 
actions (Romer, 1996).  When deciding whether a group constitutes a quasi-suspect or 
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suspect class, courts examine whether: “(1) the group has suffered a history of invidious 
discrimination; (2) the characteristics that distinguish the group’s members bear ‘no 
relation to [their] ability to perform or contribute to society’…[3] the characteristic that 
defines the members of the class as a discrete group is immutable or otherwise not within 
their control, [and] [4] the group is ‘a minority or politically powerless’” (Kerrigan, 
2008, citing Frontiero, 1973 (plurality opinion); Bowen v. Gilliard, 1987).  Groups that 
have these characteristics face greater discrimination from more powerful groups and are 
less able to remedy their disparate treatment through traditional democratic means, thus 
necessitating their quasi-suspect or suspect status for equal protection purposes 
(Kerrigan, 2008; Varnum, 2009; Jackson, 2012; Sevcik, 2012; Griego, 2013).  Although 
several courts found equal protection violations against sexual minorities even under the 
deferential rational basis standard of scrutiny, by holding that sexual orientation 
constitutes a suspect or quasi-suspect class, courts increase the likelihood that 
classifications based upon sexual orientation will be found to violate the equal protection 
clause through the application of heightened or strict scrutiny review (Baskin, seventh 
circuit, 2014; Kerrigan, 2008; SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories, 2014; 
Varnum, 2009).  Given the history of discrimination and bias against sexual minorities, 
determining that sexual minorities constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class provides an 
amount of protection that could counter the weight of such manifest prejudice. 
 Quasi-suspect class status represents a compromise between securing rights for 
minority groups under the equal protection clause and providing the government with the 
means to distinguish between dissimilar groups (Craig, 1976; Frontiero, 1973; 
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 1982; Reed v. Reed, 1971).  Unlike 
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legislation involving suspect classification, which requires strict scrutiny of legislation 
that makes distinctions between groups based upon race, alienage, or national origin, 
legislative classification based upon gender/sex or illegitimacy constitutes quasi-suspect 
classification (Cleburne, 1985).  Intermediate scrutiny for quasi-suspect classes provides 
less protection because it requires classifications to be “substantially related to a 
sufficiently important governmental interest”, rather than requiring that classifications be 
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest (i.e. strict scrutiny) (Cleburne, 
1985).  In Reed (1971), which involved a legislative distinction based upon gender for the 
purpose of administering a decedent’s estate, the Supreme Court established that, 
although states may distinguish between different classes of persons through legislation, 
the statutory creation of different classes must be related to the purpose of the statute (i.e. 
the classification must not be arbitrary).  In fact, the classification must be based on 
actual differences between the groups such that these differences bear a “‘fair and 
substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly 
circumstanced shall be treated alike’” (Reed, 1971, quoting Royster Guano Co. v. 
Virginia, 1920).  Although Reed applied the substantial relationship test to gender/sex-
based discrimination, the Supreme Court, in Frontiero (1973), stated that sex-based 
classifications must be subjected to strict scrutiny because they are inherently suspect.  In 
Stanton v. Stanton (1975), the Supreme Court held that the substantial relationship test 
applied in Reed should be used for sex-based classifications.  In Craig (1976), the 
Supreme Court reaffirmed both Reed and Stanton by holding that gender/sex-based 
classifications must meet the lower threshold of intermediate scrutiny by being 
substantially related to furthering an important state interest.  Then, in Hogan (1982), the 
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Supreme Court reiterated its stance that the lesser form of intermediate scrutiny applies to 
gender/sex-based classifications and, in Cleburne (1985), the Court firmly established the 
levels of scrutiny for different minority groups (e.g. race, alienage, national origin, 
gender, illegitimacy, age, and mental disability).   
 The creation of a lesser form of review through intermediate scrutiny presents an 
issue for protecting rights of minority groups.  Although both race and sex are, 
theoretically, immutable characteristics, courts distinguish between the protections 
provided to the two classes.  The Supreme Court justifies using intermediate scrutiny for 
gender/sex-based classifications through biological differences between men and women 
(Nguyen v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 2001).  For example, in Nguyen 
(2001), the Court held that, when deciding whether a child born out of wedlock may have 
US citizenship through his citizen father, Congress was free to choose different forms of 
verifying the child’s status given the important governmental interest in showing that a 
biological parent-child relationship exists.  The biological difference between men and 
women in regards to child-bearing allowed for different rules for establishing biological 
parentage as the birth mother could show her relationship through the birth itself (i.e. she 
could produce witnesses to confirm that she gave birth to the child).  Thus, the Court held 
that men and women were not similarly situated in this regard.  Relying on this biological 
difference, the Court held that Congress had the important interest of ensuring that the 
citizen parent and child, at least, had the potential or opportunity to have a meaningful 
relationship.  Again, the Court distinguished between men and women such that women 
have this opportunity because they give birth to the child and men may not know that 
they have this opportunity.  The Court found this opportunity to be an important 
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governmental interest because it establishes the real connection to the US required to 
obtain citizenship.  The Court then held that the means used by the statute, i.e. the 
additional lengths to which a citizen father must go in order to prove the citizenship of his 
offspring, is substantially related to ensuring that, at least, the opportunity for a real 
relationship exists between the father and his offspring.  The Court’s analysis shows that 
gender/sex may not require the same level of scrutiny as race because there may be 
instances when a state has an important reason for distinguishing between sexes in a way 
it would not for race, thereby making the legislation only somewhat suspect.   
 Within the context of sexual minorities, if the Supreme Court chooses to apply a 
heightened form of scrutiny, it is likely that they will apply intermediate scrutiny given 
the tendency for lower courts to apply it.  For example, both Courts of Appeals for the 
seventh and ninth circuit courts applied heightened scrutiny when examining equal 
protection violations of sexual minority rights.  In its combined opinion, the seventh 
circuit court held that sexual orientation discrimination in the marriage context 
constituted violation of the equal protection clause because the statute did not 
substantially further an important government interest (intermediate scrutiny) (Baskin v. 
Bogan and Wolf v. Walker, 2014).  Similarly, the ninth circuit court held that sexual 
orientation discrimination in the context of a Batson challenge (i.e. a challenge involving 
the striking of a potential jury member for an impermissible reason, such as belonging to 
a protected group) involved a violation of the equal protection clause (SmithKline, 2014).  
Prior to the Supreme Court’s holding in Lawrence (2003), lower courts often declared 
that sexual orientation could not be a suspect or quasi-suspect class for purposes of equal 
protection because, if states could criminalize same-sex sexual conduct (i.e. Bowers, 
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1986), then individuals who engaged in such conduct could not be considered a suspect 
or quasi-suspect class (Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 1989; Equality Foundation of Greater 
Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 1997; High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security 
Clearance Office, 1990; Woodward v. US, 1989; but see Citizens for Responsible 
Behavior v. The Superior Court of Riverside County, 1991).   
With regard to the criteria of protected class status, after the Supreme Court held 
that laws criminalizing same-sex sexual conduct violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
substantive due process right to liberty in ordering one’s private life (Lawrence), most 
courts have little difficulty finding a history of discrimination against sexual minorities 
and finding that the distinguishing characteristic of sexual orientation is irrelevant to the 
purpose of specific laws (Andersen v. King County, 2006; Baskin, seventh circuit, 2014; 
Conaway v. Deane, 2007; Golinski v. United States Office of Personnel Management, 
2012; Obergefell, 2013; SmithKline, 2014; Varnum, 2009; Whitewood, 2014).  However, 
the immutability of the distinguishing characteristic (i.e. whether sexual orientation can 
be changed) and whether the group lacks political power to change the classification are 
the factors on which most courts focus (Baskin, seventh circuit, 2014; Bassett v. Snyder, 
2013; Conaway, 2007; Golinski, 2012; Griego, 2013; In re Marriage Cases, 2008; 
Kerrigan, 2008; Obergefell, 2013; Pedersen v. Office of Personnel Management, 2012; 
Varnum, 2009; Whitewood, 2014).  Although more recently courts have found the trait of 
sexual orientation to be immutable, and, therefore, that it is a core aspect of identity 
which would make it wrong for the government to attempt to change, several courts have 
found that sexual orientation is modifiable in ways that other suspect or quasi-suspect 
class’s distinguishing traits are not (e.g. race or sex) (Conaway, 2007; Equality 
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Foundation, 1995; Woodward, 1989).  Similarly, some courts have found that sexual 
minorities have too much political power to be considered a suspect or quasi-suspect 
class (Andersen, 2006; Conaway, 2007; High Tech Gays, 1990).  Given these divergent 
holdings, and the Court’s reticence to apply strict scrutiny in cases not involving race, 
national origin, or alienage, it becomes far more likely that the Court will place sexual 
minorities within the quasi-suspect framework if they choose to apply a heightened form 
of scrutiny.  The possibility that the Court will hold that sexual minorities constitute a 
quasi-suspect class for the purposes of classification provides sexual minorities with a 
greater level of protection than rational basis review, but allows the government to 
discriminate against sexual minorities if the classification substantially relates to an 
important governmental interest.  Thus, intermediate scrutiny only provides a moderate 
level of protection. 
 Equal protection analysis of sexual minorities within marriage context. 
All of the courts that have analyzed equal protection within the same-sex marriage 
context found that a the law had made a distinction between different sets of people, 
whether based upon sex, gender, sexual orientation, or couple composition (i.e. same-sex 
v. heterosexual couples) (Baehr, 1993; Baker, 1971; Baskin, seventh circuit, 2014; 
Bishop, tenth circuit, 2014; Bostic, fourth circuit, 2014; De Leon, 2014; DeBoer, sixth 
circuit, 2014; Geiger, 2014; Goodridge, 2003; Griego, 2013; Jackson, 2012; Kerrigan, 
2008; Kitchen, district court, 2013; Latta, ninth circuit, 2014; Lewis, 2006; Perry, 2010; 
Robicheaux, 2014; Sevcik, 2012; Varnum, 2009; Whitewood, 2014; Windsor, 2013; and 
Wright, 2014).  The US District Courts for the Northern District of Oklahoma, Western 
District of Kentucky, and Oregon ruled that the relevant legislation that limited marriage 
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to heterosexual couples violated same-sex couples’ Fourteenth Amendment right to equal 
protection of the law (Bishop, district court, 2014; Love, 2014; Geiger, 2014).  In Lewis, 
Kerrigan, Varnum, Garden State Equality v. Dow (2013) and Griego, the Supreme 
Courts of New Jersey, Connecticut, Iowa, and New Mexico held statutes that limited 
marriage to heterosexual couples violated each state’s equal protection clause.  In Lewis, 
the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the state must provide the full provisions of 
marriage to same-sex couples (i.e. the substantive rights), but allowed the state legislature 
to decide whether to grant same-sex couples access through the term marriage or by 
providing a parallel institution (2006).  The New Jersey legislature created civil unions 
for same-sex couples as a parallel to marriage (Garden State, 2013).  After Windsor, the 
Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, of Mercer County held that the civil union 
statute deprived same-sex couples of federal marriage rights, thereby violating the state 
constitutional requirement of equal protection (Garden State, 2013).  Thus, the court held 
that New Jersey must grant access to the designation of marriage to same-sex couples.   
In the context of same-sex marriage, some courts consider whether a 
classification, based upon sex, sexual orientation, or couple status, is permissible for the 
purposes of the marriage statute or amendment, i.e. whether there is a reason for the 
distinction (Cleburne, 1985; Kerrigan, 2008).  For heightened or strict scrutiny, this 
reason must be sufficiently important or compelling and the means (i.e. the anti-marriage 
equality law) must be substantially or narrowly tailored to accomplish this interest 
(Cleburne, 1985).  For rational basis scrutiny, the legislation must simply be rationally 
related to the accomplishment of a legitimate state interest (Cleburne, 1985; Perry, 
2010).  The courts in Lewis, Kerrigan, Varnum, Perry, Griego, and Bishop v. Holder held 
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or found that same-sex couples are similarly situated to heterosexual couples for the 
purpose of marriage.  The district courts in Jackson, Robicheaux, and Sevcik and the 
Court of Appeals for the sixth circuit in DeBoer held that sexual orientation did not 
constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class and, under rational basis scrutiny, the states of 
Hawaii, Louisiana, Nevada, and the sixth circuit (Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky, and 
Tennessee), respectively, had legitimate interests that were rationally furthered by their 
anti-same-sex marriage legislation.  
 Lack of equal protection clause violation. 
When they decided Jackson and Sevcik, the US District courts were bound by the 
ninth circuit precedent established in High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security 
Clearance Office (1990), which held that being gay is not an immutable characteristic 
and that sexual minorities are not politically powerless (see also Woodward, 1989; 
Equality Foundation, 1995; and Conaway, 2007).  Examining the merits of the claim, the 
Jackson (2012) and Sevcik (2012) courts also held that the marriage statute (in Jackson) 
and amendment (in Sevcik) did not violate the equal protection clause by drawing a 
distinction based upon gender because men and women receive the same treatment, i.e. 
neither a man nor a woman may marry someone of the same sex.  In addition, the courts 
stated that without clear indication that either the ninth circuit court or the Supreme Court 
hold sexual orientation to be immutable, they would continue to follow the precedent set 
in High Tech Gays (1990).  However, the recent ninth circuit holding in SmithKline 
(2014) clarifies that laws that classify according to sexual orientation must overcome 
heightened scrutiny within the equal protection context.  Finally, the courts stated that 
sexual minorities are not politically powerless because they enjoy political success at the 
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local and national level.  The court in Sevcik pointed to the increase in anti-discrimination 
legislation and acceptance of sexual minorities within US society as countering the 
history of discrimination that sexual minorities have experienced, suggesting that sexual 
minorities do not need equal protection and can use the democratic process to achieve 
their ends.  According to Sevcik (2012), courts must be wary when classifying a group as 
a suspect or quasi-suspect class because this classification limits the ability of the 
legislature to pass laws regarding specific groups or in certain contexts.  Recently, the 
Court of Appeals for the ninth circuit reversed the decision of the US District Court for 
the District of Nevada (Sevcik, 2012) in its combined opinion of Latta v. Otter and Sevcik 
v. Sandoval (2014).  Applying heightened scrutiny due to sexual orientation 
discrimination, the circuit court held that Nevada’s proffered purposes for discrimination 
lacked empirical basis and the means used for accomplishing these purposes were both 
under- and over-inclusive (Sevcik, 2014).   
The court in Robicheaux (2014) found that sexual orientation did not constitute a 
suspect or quasi-suspect class because the US Supreme Court declined to apply 
heightened scrutiny in Windsor.  Rather, the “careful consideration” that the Court paid in 
Windsor resulted from Congress’ intrusion into a context that the state traditionally 
defined (i.e. marriage).  Distinguishing the current case from Windsor, the District Court 
observed that it was bound by the Supreme Court and fifth circuit jurisprudence, neither 
of which have declared sexual orientation to be a suspect class.  Similarly, the Court of 
Appeals for the sixth circuit held that they would follow Supreme Court and sixth circuit 
precedent, neither of which have treated sexual minorities as a suspect or quasi-suspect 
class (DeBoer, 2014).  Additionally, according to the sixth circuit, the recent political 
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power of sexual minorities indicate that they do not need to be treated as a suspect or 
quasi-suspect class because they have the power to achieve their ends through the 
democratic process (DeBoer, 2014).   
Equal protection clause violation. 
After Windsor was decided in 2013, many courts (in sixteen different states) held 
that the laws of their respective states (NJ, NM, UT, OK, VA, TX, MI, AR, ID, OR, PA, 
WI, IN, FL, KY, and CO) violated either the US Constitution or the relevant state 
constitution by not allowing same-sex couples to marry (Garden State, 2013; Griego, 
2013; Kitchen, district court, 2013; Bishop, district court, 2014; Bostic v. Rainey, district 
court, 2014; De Leon, 2014; DeBoer, district court, 2014; Wright, 2014; Latta, district 
court, 2014; Geiger, 2014; Whitewood, 2014; Wolf v. Walker, district court, 2014; Baskin, 
district court, 2014; Brenner, 2014; Love, 2014; Brinkman, 2014; Burns, 2014).  
Subsequently, the Courts of Appeals for the fourth, seventh, and tenth circuits upheld the 
lower courts’ decisions (Bostic, fourth circuit, 2014; combined seventh circuit opinion for 
Baskin v. Bogan, 2014, and Wolf v. Walker, 2014; and two tenth circuit opinions: Bishop 
v. Smith, 2014, and Kitchen v. Herbert, 2014).  The Court of Appeals for the seventh 
circuit, in its combined opinion for Baskin v. Bogan (IN) and Wolf v. Walker (WI), held 
that both Indiana and Wisconsin’s laws prohibiting same-sex marriage within state and 
recognition of out-of-state marriages violated the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment because sexual orientation constituted a suspect class (2014).     
Regarding whether sexual orientation constitutes a suspect or quasi-suspect class, 
the courts in Baskin (seventh circuit), De Leon, Griego, Latta (ninth circuit), Love, 
Varnum, Whitewood, and Wright stated that sexual minorities have experienced, and still 
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experience, discrimination historically and are relatively powerless in the context of 
marriage rights.  Following the reasoning in Kerrigan, the courts in Baskin (seventh 
circuit), Griego, De Leon, Love, Varnum, and Whitewood emphasized that the 
immutability question did not simply depend upon whether the characteristic is 
changeable at all, but, rather, “whether the characteristic is so integral to the individual’s 
identity that, even if he or she could change it, [it would] be inappropriate to require him 
or her to do so in order to avoid discrimination” (Griego, 2013, p. 884).  The courts in 
Bostic (fourth circuit), Brinkman, De Leon, DeBoer (district court), Geiger, Kitchen 
(tenth circuit), and Wright held that the state justifications for heterosexual-only marriage 
failed under the most deferential rational basis standard of review.  The court in Bishop 
(tenth circuit) followed the logic in Romer by holding that the marriage legislation in 
Oklahoma failed under rational basis review due to the animus of the citizens in 
amending their constitution (2014).  Finally, the courts in Baskin (seventh circuit), 
Griego, Latta (ninth circuit), Love, Varnum, and Whitewood held that a form of 
heightened scrutiny must be used to analyze the relevant legislation because it involved 
the potentially suspect or, more likely, quasi-suspect class of sexual orientation.  Each 
court then held that the relevant legislation failed under heightened scrutiny.  
The Court of Appeals for the seventh circuit court held that sexual orientation 
represents a suspect class and the Court of Appeals for the ninth circuit court held that 
classifications based upon sexual orientation require heightened scrutiny for the purposes 
of equal protection (combined opinion of the seventh circuit court for Baskin v. Bogan, 
2014 and Wolf v. Walker, 2014; Smithkline, 2014).  According to the seventh circuit 
combined opinion, sexual minorities constitute a suspect class because of the historical 
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discrimination they have faced based upon an immutable characteristic.  The state may 
only overcome this presumed violation of equal protection through a “compelling 
showing that the benefits of the discrimination to society as a whole clearly outweigh the 
harms to its victims” (Baskin, seventh circuit, 2014, p. 4).  For the ninth circuit, 
Smithkline (2014) asserted that the Supreme Court’s analysis in Windsor indicated that 
classifications based upon sexual orientation require heightened scrutiny for the purposes 
of equal protection.  The ninth circuit found that the Supreme Court did not use rational 
basis review because it did not give deference to post-hoc rationalizations, focused upon 
Congress’ actual purposes for DOMA (rather than potential hypothetical purposes), and 
required Congress to justify its dissimilar treatment of sexual minority individuals and 
couples (an analysis not normally required in rational basis review).  The Windsor 
analysis lacked a strong presumption of constitutionality of the law and deferential 
treatment of the government.  Thus, the ninth circuit held that Windsor requires 
heightened scrutiny for laws that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.  The 
holdings of these two circuit courts present the possibility of sexual orientation becoming 
a suspect or quasi-suspect class for purposes of equal protection.  In Obergefell (2015), 
the Supreme Court did not directly discuss whether sexual orientation requires 
heightened protection under the equal protection clause.  Rather, the Court cited the 
Equal Protection clause as bolstering the fundamental right of marriage in its application 
to same-sex couples.  Thus, the question of whether sexual orientation constitutes a 
suspect or quasi-suspect class remains open. 
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Equal protection analysis of sexual minorities within housing context. 
As of 2012, the US Department of Housing and Human Development (HUD) 
prohibits housing discrimination against individuals based upon sexual orientation or 
gender identity in HUD-funded housing (24 C.F.R. § 5.105(a)(2)(ii)).  Although this 
regulation does not protect sexual minorities from discrimination in non-HUD-funded 
housing, it provides a potential avenue for bringing claims of discrimination based upon 
sexual orientation discrimination under both the regulation itself and the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Plaintiffs have successfully brought claims of 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause due to racial 
discrimination within the housing context, thereby providing precedent for discrimination 
of other suspect or quasi-suspect groups (Heyward v. Public Housing Administration, 
1956, Hunter v. Erickson, 1969, and Shelley v. Kramer, 1948).  An initial issue regarding 
the equal protection clause is that it only protects citizens from state action, not private 
action (Fourteenth Amendment; Blum v. Yaretsky, 1982; Buchanan v. Warley, 1917; City 
of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Community Hope Foundation, 2003; Civil Rights Cases, 
1883; Harmon v. Tyler, 1927; Richmond v. Deans, 1930).  However, the Supreme Court 
construes state action to include any action by the legislative, executive, or judicial 
branch, which could, then, limit the actions of private individuals (Ex parte Virginia, 
1880; Shelley, 1948; Strauder v. West Virginia, 1880; Virginia v. Rives, 1880).  For 
example, in Shelley v. Kraemer (1948), the Supreme Court held that although private 
covenants between land owners that restricted property ownership or use based upon race 
did not violate the equal protection clause because they were the actions of private 
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individuals, a court’s enforcement of these covenants did constitute state action that 
violated the equal protection clause.   
Thus, even private discrimination can constitute a violation of the equal protection 
clause if it rests on the actions of state actors for its enforcement and has either an explicit 
discriminatory purpose or a discriminatory impact to such an extent that a discriminatory 
purpose must be inferred (Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing 
Development Corporation, 1977).  Regarding claims of sexual orientation discrimination 
in housing under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, sexual 
minorities have not successfully brought a case of violation of equal protection.  
However, as more courts recognize the potential for sexual minorities to represent a 
suspect or quasi-suspect class, an equal protection claim based upon sexual orientation 
discrimination becomes viable (Baskin, seventh circuit, 2014; Golinski, 2012; Smithkline, 
2014). 
Given the holdings of courts regarding sexual minority equal protection in other 
contexts, suspect and quasi-suspect class questions of immutability and political 
powerlessness would likely arise within the housing context.  As the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only applies to state action against individuals or 
classes (Blum, 1982; Buchanan, 1917; City of Cuyahoga Falls, 2003; Civil Rights Cases, 
1883; Harmon, 1927; Richmond, 1930), HUD’s 2012 decision to include sexual 
orientation within the classes of individuals who may not be discriminated against for 
HUD-assisted funding makes equal protection violation a viable claim for sexual 
minority individuals.   
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 Analysis of same-sex marriage litigation within the system justification 
framework provides a template for sexual minority housing discrimination.  Although not 
a fundamental right, housing does constitute a substantive civil right because of the Fair 
Housing Act (FHA).  If the FHA were extended to include sexual orientation, sexual 
minorities could have a civil rights claim akin to the substantive due process right to 
marriage equality.  Furthermore, this right would extend beyond state action (which is 
involved in due process protection) to private action.  As state interests for not providing 
civil rights protection are specific to context (i.e. a state action involving housing would 
involve different state interests than a state action involving employment), and sexual 
minorities have not brought an equal protection claim within the housing context, it is 
difficult to postulate the state interests that might be brought from a legal perspective.  
Therefore, the current research applied both the social science construct of sexual 
minority stigma and the political rhetoric equating sexual minority equality to “special 
rights” in the context of system justification theory to help understand the conditions 
under which lay people would support or refute an expansion of housing policy to include 
sexual minorities (See “System Justification Theory within the Sexual Minority Context” 
and “Housing equality: Application of system justifications”).   
State Interests and Levels of Scrutiny Application within Marriage Context 
The differences in the holdings between courts that upheld heterosexual-only 
marriage statutes and amendments and those that struck down these laws revolve around 
differences in the definitions of marriage, the applicability of equal protection principles, 
and the application of rationality concerning state interests.  When cases do not involve a 
fundamental right or suspect or quasi-suspect class, courts apply rational basis scrutiny to 
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the relevant law (Cleburne, 1985; Federal Communications Commission v. Beach 
Communications, Inc., 1993; Heller v. Doe, 1993; Romer, 1996).  This lower level of 
scrutiny provides a very deferential standard toward state rationales for same-sex 
marriage exclusion because a court must simply find one plausible reason for the state’s 
legislation (DeBoer, sixth circuit, 2014; Jackson, 2012; Sevcik, 2012).  In the context of 
same-sex marriage, the question is whether the marriage amendments could further a 
legitimate state interest motivated by a factor other than animus (Romer, 1996).  For 
example, the Jackson court held that encouraging heterosexual couples to marry 
constituted a legitimate state interest and that the prestige that formal marriage bestows 
upon heterosexual couples rationally furthered that interest (2012).  Courts that upheld 
anti-marriage equality laws have found that interests involving natural procreation, 
“ideal” parenting and child-rearing environments, defending “traditional” marriage, and 
being wary of social experimentation constitute legitimate state interests and plausible 
rationales, under rational basis scrutiny, that allow the state to limit marriage to 
heterosexual couples (Baker, 1971; Bruning, 2006; DeBoer,  sixth circuit, 2014; 
Hernandez, 2006; Jackson, 2012; Obergefell, 2015, opinion of Roberts, C.J., dissenting; 
Morrison, 2005; Robicheaux, 2014; Sevcik, 2012).  By narrowing the right that same-sex 
couples seek to only same-sex marriage, rather than a broad, general right to marriage, 
and rejecting sexual minorities as members of a suspect or quasi-suspect class, courts can 
hold that plaintiffs do not seek fundamental rights, that states may have legitimate state 
interests that are furthered by banning same-sex marriage, and that bans on same-sex 
marriage do not violate the US Constitution.   
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The various courts that have upheld same-sex marriage analyzed the states’ 
proffered interests and means of accomplishment using both rational and heightened 
forms of scrutiny.  Courts that struck down anti-marriage equality laws stated that any 
state interests involving procreation and “ideal” child-rearing environments are not 
rationally related to the laws against same-sex marriage, as scientific research 
demonstrates that children fare as well in same-sex households as in heterosexual-couple 
households (Biblarz & Stacey, 2010; Crowl, Ahn, & Baker, 2008; Goldberg & Smith, 
2013; Obergefell, 2015; Potter, 2012; Pratesi, 2012; Rimalower & Caty, 2009; Wainright 
& Patterson, 2006, 2008), and that defending “traditional” marriage or being wary of 
social experimentation, alone, are not legitimate state interests (Bishop, district court, 
2014; Bostic, fourth circuit 2014; Brinkman, 2014; Geiger, 2014; Goodridge, 2003; 
Kerrigan, 2008; Kitchen, tenth circuit, 2014; Latta, ninth circuit, 2014; Love, 2014; 
Perry, 2010; Varnum, 2009).  For example, the Court of Appeals for the seventh circuit 
held that some of the state interests were not important (e.g. tradition) and, for those that 
were important, the means that the states utilized were not substantially related to 
achieving those interests (Baskin, 2014; see also Bishop, tenth circuit, 2014; Bostic, 
fourth circuit, 2014; Kerrigan, 2008; Varnum, 2009).  Thus, although the welfare of 
children (i.e. providing an optimal child-rearing environment) constituted a legitimate 
state interest, the court held that prohibiting same-sex marriage actually hindered this 
interest by disallowing the children of same-sex couples the same security of having their 
parents married  as the children of heterosexual couples (see also Bostic, fourth circuit, 
2014; Geiger, 2014; In re Marriage Cases, 2008; Kitchen, tenth circuit, 2014; Latta, 
ninth circuit, 2014; Obergefell, 2015; Perry, 2010; Windsor, 2013).  These courts defined 
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the purpose of marriage laws as creating “stability and order to the legal relationships of 
committed couples by defining their rights and responsibilities as to one another, their 
property, and their children, if they choose to have children” (Griego, 2013, p. 878; 
Kerrigan, 2008; Kitchen, tenth circuit, 2014; Obergefell, 2015; Varnum, 2009; Windsor, 
2013).   
Many courts have explicitly stated that the sole purpose of the states’ marriage 
laws is not to further procreation, which is in direct contrast to the reasoning of the courts 
in Jackson and Sevcik (Bostic, fourth circuit, 2014; Geiger, 2014; Goodridge, 2003; 
Griego, 2013; In re Marriage Cases, 2008; Kitchen, tenth circuit, 2014; Obergefell, 
2015; Perry, 2010).  Going further, these courts held that other courts that found a 
legitimate state interest in promoting procreation within marriage (i.e. responsible 
procreation, rather than accidental procreation) supported anti-marriage equality bans that 
actually hindered this purpose because the children of same-sex couples do not have the 
same family stability and support as their peers who have heterosexual, married parents 
(Baskin, seventh circuit, 2014; Bostic, fourth circuit, 2014; Geiger, 2014; Goodridge, 
2003; Griego, 2013; In re Marriage Cases, 2008; Kitchen, tenth circuit, 2014; Latta, 
ninth circuit, 2014; Obergefell, 2015; Perry, 2010; Windsor, 2013).  These holdings align 
with scientific research, which finds that children, on average, fare better in stable, two-
parent households than in single-parent households (Chiu, 2007; Gibson-Davis & 
Gassman-Pines, 2010; Griffin, Botvin, Scheier, Diaz, & Miller, 2000; Harris, Greco, 
Wysocki, Elder-Danda, & White, 1999; Lonczak, Fernandez, Austin, Marlatt, & 
Donovan, 2007; Roy & Raver, 2014; Turner, Finkelhor, & Ormrod, 2007).     
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Additionally, several courts held that the classifications for marriage according to 
couple composition were both over- and under-inclusive for the purpose of procreation 
and keeping children within heterosexual-couple families (Baskin, seventh circuit, 2014; 
Bishop, tenth circuit, 2014; Bostic, fourth circuit, 2014; Griego, 2013; Kitchen, tenth 
circuit, 2014; Latta, ninth circuit, 2014; Varnum, 2009).  A statute is under-inclusive if 
the classification it makes “does not include all who are similarly situated with respect to 
the purpose of the law” (Tussman & tenBroek, 1949, p. 348).  A statute is over-inclusive 
if the distinction it makes “includes more persons than those who are similarly situated 
with respect to the purpose of the law” (Varnum, 2009, p. 900).  In Varnum (2009), the 
Iowa Supreme Court held that the state’s civil marriage statute’s classification did not 
further the state’s interest in providing children with the ideal family because it failed to 
exclude other, objectively poor parents (e.g., sexual predators, child abusers and 
neglectors).  In addition, the classification was also under-inclusive because it did not ban 
same-sex couples from adopting children.  Finally, the classification was over-inclusive 
because some same-sex couples wish to marry, but do not wish to raise children (i.e. the 
statute excludes them from marriage, but they do not want to raise children).  Thus, 
regardless of their attitudes regarding raising children, Iowa prohibited same-sex couples 
from marrying.  The Iowa Supreme Court held that the statute could not survive 
heightened scrutiny because the statute was not related to the state interest of providing 
the optimal environment for raising children.   
Similarly, other courts held that the statutes or amendments that were supposed to 
encourage the state interests in providing optimal child rearing environments or 
supporting procreation by prohibiting same-sex marriage fell short of the required fit 
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between state interest and legal classification, that is, the legislation allowed infertile 
heterosexual couples to wed, but similarly situated same-sex couples could not (Baskin, 
seventh circuit, 2014; Bishop, tenth circuit, 2014; Bostic, fourth circuit, 2014; Griego, 
2013; Kitchen, tenth circuit, 2014; Latta, ninth circuit, 2014).  Finally, many courts have 
held that states do not rationally have an interest in raising children only in heterosexual-
couple households (Baskin, seventh circuit, 2014; Bostic, fourth circuit, 2014; Geiger, 
2014; Goodridge, 2003; Griego, 2013; Kerrigan, 2008; Kitchen, tenth circuit, 2014; 
Latta, ninth circuit, 2014; Perry, 2010; Varnum, 2009).  These holdings follow scientific 
evidence that suggests that children thrive as well in same-sex-couple households as in 
heterosexual-couple households (Biblarz & Stacey, 2010; Crowl et al., 2008; Goldberg & 
Smith, 2013; Potter, 2012; Pratesi, 2012; Rimalower & Caty, 2009; Wainright & 
Patterson, 2006, 2008).  Furthermore, many courts have rejected the argument that 
allowing same-sex couples to marry will negatively affect heterosexual, married couples 
(Baskin, seventh circuit, 2014; Geiger, 2014; Kerrigan, 2008; Kitchen, tenth circuit, 
2014; Latta, ninth circuit, 2014; Obergefell, 2015; Varnum, 2009). 
As will be explained in the system justification section, the use of “traditional” 
definitions of marriage, being wary of social experimentation, concerns regarding natural 
procreation, and “ideal” parenting and child-rearing environments constitute attempts to 
maintain the status quo (Henry & Reyna, 2007).  Additionally, stating that sexual 
orientation is changeable and that sexual minorities are politically powerful may also 
represent attempts to justify the status quo (Haslam & Levy, 2006; Hegarty & Pratto, 
2004).  By applying principles of system justification theory, I will next show that 
support for these interests and rationalizations serve as a system justifying stereotype that 
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maintains the current dominant-subordinate relationship between the sexual majority and 
sexual minorities. 
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CHAPTER 2 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
System Justification Theory 
 System justification, as Jost and Banaji (1994) conceptualize the concept, 
involves legitimizing present social arrangements (see also Jost et al., 2004; Jost & Kay, 
2005).  System justification is a psychological process that operates with the primary goal 
of maintaining the status quo.  Researchers theorize that the motivation to maintain the 
status quo stems from an individual’s need to believe that they have personal control over 
their life (Kay, Gaucher, Napier, Callan, & Laurin, 2008; Kay, Whitson, Gaucher, & 
Galinsky, 2009).  For example, Kay, Gaucher, Napier, Callan and Laurin (2008) studied 
whether individuals who felt like they had less personal control over their lives would be 
more likely to believe that their government is responsible for providing for its citizens.  
Beliefs were collected through the World Values Survey via face-to-face interviews with 
93,122 participants from 67 countries.  The authors found that participants who felt that 
they lacked personal control over their lives believed that the government should be 
responsible for providing for its citizens, thereby endorsing the current governmental 
system within their country.  When individuals perceive the social world as random, they 
tend to experience high levels of anxiety and fear (Jost & Hunyady, 2005; Landau, 
Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Martens, 2006; Landau, Johns, Greenberg, 
Pyszczynski, Martens, Goldenberg, & Solomon, 2004).  In order to avoid or offset that 
anxiety, people strengthen their beliefs in their own personal control over their lives or in 
the justness of an external system, which has the capability of protecting them (Jost & 
Banaji, 1994; Jost et al., 2004; Jost, Hawkins, Nosek, Hennes, Stern, Gosling, & Graham, 
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2014; Jost & Hunyady, 2005; Kay, Czapliński, & Jost, 2009; Kay et al., 2008; Kay, 
Whitson et al., 2009; Laurin, Kay, & Moscovitch, 2008; Shepherd & Kay, 2012).   
For example, Laurin, Kay, and Moscovitch (2008) asked students to visualize an 
anxiety-provoking scenario, with half of the participants thought about a scenario in 
which they had little personal control and the other half, a scenario in which they had 
great personal control.  The authors then measured participants’ levels of anxiety through 
self-report and skin conductance levels.  Laurin and colleagues found that participants 
with greater levels of self-reported anxiety were more likely to believe in the existence of 
a controlling God.  Although both sets of participants experienced increased arousal as 
measured by skin conductance level, self-reported anxiety predicted belief in the 
existence of a controlling God only for those participants induced to feel a lack of 
personal control.  Thus, those without personal control felt the need to affirm their belief 
in a system of external control (i.e. religion).   
This central psychological mechanism, that individuals seek to reduce their 
uncertainty and fear by strengthening their beliefs in the external system, draws from 
cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) and just world theories (Lerner, 1980) (Jost, 
Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway, 2003).  According to just world theory, individuals 
who have a strong need to believe that the world is fair, i.e. that people are punished or 
rewarded according to what they deserve (Hafer, 2000) respond with high levels of 
anxiety to threats to this belief (e.g., innocent victims or evidence that the world is not 
just).  In order to reduce this anxiety, people try to restore justice, which may take both 
positive (i.e. victim helping) or negative forms (i.e. rationalization, derogation, and 
blame) (Hafer, 2000).   
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Cognitive dissonance, within the context of system justification, involves an 
ideological dissonance that results from the contradictory thoughts that disadvantaged 
groups hold that place individuals in those groups in a subordinate position.  
Furthermore, by allowing themselves to be disadvantaged through acquiescence, their 
group supports that system (Jost, Pelham, Sheldon, & Sullivan, 2003).  To reduce the 
anxiety caused by this dissonance, members of disadvantaged groups may engage in 
enhanced system justification.  Applying these concepts (i.e. just world and cognitive 
dissonance) in the context of system justification theory, individuals may defend an 
external system even when that defense results in their own, personal disadvantage (i.e. 
members of minority groups may defend the status quo, even though it results in them 
having less power) (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost & Hunyady, 2005).  Rather than 
questioning the existing social arrangement, most people will accept the arrangement as 
normal and will create or accept explanations (i.e. rationalizations) that maintain the 
system (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost & Kay, 2005; Kay, Czapliński, & Jost, 2009; Kay, 
Gaucher, Peach, Laurin, Friesen, Zanna, & Spencer, 2009).  Similarly, most people will 
create rationalizations for specific outcomes that further the status quo.  Whether these 
explanations are objectively true or false is irrelevant because people accept them and use 
them to justify the current status quo.   
Explanations for the current social system often take the form of stereotypes, i.e. 
shared conceptions regarding a group of people (Jost & Banaji, 1994).  People infer these 
stereotypes “directly from information about status or position, mainly in order to justify 
differences in status or position” (Jost & Banaji, 1994, p. 12) and as a result often attach 
associations of stigma to the stereotypes (Herek, 2000).  Interestingly, the valence of the 
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stereotypes matters little as long as they enhance the maintenance of the status quo (Glick 
& Fiske, 2001a; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost et al., 2004; Kay, Gaucher et al., 2009; Kay 
and Jost, 2003; Kay, Jost, & Young, 2005).  For example, within the context of 
ambivalent sexism, endorsement of benevolent, seemingly positive, stereotypes of 
women (i.e. that women are “pure creatures” who need to be protected, loved, and adored 
by men) helps produce a greater inequality between men and women (Glick & Fiske, 
2001a).  Furthermore, so-called benevolent, sexist stereotypes maintain the current 
system of inequality by making men defensive towards women who resist their 
subordinate status and by making women, in general, more accepting of their subordinate 
position as it appears to be subjectively positive.   
Kay and Jost (2003) found similar results when they exposed participants to 
complementary stereotypes (e.g., “poor but happy” and “rich but miserable”) which led 
to greater system justification within an economic context.  Forty-seven undergraduate 
students read about an individual who varied in terms of wealth (wealthy v. poor) and 
happiness (happy v. unhappy), and then completed a series of items measuring their 
beliefs in system justification.  As hypothesized, participants were more likely to support 
the current system when exposed to complementary pairings (i.e. “poor but happy” and 
“rich but unhappy” over “poor but unhappy” and “rich but happy”).  The positive 
component of these stereotypes allowed marginalized groups to support the current 
system by compensating their lower status with a positive trait.  By accepting and 
defending the status quo, individuals from marginalized groups increase positive 
emotions and satisfaction with their current situation and decrease distress regarding their 
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lower status (Jost & Hunyady, 2005; Jost, Pelham et al. 2003; Wakslak, Jost, Tyler, & 
Chen, 2007). 
Increasing system justification: Dependency, inescapability, and threat. 
 Research has found a number of factors that can increase the likelihood that 
individuals will justify systems that support subordinate groups.  The more that 
individuals feel they are dependent upon a system, that it is inescapable, or that the 
system is threatened, the more they will engage in system justification (Jost, Kivetz, 
Rubini, Guermandi, & Mosso, 2005; Kay, Gaucher et al., 2009; Kay & Zanna, 2009; 
Laurin, Shepherd, & Kay, 2010).  Regarding system dependence, Kay, Gaucher, and 
colleagues (2009) manipulated whether undergraduate participants believed that their 
university or their country controlled aspects of their lives (i.e. participants were either 
dependent upon their university or their country).  Then, participants read that funds were 
unequally distributed either throughout their university or throughout their country and 
answered a series of questions that measured the degree that they supported the current 
funding system.  Participants who read that they were dependent upon their country 
(university) agreed with their government’s (university’s) funding system but not their 
university’s (government’s) funding system, demonstrating that reminding individuals of 
their dependency upon a system increases their support for that system.   
In an example of system inescapability, Laurin, Shepherd, and Kay (2010) 
manipulated the ease with which Canadian participants believed one could emigrate from 
Canada.  Next, participants read that men were more likely to be financially successful 
than women in Canada and were asked whether this difference was due to systemic 
inequality or actual differences between men and women.  The authors found that 
57 
 
participants in the difficult-to-emigrate condition were more likely to believe that actual 
gender differences caused financial inequality between men and women, whereas 
participants in the easy-to-emigrate condition were more likely to question the legitimacy 
of the current system.  Apparently, when people feel they are dependent upon a system 
and that they cannot escape that system, they must defend it as legitimate and just in 
order to reduce the anxiety caused by their dependency (Jost, Pelham et al., 2003).   
Other researchers have shown that threats to a system motivates people to defend 
it (Brescoll, Uhlmann, & Newman, 2013; Kay et al., 2005).  Participants from an online 
database read that people in the US (their country) either believed that the country was at 
a low point (system threat) or was at a high point (system affirmation) (Brescoll et al., 
2013).  In addition, the authors created an existentialist threat condition unrelated to their 
country in which participants wrote about a vivid and important scene from their 
childhood or youth and how it would change in the future, thereby creating a sense of 
insecurity.  Others in the control condition simply completed the dependent measures, 
items measuring beliefs about biological essentialism and immutability as explanations of 
gender differences, as well as basic gender differences beliefs.  While basic beliefs about 
gender differences did not differ by condition, participants in the system-threat condition 
were more likely than participants in the other three conditions to believe in biological 
essentialism and immutability, with immutability acting as a mediator between system 
threat and biological essentialism.  These results indicate that threatening the status quo 
elicits the need to defend the hierarchical system as the immutable natural condition. 
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Widespread stereotype knowledge. 
Other justification theories (i.e. ego-justification and group-justification) are 
limited in scope as compared to system justification (Jost & Banaji, 1994).  For example, 
ego-justifications suggest that stereotypes of groups should be specific to the needs of 
individuals justifying their higher status in society.  For example, because white people 
have higher status within American society, only whites should hold the stereotype that 
other, more disadvantaged groups are in some way inferior because only whites have a 
need for justification.  In the same way, group-justification predicts that the stereotype of 
an outgroup should depend upon the specific relation between that outgroup and the in-
group (i.e. stereotypes of groups should not be consistent across groups) (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1986).  For example, though African Americans may have stereotypes about 
Latinos and Latinos about African Americans, those stereotypes should be unique to each 
in-group because they were developed by in-group solidarity (i.e. differentiation) and 
outgroup derogation (Tajfel & Turner, 1986).  How, then, to explain why some members 
of the in-groups also self-stereotype in the same way that the out-group would stereotype 
those individuals?  In addition, how could one explain the notion that stereotypes are 
well-known across groups?  System-justification, by focusing on the ideological need to 
defend the current status quo at the societal level and not in-groups, accounts for why 
different groups can hold the same stereotypes about other groups and why group 
members may negatively self-stereotype (Jost & Banaji, 1994).   
In order for the status quo to be maintained, individuals throughout the social 
hierarchy must accept the same rationalizations regarding the system.  Thus, an 
individual’s need for a stable, rational system, trumps their needs for personal or group 
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self-esteem (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost & Burgess, 2000; Jost & Hunyady, 2005).  Jost 
and Burgess’s (2000) study had undergraduates read a vignette about a female student 
who was suing her university for gender discrimination after she was not admitted into 
the university’s honors program.  Jost and Burgess had participants complete measures of 
their attitudes about the female student and the university, their level of social dominance 
orientation, and their belief in a just world and found that women who were high in belief 
in a just world were more likely to have ambiguous (i.e. both positive and negative) 
attitudes towards the plaintiff than women who were low in just world belief.  Thus, 
women who have a strong need to believe in a just world tend to hold ambiguous 
attitudes towards members of their in-group (women) when one of those individuals 
threatens the fairness of the social system.  Thus, in this situation, the need for a stable, 
rational system trumped these women’s needs for group based self-esteem.  
Using an experimental paradigm, Haines and Jost (2000) manipulated the extent 
to which a group of students possessed power and legitimacy to judge another group of 
students and found that less powerful groups had stronger acceptance and more positive 
stereotypes about the judges when the judges were powerful and legitimate.  Specifically, 
researchers informed college students from Hunter College that students from Brooklyn 
College would either complete the same task as the Hunter College group or would judge 
how successful the Hunter College students were at their task to determine whether the 
Hunter College students would continue in the study.  Here, the Brooklyn students either 
possessed or did not possess power over the Hunter students.  The experimenters either 
gave the Hunter College students a legitimate explanation, that the Brooklyn College 
students had experience within the specific task, or an illegitimate reason, that the lead 
60 
 
investigator had received his degree from Brooklyn College and had picked the Brooklyn 
students because he knew them, or no reason at all.  Regardless of whether the reasons 
were legitimate or not, participants had greater positive affect when given any reason for 
why Brooklyn students would judge them and they rated the Brooklyn students as more 
responsible and intelligent (i.e. positive stereotypes) when they had power over the 
Hunter participants (Haines & Jost, 2000).  Furthermore, in comparison to those with no 
explanation, participants with an explanation believed that the Brooklyn students had a 
right to judge them on their task (again, regardless of legitimacy).  Finally, within the 
powerful condition, participants (regardless of the reason condition) were more likely to 
remember that they had received legitimate reasons for why the Brooklyn students would 
be judging their completed task.  Thus, when group dominance is manipulated, 
individuals are likely to not only engage in stereotyping to justify the power differential, 
but also misremember the reasons for the power differential as being more legitimate 
than they actually are.  Jost and Burgess found similar results when they manipulated the 
status of different groups of university alumni (2000).  Thus, it appears that simply being 
in a more powerful position within the system can give the high status group greater 
legitimacy and maintain the system itself.   
Alternative Theories 
 Alternative theories, such as dehumanization theory, social dominance theory, and 
stereotype content model, explain aspects of sexual minority stigmatization, but do not 
account for the marriage and housing discrimination towards LGBT populations.  Sexual 
minority stigmatization involves the belief that sexual minorities are morally wrong, 
immature, criminal, sick, and less worthy than heterosexuality or at least, less than 
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optimal (Geiger, 2014; Herek, 2004, 2007; Herek et al., 2009).  Dehumanization involves 
denying to another human being aspects of humanness (Bastian, Denson, & Haslam, 
2013; Haslam, 2006).  Although there are two forms of dehumanization (animalistic and 
mechanistic), based upon sexual minority stigma, the animalistic form of dehumanization 
appears to apply to sexual minority stigmatization (Haslam, 2006; MacInnis & Hodson, 
2012).  Animalistic dehumanization involves denying to others uniquely human (UH) 
traits, such as “cognitive sophistication, culture, refinement, socialization, and 
internalized moral sensibility” (Haslam, 2006, p. 256; Haslam & Loughnan, 2014; 
Leyens, 2009).  Mechanistic dehumanization involves denying traits involving human 
nature (HN), such as emotional responsiveness, interpersonal warmth, cognitive 
openness, agency, individuality, and depth (Haslam, 2006; Haslam & Loughnan, 2014).  
Others see animalistically dehumanized individuals as immature, driven by their desires, 
and immoral or amoral, whereas others see mechanistically dehumanized individuals as 
inert, cold, rigid, passive, and superficial (Haslam, 2006).  Animalistic dehumanization 
explains the hierarchical categorization that differentiates heterosexual and sexual 
minority groups (as sexual minority individuals are seen as less than heterosexuals) as 
well as the disgust felt by some heterosexuals towards sexual minorities because denial to 
the outgroup uniquely human features, such as sophistication, maturity, and morality, 
allows in-group members to distance themselves from their own animalist nature by 
casting it onto the outgroup (Balzer & Jacobs, 2011; Cunningham, Forestell, & Dickter, 
2013; Embrick, Walther, & Wickens, 2007; Haslam, 2006; Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe, & 
Bloom, 2009; Lyons, 2006; MacInnis & Hodson, 2012; Zeichner & Reidy, 2009).   
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However, only one study of dehumanization investigated whether individuals ascribe 
different levels of uniquely human and human nature traits to others based upon sexual 
orientation (MacInnis & Hodson, 2012) and found that, although undergraduate students 
were more likely to ascribe uniquely human traits to heterosexuals than homosexuals 
(indicating animalistic dehumanization), undergraduates were more likely to ascribe 
uniquely human emotions to homosexuals than heterosexuals (indicating a lack of 
animalistic dehumanization).  Thus, the current understanding of dehumanization may 
not fully accommodate different aspects of sexual minority stigma.   
Other obstacles exist in applying dehumanization to sexual minority stigma.  As 
Haslam (2006; Leyens, 2009) states, animalistic dehumanization requires the dominant 
group to view the minority group in essentialist terms, i.e. it is categorically different 
from the majority.  Therefore, the trait that distinguishes the two groups must stable.  
From an equal protection perspective, then, animalistic dehumanization cannot fully 
explain disparate treatment of sexual minority members because lack of immutability (i.e. 
the theory that sexual minorities can choose to be heterosexual through behavioral 
modification) remains a cornerstone for denying suspect and quasi-suspect class status 
based upon sexual orientation (Conaway, 2007; Equality Foundation, 1995; High Tech 
Gays, 1990; Jackson, 2012; Woodward, 1989).  Another problematic aspect of using 
animalistic dehumanization to explain sexual minority treatment is that it does not readily 
provide predictions for what happens when dehumanized individuals assert their 
humanity.  From a dehumanization perspective, when sexual minorities fight for marriage 
and housing rights they claim ownership of uniquely human traits by seeking access to 
institutions that, in society, signal maturity (i.e. the responsibility of becoming a part of a 
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family and home ownership or rental) (Haslam, 2006).  Although animalistic 
dehumanization helps to explain the content of sexual stigma and the reactions of some 
heterosexual individuals toward sexual minorities, it does not provide guidance for how 
the majority group will react when the minority group claims ownership of uniquely 
human traits and attempts to shake off their dehumanized treatment.   
Similar to system justification, social dominance theory concerns the maintenance 
of hierarchical systems by individuals in dominant and subordinate groups (Bahns & 
Crandall, 2013; Lee, Pratto, & Johnson, 2011; Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius, Devereux, & 
Pratto, 1992; Sidanius & Pratto, 1993; Sidanius, Pratto, Martin, & Stallworth, 1991).  
Both at the institutional and individual level, discrimination against the subordinate group 
and its members creates a stable social system with the dominant group at the top of the 
hierarchy.  To maintain the hierarchical status quo and reduce inter-group conflict, 
societies create legitimizing myths, which can be any set of beliefs, values, attitudes, or 
opinions that provide legitimacy for the superior position of a dominant group within 
society, thereby resulting in differential distribution of power and resources (Pratto et al., 
1994; Sidanius et al., 1992; Sidanius & Pratto, 1993; Sidanius et al., 1991).  In terms of 
theory, then, social dominance theory resembles system justification theory in that both 
theories focus on how hierarchical systems are maintained through ideologies (whether 
called legitimizing myths or system justifications).   
One interesting difference between the theories involves the focus of social 
dominance theorists on an individual difference variable, i.e. social dominance 
orientation (SDO) (Bahns & Crandall, 2013; Lee et al., 2011; Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius 
& Pratto, 1993).  SDO involves the extent that an individual desires their in-group to hold 
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power over other groups within a hierarchical social system (Pratto et al., 1994).  
Although research suggests that dominant group individuals display greater levels of 
SDO, there should be variation in SDO within the dominant group (Lee et al., 2011).  
How, then, does one account for the large percentages by which anti-marriage equality 
legislation passed in states that held referendums and ballot initiatives?  For example, 
59% of Michigan voters (DeBoer, sixth circuit, 2014), 74% of Kentucky voters (DeBeor), 
62% of Ohio voters (DeBoer), 80% of Tennessee voters (DeBoer), 69% of Hawaii voters 
(Jackson, 2012) all voted to ban same-sex marriage.  Does a high level of SDO account 
for the decisions of the majority of the voting populaces within these states?  It is 
unlikely, that the all those who voted against same-sex marriage are at the highest levels 
of SDO.  Although social dominance theory may provide theoretical guidance in 
understanding sexual minority discriminatory treatment, SDO, a trait-like concept, cannot 
account for the majority of individuals who voted for marriage bans.  By ignoring the 
importance of situational variables, such as the anxiety created by the threat of allowing 
same-sex couples to marry, social dominance theory provides only a limited 
understanding of sexual minority stigma. 
Another possible theoretical explanation for sexual minority stigma, stereotype 
content model involves the use of two dimensions (warmth and competence) to explain 
the stereotypes held about different groups within society (Brambilla, Carnaghi, & 
Ravenna, 2011; Clausell & Fiske, 2005; Fiske, 2012; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002).  
Individuals experience feelings of warmth based upon the intentions of others (i.e. do 
they intend to harm or help?) and make appraisals of competence based upon the status of 
others (i.e. does their status indicate that they have the ability to carry out their 
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intentions?) (Brambilla et al., 2011; Fiske, 2012).  Individuals ascribe differing levels of 
warmth and competence to groups, thereby resulting in specific stereotypes for those 
groups in a 2 (Warmth: high vs. low) by 2 (Competence: high vs. low) matrix.  People 
feel specific emotions according to the ascribed dimensions (i.e. high warmth/ high 
competence invokes admiration, high warmth/ low competence invokes pity, low 
warmth/ high competence invokes envy, and low warmth/ low competence invokes 
contempt) (Fiske, 2012; Fiske et al., 2002).   
One problem involving the stereotype content model is that, in initial tests of the 
concept, gay men were viewed as neutral (i.e. participants did not view gay men as 
cold/warm or competent/incompetent) (Fiske et al., 2002).  Given the well-documented 
stigma held towards gay men and other members of sexual minorities, this finding is 
extremely suspect (Brown & Henriquez, 2008; Eagly, Diekman, Johannesen-Schmidt, & 
Koenig, 2004; Herek, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2007; Herek & Gonzalez-Rivera, 2006).  
Clausell and Fiske (2005) attempted to remedy this problem by focusing on potential 
subgroups within the gay, male population.  The researchers had undergraduate 
participants create gay, male subgroups according to how “most Americans” view gay 
men.  Forty undergraduate students then rated the ten gay, male subgroups along the 
competence and warmth dimensions.  The researchers found that the ten subgroups 
divided into three clusters representing high warmth/ low competence (HW/LC, i.e. 
flamboyant and feminine subgroups), low warmth/ high competence (LW/HC, i.e. 
artistic, body-conscious, in the closet, straight-acting, activists, and hyper-masculine 
subgroups), and low warmth/ low competence (LW/LC, i.e. cross-dressed and 
leather/biker subgroups).  As hypothesized, the stereotypes assigned to the HW/LC and 
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the LW/HC groups tended to match gender stereotypes of femininity and masculinity, 
respectively.  Similarly, studies on perceptions of lesbians indicate the likely presence of 
subgroups that account for different stereotypes (Brambilla et al., 2011; Geiger, 
Harwood, & Hummert, 2006).   
According to stereotype content model, a group’s status should predict 
competency beliefs regarding that group and a group’s intention to compete or cooperate 
should predict subjective warmth, e.g., those who have a high status appear as competent 
and those who intend to compete could take valuable resources, thereby leading to 
feelings of envy (Fiske et al., 2002).  These social structural variables are the reasons that 
individuals stereotype members of outgroups (Clausell & Fiske, 2005).  Although 
Clausell and Fiske (2005) studied beliefs about gay men and found that competence and 
status were related, they also found that cooperation was not related to warmth, indicating 
that the status of gay men but not their warmth level determined the cultural stereotype.  
Brambilla and colleagues (2011) found that status related to competence and cooperation 
related to warmth for the lesbian subgroups that participants rated high in these 
dimensions (i.e. feminine, outed, and butch lesbians for competence and feminine and 
outed lesbians for warmth), but competition did not relate to warmth.  This finding 
indicates that perceived group competition, a key social structural variable within the 
stereotype content model, does not affect stereotypes held towards lesbians.   
These findings call into question whether the stereotype content model accounts 
for all of the aspects of sexual minority stigma.  As Herek (2004, 2007) noted, sexual 
majorities stigmatize sexual minorities as immoral, immature, criminal, and sick, and the 
concept of sexual minority itself is less than heterosexual, less than optimal and negative 
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in valence (see also Herek et al., 2009).  Immaturity, sickness, and being less than others 
could, potentially, be aspects of status such that the majority culture sees some subgroups 
of sexual minorities as being incapable of achieving their goals.  Thus, unable to achieve 
their goals, sexual minorities could be incompetent.  Immorality, criminality, and 
negative valence could be aspects of a lack of cooperation (though, not necessarily 
competition), thereby resulting in neutral or cool feelings.  How then to account for the 
finding that only two subsets of gay men (cross-dressed and leather/biker) inhabited the 
low-neutral warmth/ low competence quadrant within the stereotype content model 
(Clausell & Fiske, 2005)?  Furthermore, participants attributed to two subgroups of gay 
men (i.e., the flamboyant and feminine) great warmth (though, low-neutral competence) 
and to six subgroups (artistic, in the closet, activist, straight-acting, body-conscious, and 
hyper-masculine) great competence (with lower warmth than the flamboyant and 
feminine groups).  According to stereotype content model, heterosexual individuals 
should envy those within the six subgroups who are competent and pity those within the 
two subgroups towards whom they feel warmth.  In addition, Brambilla and colleagues 
(2011) found that heterosexual participants viewed feminine and outed lesbians with high 
warmth/ high competence (which should arouse admiration), butch lesbians with low 
warmth/ high competence (which should arouse envy), and closeted lesbians with low 
warmth/ low competence (which should arouse contempt).  Although anger, fear, and 
disgust have been linked to perceptions of sexual minorities, little empirical research 
shows that heterosexual individuals express envy, pity, contempt, or admiration towards 
sexual minorities (Balzer & Jacobs, 2011; Cunningham et al., 2013; Embrick et al., 2007; 
Inbar et al., 2009; Lyons, 2006; Zeichner & Reidy, 2009).  In short, applying stereotype 
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content model to the stereotypes that people hold about lesbians and gay men falls short 
of explaining the sexual stigma that appears to motivate the opponents to same-sex 
marriage or fair housing for LGB individuals.  Thus, although stereotype content model, 
like dehumanization and social dominance theory, may contribute to the understanding of 
sexual minority stigma, the theory does not account for other aspects of sexual minority 
stigma within the context of marriage and housing equality. 
Threatening the Status Quo and System Justification Theory 
 On the other hand, viewing efforts of the sexual majority (and perhaps the sexual 
minorities themselves) to defend the status quo against threat through system justification 
theory offers a promising approach to explain discrimination against sexual minorities.  
Threatening the status quo creates a motivation to defend the current system (Brescoll et 
al., 2013; Hafer, 2000; Jost, Blount, Pfeffer, & Hunyady, 2003; Jost & Hunyady, 2005; 
Jost et al., 2005; Kay, Gaucher et al., 2009; Kay et al., 2005; Lau, Kay, & Spencer, 2008).  
Defense of the current system involves endorsing rationalizations (i.e. stereotypes) that 
justify the need for the system.  For example, Brescoll, Uhlmann, and Newman (2013) 
had Americans read a news story that stated that their fellow citizens either believed the 
US was at a new low point (system threat condition) or was stable (system affirmation 
condition)  according to political, social, and economic indicators.  Participants then rated 
the extent to which they agreed with gender-related items, some of which were system-
justifying (e.g., biological essentialism) and some of which were not system-justifying 
(e.g., average physical differences between men and women).  Biological essentialism 
explains the current gender dominance (i.e. of men holding a higher status than women) 
by insisting that there are differences between the genders (men and women) that emerge 
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from innate and immutable biological causes.  Biological essentialism maintains the 
current status quo of gender dominance by providing a rationale for women occupying 
lower social and economic positions because men and women are better suited to the 
dominant or submissive role, respectively.  Thus, men succeed more within business not 
because of social systems that maintain their dominance, but because men are naturally 
better at the tasks involved within the business world.   
Within the context of system justification theory, biological essentialist beliefs 
represent stereotypes that rationalize the current power structure.  Beliefs in biological 
essentialism and immutability (i.e. that gender differences will not change) were greater 
in the system threat condition compared to the other groups (Brescoll et al., 2013).  
Importantly, there were no differences between conditions in beliefs in basic, non-
system-justifying gender attributes.  Further, inducements of uncertainty (in general) did 
not lead to greater endorsement of system-justifying stereotypes.  These results indicate 
that system threat activates only those beliefs that maintain the status quo and that they 
are activated within the specific domain of system justification to which the threat 
pertains (i.e. uncertainty, in general, is not enough to activate these beliefs).  
Furthermore, giving individuals an explicit opportunity to express their disagreement 
with the author who threatened the system decreased participants’ need to justify the 
status quo, leading to biological essentialist beliefs that were the same as in the system 
affirmation condition.   
In a second study, Brescoll and colleagues (2013) used the same system threat 
manipulation (i.e. the authors threatened the current system by having participants read a 
news story discussing how their country was currently in a low state in terms of social, 
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political, and economic factors) as in their previous study, but gave participants the 
opportunity to disagree with the author by rating the extent that they believed the author 
was ignorant, biased, unfair, and inaccurate.  The authors hypothesized that giving 
participants ways to defend the system would lessen their need to endorse biological 
essentialist beliefs for gender differences.  As expected, participants in the system threat 
condition were more likely to endorse a biological essentialist justification for gender 
differences than participants in either the system affirmation or explicit disagreement 
condition, who did not differ in their endorsement of essentialist beliefs.  Thus, it appears 
that discrediting the threat to the system reduced the motivation to justify the current 
system.   
Brescoll and colleagues’ research matches Henry and Reyna’s (2007) earlier 
work, which found that only those individuals who believed that gay people violate 
traditionalism (as opposed to individualism) were significantly less likely to support gay 
marriage.  Henry and Reyna asked undergraduate, psychology students and community 
members the extent to which they would vote for legalizing same-sex marriage to give 
same-sex couples the same benefits as heterosexual couples and the extent to which they 
would vote for California (their state) to recognize same-sex marriages from other states 
and countries.  Participants also completed abstract measures of the importance of 
individualism and traditionalism, as well as specific, judgmental expressions of 
individualism and traditionalism within the context of gay people.  The items that tapped 
into gay individualism measured the extent to which participants believed that gay people 
support putting forth effort to get ahead, being self-reliant, and the importance of working 
hard in life.  On the other hand, the items representing gay traditionalism measured the 
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extent to which participants believed that gay people support the importance of family, 
the value of raising children appropriately, and maintaining “traditional” relationships.  
First, participants saw gay people as violating traditionalism more than individualism.  
Moreover, while beliefs that gay people violate traditionalism did predict gay marriage 
opposition, beliefs in traditionalism (in general) did not significantly predict opposition to 
gay marriage.  Both the Henry and Reyna (2007) study and the Brescoll and colleagues 
(2013) study suggest that threats toward the status quo motivate individuals to attempt to 
maintain specific, relevant systems.  This tendency will be explored in the current study 
by asking participants whether they support a ballot initiative in the specific contexts of 
housing and marriage equality.  For marriage equality, the current study presents a unique 
opportunity to observe the effect of threat when the status quo becomes uncertain. 
The system justification response to system threat leads to complementary 
stereotyping of high and low status groups and to both victim derogation and 
enhancement (Jost, Kivetz, Rubini, Guermandi, and Mosso, 2005; Kay, Gaucher et al., 
2009; Kay et al., 2005; Lau et al., 2008).  Jost et al., (2005) investigated whether issuing a 
system threat to Israeli citizens would trigger complementary stereotypes regarding the 
high-status Ashkenazim and low-status Sephardim for traits of agency and communality.  
This hypothesis draws from previous research that demonstrates a tendency to endow 
high-status groups with agency, achievement-motivation, competence, and self-
profitability dimensions and low-status groups with communality, socioemotional-
motivation, warmth, likeability, morality, and other-profitability dimensions (Conway, 
Pizzamiglio, & Mount, 1996; Eagley & Steffen, 1984; Glick & Fiske, 2001b; Hoffman & 
Hurst, 1990; Jost, Burgess, & Mosso, 2001; Jost & Kay, 2005; Locke, 2003; Peeters & 
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Czapinski, 1990; Poppe & Linssen, 1999; Ridgeway, 2001; Rosenberg & Sedlak, 1972).  
In addition, system justification theory suggests that threat should result in endowing 
high-status groups with characteristics allowing them to achieve power while at the same 
time endowing low-status groups with characteristics unrelated to achieving power, yet 
still positive in valence.  This process serves to maintain the status quo of high-status 
group dominance.  When the system is threatened, if people endowed low-status groups 
with agency, those groups would be more likely to question the current status quo 
(because it places their group in a state of disadvantage) and, potentially, topple the 
current regime.  Therefore, the stereotypes of low-status groups compensate their 
members by endowing them with positive characteristics that are unrelated to power.  To 
the extent that threatening the status quo creates anxiety within the individual, they 
should be more likely to endorse these complementary beliefs.   
Consistent with system justification theory, Jost and colleagues (2005) found that 
both the Ashkenazim and the Sephardim were more likely to believe that Ashkenazi Jews 
have greater achievement-related traits and agency and that Sephardic Jews have greater 
socioemotional traits and communality when they read about a threat to the system in 
Israel. An important aspect of this study is that the low-status group was endowed with 
positive traits in a domain that was irrelevant to the system that was threatened (i.e. when 
Israel was thought to be struggling politically and economically, the Sephardim were 
rated as communal in nature).  According to Kay, Jost, and Young (2005), when the 
system is under threat, individuals enhance high-status groups in ways that are related to 
the system, but derogate them on unrelated traits (e.g., the rich are competent, but cold) 
and derogate low-status groups in ways that are related to the system, but enhance them 
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on unrelated traits (e.g., the poor are incompetent, but warm) (2005; see also Jost & 
Burgess, 2000).  Thus, Kay et al. (2005) found that, in conditions of high system threat, 
powerful people were thought to be independent and intelligent (but not happy) and 
overweight people were thought to be lazy (but more sociable).  In the current study, 
participants who experience system threat may endorse “positive” sexual minority 
stereotypes in ways unrelated to system threat, at the same time, maintaining the current 
system of hierarchical status by voting against marriage and housing equality measures. 
Because the stereotypes endorsed by individuals during times of system threat 
tend to increase support for those in high-status positions, system threat leads to greater 
maintenance of the current system (e.g., the powerful are intelligent and independent; 
therefore, they should be trusted to lead).  This trusting in the status quo extends beyond 
what is (i.e. the current status quo) to what should be (i.e. the future status quo) 
(Eidelman, Crandall, & Pattershall, 2009; Kay, Gaucher et al., 2009).  Kay, Gaucher, and 
colleagues (2009) have termed this belief injunctification (i.e. that which is, constitutes 
what should be because it is the best version of the world.  Kay, Gaucher, and colleagues 
utilized a 2 (condition: threat vs. no threat) by 2 (status quo: high inequality vs. low 
inequality) between-subjects design to investigate whether women would injunctify the 
current status quo.  Half of the participants read that Canada (their country) was 
experiencing an economic and social downturn, whereas the other half did not.  For the 
status quo manipulation, one of two data sets were given to that described the gender 
composition of CEOs in Canada’s top Fortune 500 companies.  Although men were 
shown as more common in both conditions, the relative gender disparity varied (i.e. there 
was either high or low inequality between the genders).  The authors then asked 
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participants whether the number of men and women in upper management positions 
should be equal or unequal.  The researchers found that participants in the high threat 
condition were more likely to say that there should or should not be more women in 
business according to what the status quo was for their condition (i.e. women who were 
told there were not many female CEOs in business were less likely to believe that there 
should be more women in business than women who were told that there were many 
female CEOs in business) (Kay, Gaucher et al., 2009).  In contrast, when no threat was 
present, the women in the two status conditions were not significantly different in their 
belief of whether women should be in business.  Extrapolating to the context of same-sex 
marriage, injunctification may explain part of the “traditional” and definitional 
rationalizations for heterosexual-only marriage in that this form of marriage may be seen 
as what should be because it encompasses the current status quo under conditions of 
threat. 
Likelihood of Becoming the Status Quo: The Tipping Point 
 Maintaining the status quo takes on a dynamic aspect in that, when change to the 
status quo seems likely, thereby establishing a new status quo, individuals are likely to 
desire the new status quo (Eidelman et al., 2009; Kay, Jimenez, & Jost, 2002).  Once 
individuals have accepted that a new state of affairs will be the status quo, they will 
engage in rationalizations that defend it.  The shift in rationalization occurs when 
individuals are motivationally involved in the outcome, i.e. the outcome is important to 
them.  Kay, Jimenez, and Jost (2002) found that undergraduate students would rationalize 
only those outcomes that were highly important to them (2002).  However, likelihood of 
the outcome occurring moderated this effect such that the less likely a positive event (i.e. 
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a tuition decrease) was to occur, the less participants desired the event, and the more 
likely a negative event (i.e. a tuition increase) was to occur, the more participants desired 
it.   
Kay and colleagues also found this “sour grapes” and “sweet lemons” aspect of 
likelihood in motivated contexts in the days prior to the Bush-Gore 2000 presidential 
election (2002).  As the polls predicted the vote totals for the candidates to be very close, 
the election provided an ideal setting to test the effect of likelihood on rationalization of 
the status quo.  The authors manipulated the likelihood that each candidate would win 
(using the conclusions of “experts”), then asked each community participant how 
desirable it would be for each candidate to win and their own political affiliation.  For 
both Republicans and Democrats, as the probability of their preferred candidate winning 
became less likely, participants found that candidate to be less desirable (i.e. “sour 
grapes” rationalization).  Similarly, for both Republicans and Democrats, as the 
probability of their non-preferred candidate winning became more likely, participants 
found that candidate to be more desirable (i.e. “sweet lemon” rationalization).  In 
contrast, the nonpartisans, Independents, and undecided did not engage in any form of 
rationalization (i.e. their desirability of each candidate did not depend upon likelihood of 
election).  Although Kay, Jimenez, and Jost (2002) found motivation to be very important 
to the activation of rationalizations for the new status quo, Eidelman, Crandall, and 
Pattershall (2009) found that the mere existence of a phenomenon (or, status quo) is 
enough to make individuals desire it.  Future research will need to investigate further 
when the likelihood of a new status quo is enough to trigger rationalizations and when 
participants require additional motivation regarding the status quo.   
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As marriage remains important to most individuals within the US, individuals 
should be motivated to defend it when they believe it is threatened (Campbell & Wright, 
2010; Cherlin, 2004; Lewis, 2006, Poritz, C.J., concurring and dissenting; Thornton & 
Young-DeMarco, 2001).  However, as the inclusion of same-sex couples within the 
construct of marriage becomes more likely to be the status quo, individuals should 
become more likely to support marriage equality and should develop rationalizations to 
justify the new status quo.  Therefore, the current study provides a unique opportunity to 
study the effect that the emergence of a new status quo has on beliefs. 
System Justification Theory within the Sexual Minority Context 
System justification theory, as defined above, involves the active maintenance of 
current status quos through the use of rationalizations (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost et al., 
2004).  When applied within the context of sexual orientation, people use stereotypes of 
sexual minorities to maintain the power and dominance of the sexual majority (i.e. 
heterosexual or “straight” individuals) and to keep the current system of heterosexual 
dominance in place (Herek, 2004).  According to Herek and Garnets (2007), both 
homosexual and heterosexual behaviors have existed within human cultures for centuries, 
but the terms “homosexuality” and “heterosexuality” did not appear in academic or 
popular discourse until the mid to late 1800s (Herek & Garnets, 2007; see also Dynes, 
1990; Katz, 1995).  The concept of sexual orientation as defined by the sex to which one 
is attracted did not gain traction within psychiatry until Freud defined homosexuality in 
his Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (Freud, 1953/ 1905; Herek & Garnets, 2007).   
Mental health professionals initially classified Homosexuality as a sociopathic 
personality disturbance in the Mental Disorders: Diagnostic and Statistical Handbook 
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(i.e. the Diagnostic and Statistical Handbook of Mental Disorders (DSM)) in 1952.  
Homosexuality remained on this list of disorders until 1973 (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1952; Herek, 2007, 2008; Herek & Garnets, 2007).  The change in diagnosis 
categories came after researchers challenged the notion that the prevalence of 
psychological disorders within a population (i.e. sexual minorities) supported the 
existence of symptoms of the underlying pathology of same-sex attraction and behavior 
(Herek & Garnets, 2007; see also Gonsiorek, 1991; Riess, 1980).  Studies that did seem 
to show same-sex attraction as a pathology had methodological problems, such as 
sampling biases (Herek & Garnets, 2007; see also Gonsiorek, 1991; Hooker, 1957; 
Kinsey, Pomeroy, & Martin, 1948; Kinsey, Pomeroy, Martin, & Gebhard, 1953; Riess, 
1980).  However, although most psychiatrists and clinical psychologists have renounced 
the view that homosexuality is a pathology, the belief that sexual minority individuals 
have a pathology still permeates popular discourse (Herek, 2002, 2004; Herek & Garnets, 
2007; Herek, Gillis, & Cogan, 2009).   
The belief that sexual minorities have a pathology is one aspect of the larger 
concept of sexual stigma, which involves the knowledge that society considers 
homosexuality as a whole, to be morally wrong, negative, immature, criminal, 
pathological, and less than heterosexuality or less than optimal (Geiger, 2014; Herek, 
2004, 2007, 2008; Herek et al., 2009).  According to Herek (2004), stigma involves an 
“enduring condition or attribute…[that] is not inherently meaningful”, but, through social 
interaction with the larger society, gains a negative meaning (p. 14; Herek, 2008; see also 
Goffman, 1963; Jones, Farina, Hastorf, Markus, Miller, & Scott, 1984; Link & Phelan, 
2001).  The negative valuation of the attribute involves shared knowledge throughout 
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society (Herek, 2008).  Finally, the stigma completely represents the individual who has 
it, such that, in the eyes of others, this one characteristic subsumes the person’s entire 
identity.  In other words, the person is no longer an individual with a disliked or 
disapproved aspect of their identity, but rather, the stigmatized person only exists in 
terms of the stigmatizing identity.  For example, in terms of sexual stigma, the sexual 
orientation of a sexual minority person engulfs the individual’s identity, such that others 
may see the individual only as a gay person, rather than as a complete human being for 
whom sexual orientation is merely one aspect of identity.  The stigmatization of a group 
results in a power differential whereby the non-stigmatized group has a higher status and 
dominates the lower status, subordinate, stigmatized group (Herek, 2000, 2004, 2007, 
2008; Herek et al., 2009).  Sexual stigma represents the antipathy that society holds 
toward the non-heterosexual (Herek, 2004, 2008; Herek et al., 2009).  Heterosexism, i.e. 
“beliefs about gender, morality, and danger by which homosexuality and sexual 
minorities are defined as deviant, sinful, and threatening”, sustains sexual stigma by 
providing rationales that support the system of heterosexual dominance (Herek, 2004, p. 
15; Herek, 2008).  According to Herek, heterosexism and sexual stigma become part of 
the individual when they hold a negative, lasting attitude towards sexual minorities (i.e. 
sexual prejudice) (2004; 2008).  This attitude, then, has the potential to influence that 
individual’s future behaviors and actions.  In the language of system justification theory, 
heterosexual dominance within society represents the status quo. 
Although sexual minority treatment fits well within the system justification 
framework, researchers have conducted little research applying system justification 
theory to explain sexual minority stigma.  Pacilli, Taurino, Jost, and van der Toorn (2011) 
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investigated whether internalized homophobia and system justification affected the views 
of same-sex and heterosexual parenting in Italian gay men and lesbians.  As expected, the 
more participants justified the current system, the less competent they believed same-sex 
parents to be.  Interestingly, this finding was qualified by an interaction in which system 
justification beliefs did not affect the beliefs of lesbians (who thought that same-sex 
parents were more competent than heterosexual parents, overall), but was a significant 
factor for gay men.  Specifically, gay men who had greater system justification beliefs 
were more likely than gay men who had lesser system justification beliefs to think that 
same-sex parents were less competent parents.   
Similarly, Jost, Banaji, and Nosek (2004) explored whether gay and lesbian 
respondents were less likely to show in-group favoritism than heterosexual respondents 
using both implicit (Implicit Association Test (IAT), Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 
1998) and explicit (feeling thermometer) measures.  The feeling thermometer measures 
how warmly or coolly a respondent feels towards a group of people by having the 
respondent give that group a temperature between 0 and 100 degrees and a number of 
defining characteristics.  The IAT asks participants to categorize words that flash onto a 
computer screen by pressing one of two keys on a keyboard when the word falls within 
the overall category (e.g., gay v. straight).  Categories (or groups) are then paired with 
positive and negative words (e.g., participants must press one key if either a “good” word 
or a “straight” word/ image appears on the screen and must a different key if either a 
“bad” word or a “gay” word/ image appears on the screen).  Participants have implicit 
biases if they can more quickly pair certain categories and valenced words (i.e. faster 
categorization of straight/ good words and gay/ bad words than straight/ bad words and 
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gay/ good words).  Jost and colleagues (2004) found that, although straight respondents 
showed in-group favoritism on both the implicit and explicit measures, lesbians and gay 
men only showed comparable in-group favoritism on the explicit measure.  Although the 
sexual minority respondents did show slight in-group favoritism on the implicit measure, 
over a third (37.5%) showed outgroup (straight) favoritism.   
Although Pacilli et al.’s study (2011) and Jost et al.’s study (2004) showed the 
negative effects that being a member of a sexual minority can have on one’s attitudes 
about the self (both consciously and unconsciously), both studies focused upon the harm 
caused by being members of a subordinate group.  Neither study examined how the 
majority group stigmatizes the minority group to retain the status quo, a key aspect of 
system justification theory.  In fact, only Pacilli and colleagues’ study (2011) shows 
actual system justification (through rationalizations against same-sex parents that 
maintain the current heterosexual-only dominant parenting scheme).  Although Jost et al. 
(2004) showed a relationship between both implicit and explicit measures and 
conservatism, such that sexual minority individuals who were conservative tended to 
show a pro-straight/ anti-gay outgroup bias, the authors did not measure the extent that 
these individuals endorsed system justifying rationales to support the current system.  
Although their findings show a relationship between conservatism and anti-gay bias, the 
research failed to examine support for the status quo, which would explain the reason that 
the subordinated outgroup that prefers the dominating in-group would also be 
conservative.  Although conservatism may represent the system justifying rationale, there 
is no overall evidence that these individuals were more likely to support the status quo 
than their more liberal, less conservative sexual minority counterparts.   
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Furthermore, neither study focuses on how the majority group creates 
rationalizations that justify the current system of dominance.  As the group in power, why 
would the dominant, heterosexual majority group feel the need to stigmatize the 
subordinate, sexual minority group?  How and when does the majority group feel 
threatened by the minority group?  How would researchers know whether system 
justification actually explains the disparate treatment experienced by gays and lesbians?  
The current research will address these gaps in the system justification literature by 
systematically varying the threat posed by sexual minority individuals in two different 
contexts (marriage and housing equality) and measure the extent that majority members 
feel the need to support the status quo, and the extent that they endorse rationales that 
support the status quo. 
Marriage equality: Understanding the impact of system justification. 
 Whereas heterosexual individuals can marry the persons of their choice, sexual 
minorities, prior to the Supreme Court ruling in Obergefell (2015), in many jurisdictions, 
could not do the same (HRC, 2015).  Research suggests that some members of the 
dominant sexual orientation group (i.e. heterosexual individuals), may be more inclined 
to deny marriage opportunity to lesbians and gay men to maintain the status quo 
(Brumbaugh, Sanchez, Nock, and Wright, 2008).  To investigate marriage attitudes, 
Brumbaugh, Sanchez, Nock, and Wright (2008) conducted telephone surveys with 976 
adults from Arizona, Louisiana, and Minnesota between 1998 and 2000, asking them 
about their attitudes about same-sex marriage, covenant marriage, divorce, religion, 
politics, and society.  Interestingly, the researchers found that heterosexual individuals 
who are against same-sex marriage are significantly more likely to hold conservative 
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views regarding divorce and believe that covenant marriages (i.e. marriages that require 
marriage counseling prior to entry and only allow fault-based divorce) reinforce 
heterosexual marriage.  Furthermore, married, heterosexual individuals who have 
children and who have never cohabitated are more likely to be against same-sex marriage 
than unmarried, heterosexual individuals, those who do not have children, and those who 
have cohabitated (Brumbaugh et al., 2008).  Thus, in 2000 those who had a stake in the 
“traditional” (i.e. heterosexual, two-parent) marriage were likely to fight against allowing 
sexual minorities to marry (see also Henry & Reyna, 2007).   
Supporting this system justification account, as marriage equality (i.e. same-sex 
marriage) has threatened the heterosexual monopoly on marriage, some heterosexual 
individuals have responded by passing measures intended to strengthen the current status 
quo (e.g., anti-same-sex marriage statutes and amendments) (Bishop, district court, 2014; 
Geiger, 2014; Henry & Reyna, 2007; Kitchen, district court, 2013; Wardle, 2005).  For 
example, Oklahoma passed its anti-marriage equality amendment as a direct reaction to 
the Massachusetts Supreme Court marriage equality decisions, Goodridge and In re 
Opinions of the Justices to the Senate (2004) (Bishop, district court, 2014).  Twelve states 
in 2004 passed anti-same-sex marriage amendments, likely as a reaction to Goodridge 
(Freedom to Marry, 2015).  Similarly, after Multnomah County, Oregon, issued 3,000 
marriage licenses to same-sex couples in 2004, Oregon’s voting populace amended its 
state constitution to only allow marriage for heterosexual couples (Geiger, 2014).   
Those who oppose marriage equality rely upon negative stereotypes of sexual 
minorities and on a narrow meaning of marriage and family to justify the maintenance of 
the current system (Bishop, district court, 2014; Bruning, 2006; DeBoer, sixth circuit, 
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2014; Geiger, 2014; Kitchen, district court, 2013; Lewis, 2006; Varnum, 2009).  Judges 
consider these rationales when deciding whether heterosexual couple only marriage 
legislation violates state equal protection and the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal 
protection clause and substantive due process (Baker, 1971; Bruning, 2006; DeBoer, 
sixth circuit, 2014; Goodridge, 2003; Hernandez, 2006; Jackson, 2012; Lewis, 2006; 
Sevcik, 2012).  For example, the court in Jackson focused on the state interests in 
promoting “traditional” (i.e. heterosexual) marriage, heterosexual procreation within 
marriage, heterosexual parenting as the “ideal” parenting, and being wary of social 
experimentation when they held that the state of Hawaii could rationally withhold 
marriage from same-sex couples (2012).  Similarly, the US District Court for the District 
of Nevada also found that state interests promoting “traditional” marriage and 
heterosexual procreation within marriage were legitimate interests under rational basis 
scrutiny (Sevcik, 2012).   
As discussed earlier, arguments for heterosexual couple only marriage that focus 
on traditional values and morality raise stereotypes as justifications that sexual minorities 
are morally wrong or of lesser value than heterosexual individuals (Hernandez, 2006, 
Kaye, C.J., dissenting; Kitchen, district court, 2013; Lawrence, 2003; Lewis, 2006, Poritz, 
C.J., concurring and dissenting).  For example, proponents of Oklahoma’s and Utah’s 
anti-marriage equality amendments stated that the people of Utah needed the 
amendments to insure morality (Bishop, district court, 2014; Kitchen, district court, 
2013).  Similarly, being wary of social experimentation is code for the argument that 
same-sex marriage is wrong morally (DeBoer, district court, 2014; Kerrigan, 2008).  
Several courts held that these arguments were actually religious beliefs and, as such, 
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could not constitute legitimate state interests or could not constitute the state’s only 
interests behind legislative enactment (Geiger, 2014; Griego, 2013; Kerrigan, 2008; 
Lawrence, 2003, O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment; Perry, 2010; Romer, 1996; 
Varnum, 2009).  These judges opined that promoting “traditional” marriage merely relies 
upon the history of discrimination (i.e. not allowing same-sex marriage because the state 
has never allowed same-sex marriage) as a rationale to justify continuing the 
discrimination (Geiger, 2014; Hernandez, 2006, Kaye, C.J., dissenting; Kerrigan, 2008; 
Kitchen, district court, 2013; Lawrence, 2003; Lewis, 2006, Poritz, C.J., concurring and 
dissenting; Romer, 1996).     
Other state officials, not on the bench, defended heterosexual couple only 
marriages as a way of promoting the morality of the community and optimal relationships 
between couples and within families, using these justifications to define marriage as a 
heterosexual couple only institution (Baehr, 1993; Bishop, district court, 2014; Bruning, 
2006; DeBoer, district court, 2014; Goodridge, 2003; Lewis, 2006, Poritz, C.J., 
concurring and dissenting; Varnum, 2009).  For example, in Lewis (2006), amici curiae 
defended an anti-marriage equality law by stating that heterosexual couple only 
marriages created the ideal environment to raise children (Poritz, C.J., concurring and 
dissenting).  These reasons constitute rationalizations rather than factual assertions 
because numerous studies have found little to no difference in child raising outcomes 
between families headed by heterosexual or same-sex couples (Bostic, fourth circuit, 
2014; Chiu, 2007; DeBoer, district court, 2014; Geiger, 2014; Gibson-Davis & Gassman-
Pines, 2010; Griffin et al., 2000; Harris et al., 1999; Lonczak et al., 2007; Perry, 2010; 
Roy & Raver, 2014; Turner et al., 2007; United States v. Windsor, Brief of the American 
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Psychological Association et al., as Amici Curia, 2013, p. 2695–2696).  Promoting 
heterosexual-couple parenting as the “ideal” embraces the unfounded stereotype that 
sexual minorities are less than heterosexual individuals in terms of parenting abilities 
(DeBoer, district court, 2014; Kitchen, district court, 2013; Lewis, 2006. Poritz, C. J., 
concurring and dissenting).  In classic system justification parlance, these rationalizations 
act as justifications to maintain the status quo of heterosexual dominance.  Furthermore, 
these laws convey to sexual minorities and society the view that same-sex relationships 
and families have less worth than heterosexual couple relationships and families (Bishop, 
district court, 2014; Geiger, 2014; Kitchen, district court, 2013; Lewis, 2006, Poritz, C.J., 
concurring and dissenting; Obergefell, 2015; Windsor, 2013).   
When defining the meaning of marriage, proponents of anti-marriage equality 
initiatives rely upon the false rationalization that the purpose of marriage is to produce 
offspring through a “natural” process that the state sanctions (Baehr, 1993, Heen, J., 
dissenting; Baker, 1971; Bruning, 2006; DeBoer, sixth circuit, 2014).  The courts in 
DeBoer (district court, 2014) and Goodridge (2003) described how state officials and 
lower court judges, respectively, focused on “natural” procreation as an argument against 
the inclusion of same-sex couples within marriage.  This definition of marriage ignores 
the US Supreme Court decisions that have held that the choice to procreate within 
marriage falls within a realm of privacy into which the state cannot intrude (Griswold, 
1965).  If the choice of whether or not to procreate within marriage is private, then it 
cannot be a necessary aspect of marriage, nor can it be the sole purpose of marriage 
(Bishop, district court, 2014; Geiger, 2014; Goodridge, 2003).  If funneling procreation 
were the only purpose of marriage, then the state would need to deny other couples who 
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cannot procreate “naturally” the ability to marry (Bishop, district court, 2014; Geiger, 
2014; Goodridge, 2003; Varnum, 2009).  In fact, as Senior District Judge Friedman 
noted, none of the states have ever made procreative capacity or desire a requirement for 
marriage (DeBoer, district court, 2014).  Importantly, the US Supreme Court held that 
prison inmates, who lack the ability to procreate due to their confinement, still possessed 
a fundamental right to marry that the state could not infringe upon without a narrowly 
structured scheme intended to promote compelling state interests (Turner, 1987).  The 
equivalent logic applied to marriage equality would create a fundamental right for gays 
and lesbians that would require a strict scrutiny test to overcome.   
Promoting heterosexual procreation within marriage highlights the potential 
“unnaturalness” of same-sex parenting, as it cannot occur without reproductive assistance 
or adoption (Sevcik, 2012).  In addition, as stated in Goodridge (2003), it marks same-sex 
relationships as “inherently unstable and inferior to opposite-sex relationships and [as] 
not worthy of respect”.  As states do not and, according to Griswold, cannot forbid 
individuals from marrying on the basis of ability or desire to procreate, the concept of 
marriage as only a vehicle for insuring “natural” procreation appears to be an unjustified 
rationalization that people endorse as a justification to maintain the current system 
(Goodridge, 2003).  If states do not have a legitimate state interest in procreation within 
marriage, yet rely on this purported interest to withhold marriage from same-sex couples, 
then states appear to be rationalizing disparate treatment of a minority group to maintain 
the current social system (i.e. heterosexual-only marriage).  Indeed, some courts have 
ruled anti-marriage equality statutes and amendments to be constitutional by using anti-
marriage equality proponents “natural” procreation rationales to justify their rulings 
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(Bruning, 2006; Jackson, 2012; Obergefell, 2015, Roberts, C.J., dissenting; Sevcik, 
2012).           
Other courts that have upheld anti-marriage equality statutes and amendments 
have stated that the sexual minorities or couples do not constitute a suspect or quasi-
suspect class because their traits are not necessarily immutable (Sevcik, 2012).  The lack 
of immutability argument draws upon stereotypes of immorality, immaturity, and 
pathology endorsing the view that, if the sexual minority individual only chose to be 
heterosexual, then they could enjoy the rights held by the majority.  This view hints that 
the sexual minority person deserves the stigma associated with their sexual orientation 
because they either choose to be immoral or choose to not seek help for overcoming their 
illness (Dean v. District of Columbia, 1995, Ferren, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part; Kerrigan, 2008).  By defining sexual minorities as individuals who choose to 
behave in certain deviant ways, courts justify not treating sexual minorities as a suspect 
or quasi-suspect class, thereby excluding sexual minorities from marriage through the 
limited analysis that rational basis scrutiny affords (Equality Foundation, 1995; High 
Tech Gays, 1990).  
 Housing equality: Application of system justification. 
 Unlike marriage, there exists no fundamental right to housing (Jaimes v. Toledo 
Metropolitan Housing Authority, 1985; Lindsey v. Normet, 1972).  However, the Fair 
Housing Act of 1968 (FHA) offers some protection to certain classes of individuals, 
which legislatures could ultimately extend to sexual minorities.  While states have not 
passed anti-sexual minority housing measures akin to same-sex marriage bans, most have 
also not passed housing protection laws for sexual minority individuals (HRC, 2015).  
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Thus, landlords and rental agencies may discriminate against sexual minority individuals 
within the private housing sector in these states.  However, after HUD ruled that sexual 
orientation is a protected class, HUD-funded housing companies may not discriminate 
against renters based upon sexual orientation (2012).  Additionally, if private 
discrimination rests upon state action or the federal government fails to remedy HUD-
funded housing companies’ discriminatory actions, then sexual minorities may have a 
claim for Fourteenth Amendment equal protection violation (Ex parte Virginia, 1880; 
Shelley v. Kraemer, 1948; Strauder v. West Virginia, 1880; Village of Arlington Heights 
v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation, 1977; Virginia v. Rives, 1880).  
Finally, individual states may provide housing protection for sexual minorities under their 
own versions of the equal protection clause (HRC, 2015).   
 HUD protection, the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause, and state 
equal protection policies suggest that sexual minority individuals could have viable 
claims of housing discrimination, although no courts have ruled in favor of plaintiffs in 
anti-discrimination cases under these theories.  Most importantly, if Congress extended 
the FHA list of protected classes to include sexual orientation, sexual minorities would 
enjoy protection from housing discrimination at the federal level.  State and federal 
interests in not providing protection for sexual minorities are difficult to isolate given the 
lack of sexual orientation housing discrimination cases.  However, the characterization of 
sexual minority civil rights (i.e. housing, employment, and public accommodations non-
discrimination, as well as relationship equality rights) as “special rights” provides insight 
as to potential interests that housing equality opponents might invoke (Alexander, 2001; 
Blain, 2005; Conant, 2010; Hargis, 2000; Price, Nir, & Cappella, 2005; Rahman, 2004; 
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Sen & Morwitz, 1996).  Specifically, some will likely characterize these civil rights as 
“special rights” and denounce them as undemocratic and as privileging sexual minority 
individuals above seemingly similarly situated heterosexual individuals (who are thought 
not to have access to the same rights) (Alexander, 2001; Blain, 2005; Hargis, 2000; Price 
et al., 2005; Rahman, 2004).  For example, Blain (2005) analyzed the discourse used in 
the “no special rights” legislative initiative in Idaho in 1994, which if passed, would have 
prevented sexual minority rights protection.  Initiative proponents described civil rights 
protective measures as “special rights” because the term implies that sexual minorities 
seek rights above those available to the “ordinary” citizen (Blain, 2005).  Furthermore, 
beyond simply denouncing proponents of “special rights” as undemocratic and 
privileged, opponents of sexual minority civil rights often described civil rights 
campaigns as attacks on majority values, such as “traditional” (i.e. heterosexual) marriage 
and parenting (Alexander, 2001; Conant, 2010; Hargis, 2000; Rahman, 2004).  Goldberg-
Hiller and Milner (2003), pointed out that by labeling civil rights as “special rights” in 
pursuit of a “homosexual agenda”, opponents to civil rights legislation falsely 
delegitimize the true victims as individuals who place their own selfish needs above those 
of the majority (see also Alexander, 2001; Blain, 2005; Hargis, 2000).   
By objecting to the cultural and moral norms of the majority, these transgressors 
serve as moral pollutants whom the majority must reject in order to preserve the 
community (Alexander, 2001; Blain, 2005; Goldberg-Hiller & Milner, 2003; Hargis, 
2000).  For example, in its campaign for passage of Amendment 2 (an amendment that 
denied sexual minority individuals basic civil rights protections in Colorado), Colorado 
for Family Values (CFV) described Amendment 2 as ensuring that “gays” continue to 
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have the same rights that all Coloradans already enjoy and that they would prevent them 
from procuring “special rights” (Alexander, 2001).  In flyers it distributed to Coloradans, 
the CFV described “gays” as enjoying a more privileged status than “average” 
Americans, able to exert their influence on the political system.  By focusing on the 
purported advantages sexual minorities already had (such as greater amounts of 
disposable income and ability to travel), CFV cast sexual minorities as a selfish and 
immature minority group dedicated to securing extra rights and privileges for themselves 
at the expense of others (Alexander, 2001).  In fact, when asked for the reasons why they 
had voted for Amendment 2, 74% of individuals polled in Colorado stated that it was not 
because they disliked homosexuals, but because the voters disagreed with special rights.   
The other, equally important reason that allowed the passage of Amendment 2 
involved the rejection of homosexuality within the private sphere (especially private 
housing).  Many voters feared gay and lesbian individuals would force their lifestyles 
upon the heterosexual majority in private areas such as rental housing, work 
environments, and public accommodations (Alexander, 2001).  Thus, by rejecting sexual 
minorities as transgressors, Coloradans viewed themselves as protecting their right to 
their own moral code.  In system justification terms, advocates of “special rights” 
threaten the heteronormative system by pursuing rights of equal footing to the 
heterosexual majority, i.e. the dominant group (Alexander, 2001; Blain, 2005; Hargis, 
2000).  Claims that sexual minorities are privileged and seek rights through an 
undemocratic process constitute system justifications.  Similarly, denigrations of sexual 
minorities as selfish, immature, immoral, sick, and unnatural (i.e. the elements present in 
sexual stigma) also act as rationalizations for not granting sexual minorities equal rights 
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(Alexander, 2001; Blain, 2005; Conant, 2010; Goldberg-Hiller & Milner, 2003; Hargis, 
2000).  The current study explored these rationalizations, as well as the rationalizations 
used in the marriage equality context as potential system justifications. 
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CHAPTER 3 
CURRENT RESEARCH: OVERVIEW 
The current project investigated whether system justification theory explains the 
initial backlash against same-sex marriage and the change in marriage equality cases after 
the United States Supreme Court decision in United States v. Windsor (2013) and 
whether system justification theory could explain sexual minority housing discrimination.  
System justification theory posits that individuals are motivated to maintain the status 
quo, even if it is harmful, because maintaining and defending external systems decreases 
the personal anxiety and fear individuals have over the unpredictability of life (Jost & 
Banaji, 1994; Jost & Hunyady, 2005; Landau et al., 2006; Landau et al., 2004).  When 
same-sex couples who wish to marry threaten that system, some heterosexual individuals 
may justify heterosexual-only marriage (i.e. the status quo) by creating or championing 
stereotypes regarding marriage and sexual minority individuals to rationalize their actions 
(i.e. justifying anti-marriage equality actions) (Bishop, tenth circuit, 2014; Bruning, 2006; 
DeBoer, sixth circuit, 2014; Geiger, 2014; Kitchen, district court, 2013; Lewis, 2006).  
Although individuals feel the need to defend the current status quo, when it appears likely 
that the status quo will change, they cease to defend the old status quo and seek to justify 
and maintain the emerging one (Kay et al., 2002).  After the Supreme Court upheld state 
created same-sex marriage in Windsor, at least thirty lower level federal and state courts 
struck down anti-marriage equality laws (HRC, 2015).  Thus, Windsor represents a 
tipping point for same-sex marriage.  Within the context of housing discrimination, 
sexual minorities seeking housing protections threaten the belief that the current system is 
fair, a core aspect of several system maintenance ideologies (e.g. just world theory) 
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(Lipkus, 1991; Rubin & Peplau, 1975).  When sexual minorities threaten the system, 
some heterosexual individuals defend the exclusion of sexual minority protection by 
designating the protection as “special rights” that a privileged minority demands  through 
undemocratic and unfair means (Alexander, 2001; Blain, 2005; Conant, 2010; Hargis, 
2000; Price et al., 2005; Rahman, 2004; Sen & Morwitz, 1996).  Finally, opponents of 
equality denigrate sexual minority members in ways that that are consistent with 
endorsement of sexual stigma (Alexander, 2001; Blain, 2005; Conant, 2010; Goldberg-
Hiller & Milner, 2003; Hargis, 2000).   
 The current research analyzed the potential causal mechanism (system 
justification) behind the same-sex marriage backlash and tipping point and applied it in 
both the marriage equality and housing equality context.  The research included two 
experiments, one examining marriage equality and one, housing equality.  Using a 2 
(Socioeconomic threat condition: threat v. affirmation) x 4 (Likelihood of new status quo: 
10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) between subjects design, the research tested the effect that 
threatening versus affirming the current socioeconomic system had on whether 
participants voted for a new status quo (i.e. either same-sex marriage inclusion or sexual 
minority housing protection).  While several studies have shown that threatening the 
status quo motivates individuals to defend the system, none of the previous studies 
manipulated threat within sexual minority marriage or housing equality contexts 
(Brescoll et al., 2013; Jost et al., 2005; Kay, Gaucher et al., 2009; Kay et al., 2005).  
Following the procedure of previous system threat manipulations, participants read an 
ostensive news article that reported that the United States had reached an economic, 
social, and political low (system threat) or was doing well (system affirmation) (Brescoll 
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et al., 2013).  Participants completed a measure of their emotions regarding the article 
they read and then completed system justification/rationalization questionnaires specific 
to both contexts (same-sex marriage and housing equality).  Next, participants read a 
proposed ballot initiative that extended the definition of marriage to include same-sex 
couples (Study 1) or extended protection against discrimination to include sexual 
orientation as a protected class (Study 2).  Participants determined whether or not they 
would favor such an initiative and how likely they would be to vote for the initiative if 
they saw it in a voter referendum.  Participants then read a purported scientific report in 
which an experts stated that, by the year 2016, it is likely that all fifty states will have 
equality (either marriage or housing, depending upon the study).  Kay, Jimenez, and Jost 
(2002) observed that manipulating the likelihood of a new status quo leads to 
rationalizations that support the new status quo as it becomes more likely (i.e. 
participants will provide far greater support to a status quo that is 90% likely to occur 
than a status quo that is 30% likely to occur).  The current study extends these findings 
into the contexts of marriage equality and housing equality by varying the degree of 
likelihood for the new status quo.  Specifically, participants were told that experts believe 
there is 10% (or 30% or 60% or 90%) likelihood that the country will have a new status 
quo of complete (i.e. all fifty states) marriage or housing equality.  Participants then 
completed a second set of emotion measures regarding the political report they read and 
completed the system justification/rationalization questionnaires specific to both contexts 
(same-sex marriage and housing equality) a second time.  Thus, participants’ emotions 
and specific justifications were measured twice.  Participants then, again, indicated 
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whether they would support complete marriage or housing equality and the extent to 
which they would support it. 
 Participants completed a final set of questionnaires that measured how different 
psychological aspects impacted their decisions.  Specifically, participants completed trait 
system justification measures, integrated threat measures, current equality knowledge 
questions, and demographic questions.  It was estimated that a sample of approximately 
280 participants would be sufficient to find moderate effects in the eight cells required for 
the completely crossed experimental design in each study.  Having a minimum of 35 
participants in each condition created a power level equal to at least 90% with a moderate 
effect size.  This power analysis increased the likelihood that there would be a sufficient 
sample size to detect actual differences between groups, but not too large for results to be 
simply due to chance (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007).  As the current research 
involved two experiments, it was estimated that a sample of approximately 560 
participants would be sufficient. 
Specific Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: Threat manipulation (Main effect). 
Vote (Initial ballot). 
Threatening participants’ status quo should cause participants to vote against the 
ballot initiative (in the first vote) as it represents a change in the current laws in their state 
(Brescoll et al., 2013; Jost et al., 2005; Kay, Gaucher et al., 2009; Kay et al., 2005).  
Affirming participants’ status quo should lead participants to vote according to their own 
beliefs, i.e. the vote will be affected by the individual differences variables (see 
Hypothesis 4, below).   
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Emotion (Initial measurement). 
Participants in the threatened condition should feel greater amounts of fear and 
anxiety than those in the affirmation condition (Laurin et al., 2008; Smith & Ellsworth, 
1985).  It is unknown whether either group will feel greater amounts of anger, disgust, 
compassion, happiness, hope, or pity; therefore, the experiment explored the extent to 
which each group felt these emotions. 
Justification (Initial measurement). 
Participants in the threatened condition should feel a greater need to justify the 
current status quo, i.e. a heterosexist society; therefore, they should be less likely than 
participants in the affirmation condition to state that sexual minorities belong to a suspect 
or quasi-suspect class (i.e. less likely to state that lesbians and gay men have a history of 
experiencing discrimination, more likely to believe that sexual orientation can be 
changed, more likely to state that sexual orientation is related to an individual’s ability to 
contribute to society, and more likely to say that lesbians and gay men are politically 
powerful enough to achieve their goals through the ordinary political process) (Jost et al., 
2004; Jost, Blount, et al., 2003; Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003).  These participants should also 
be more likely to endorse justifications specific to the change in the system’s status quo, 
e.g., that the state should preserve the “traditional” form of marriage and that lesbians and 
gay men want “special rights” that other groups do not have.  Participants in the 
affirmation condition should endorse heterosexist system justifications according to 
individual differences variables (see Hypothesis 4, below).  Additionally, threatened 
participants should be more likely to endorse the status quo in general, which the 
Situational System Justification scale (SSJ) (Kay & Jost, 2003) will measure. 
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Mediation. 
Emotion and system justifications will mediate the main effect of threat on the 
initial ballot vote.  Participants in the threatened condition, feeling greater amounts of 
fear and anxiety, should be less likely to vote for the initial ballot that would create 
change within their state than participants in the affirmation condition (Laurin et al., 
2008).  Additionally, these participants should also feel a greater need to justify the status 
quo, which should then predict their vote (Wakslak et al., 2007).  Individual difference 
variables (see Hypothesis 4, below) will moderate the votes of those in the system 
affirmation condition. 
Hypothesis 2: Likelihood manipulation (Main effect).  For aid of discussion, I 
will refer to the 10% likelihood of change condition as the “lowest”, the 30% as low 
condition, the 60% as the moderate condition, and the 90% as the highest.  
Vote (Second ballot). 
Participants in the lower likelihood of change conditions (10% and 30%) should 
be less likely to vote for the ballot initiative than participants in the highest likelihood of 
change condition (90%) as it represents an unlikely change to the status quo (Kay et al., 
2002).  Participants in the highest likelihood of change condition (90%) should be more 
likely to vote for the ballot initiative than participants in the other three conditions (Kay 
et al., 2002).  Participants in the moderate likelihood of change condition (60%) should 
be influenced by individual differences variables in their ballot decisions (see Hypothesis 
4, below). 
Emotion (Second measurement). 
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Participants in the lowest and highest likelihood of change conditions will feel 
greater amounts of happiness and joy than participants in the other two conditions 
because the participants in the lowest and highest likelihood of change conditions will 
have greater confidence in their votes (Kay et al., 2002).  Participants in the low (30%) 
and moderate (60%) likelihood of change conditions should feel greater amounts of fear, 
anxiety, and hope than other participants as they have less certainty in their state’s future 
status quo (Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).   
Justification (Second measurement). 
Participants in the lowest (10%) and highest (90%) likelihood conditions will not 
feel the need to justify their vote; therefore, these participants will not endorse system 
justifications as greatly as participants in the low and moderate likelihood conditions 
(Kay et al., 2002). 
Mediation. 
The effect of status likelihood upon participants’ second ballot vote should be 
mediated by both emotion and system justifications.  For participants in the lowest and 
highest likelihood conditions, the happiness they feel regarding the certainty of the future 
status quo should predict their vote decision (Kay et al., 2002; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).  
Additionally, the certainty that comes from either very high or low likelihood of equality 
as the new status quo should affect the justifications participants offer for their vote so 
that the justifications match their voting outcome (regardless of individual differences 
variables).  Thus, participants in the lowest likelihood condition should endorse system 
justifications as they vote against the equality initiatives.  Participants in the highest 
likelihood condition should not endorse system justifications as they vote for the equality 
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initiatives.  Participants in the low and moderate likelihood conditions (30% and 60%) 
should feel greater anxiety, fear, and hope, given the uncertainty of the future status quo, 
which should then affect their ultimate ballot decision (Laurin et al., 2008; Ortony et al., 
1988; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).  These feelings of uncertainty should make room for 
individual differences variables to impact participants’ votes (see Hypothesis 4, below).  
Participants in the low and moderate likelihood conditions should also feel a greater need 
to justify the status quo, which will impact their votes (Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003; Jost, et 
al., 2007; Kay et al., 2002).  Again, individual differences variables should impact these 
decisions (see Hypothesis 4, below).   
Hypothesis 3: Threat by Likelihood (Interaction effect). 
Vote (Initial and second ballots). 
Threatened conditions. 
Participants in the threatened, lowest, low, and moderate likelihood conditions 
should vote against the ballot initiative (second vote).  Participants in the threatened, 
highest likelihood condition should vote for the second ballot initiative as a way to 
decrease uncertainty.  Thus, a change in vote should occur only for the participants in the 
threatened, highest likelihood condition (Kay et al., 2002).  However, Brescoll and 
colleagues (2013) found that allowing participants to explicitly disagree with a system 
threat decreased their motivation to subsequently defend the status quo, indicating that 
participants who initially defended the current system in their ballot vote may no longer 
feel the need to defend it in the support vote (i.e. the dependent variable after the 
likelihood manipulation).  Thus, those participants in the threat condition who vote 
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against the ballot initiative in their initial vote may not feel the need to subsequently vote 
against the second ballot initiative.   
However, it is also possible that participants who defend the status quo by voting 
against the equality initiative may feel further vindicated in their choice if they read that 
experts believe it is unlikely (10% and 30%) that the country will have marriage or 
housing equality.  These participants may feel the need to further defend their initial vote 
by not supporting complete equality.  This hypothesis follows the research of Kay and 
colleagues (2002), who found that participants who were highly involved in the outcome 
of a decision differed in their ratings of desirability for the new status quo according to 
whether the new status quo was likely to occur.  Participants in the unlikely condition 
found the new status quo to be undesirable as compared to participants in the likely 
condition.  The current study tested these competing hypotheses for either potential 
result. 
Affirmation conditions. 
Participants in the affirmation conditions should not feel a need (from the threat 
manipulation) to reduce uncertainty about the status quo.  Therefore, their votes on the 
second ballot initiative should depend upon their likelihood condition (see Hypothesis 2, 
above).  Thus, participants in the moderate likelihood condition should be most likely to 
vote according to individual differences variables, whereas the participants in the other 
three conditions may change their votes if their individual differences tendencies do not 
match their likelihood condition (e.g., if participants tend to support the current, 
heterosexist system, but were in the highest likelihood condition, they may vote against 
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the ballot initially, then vote for it after learning of the likelihood of a new status quo) 
(Kay et al., 2002). 
Emotion (Initial and second measurements). 
Threatened conditions. 
Participants in the threatened conditions likely felt a greater amount of anxiety 
and fear than participants in the affirmation conditions (Laurin et al., 2008) initially and 
they may still experience these emotions.  However, they may have alleviated their 
distress by voting against the initial ballot (Brescoll et al., 2013; Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003; 
Jost et al., 2007; Wakslak et al., 2007).  Thus, participants may be affected by both 
system threat and status likelihood or just status likelihood.  Participants in the lowest and 
highest likelihood of change conditions should feel greater amounts of happiness and joy 
than participants in the other two conditions because those in the lowest and highest 
likelihood of change conditions will have greater confidence in their votes (Kay et al., 
2002).  Participants in the moderate likelihood of change conditions should feel greater 
amounts of fear, anxiety, and hope than other participants as they will have less certainty 
in their state’s future status quo (Ortony et al., 1988; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).       
Affirmation conditions. 
Participants in the affirmation condition should have, initially, felt happiness upon 
reading that the current system is prospering (Kay et al., 2002).  These participants 
should only be affected by the likelihood manipulation (see Hypothesis 2, above).  Thus, 
although participants in the lowest and highest likelihood of change conditions should 
still feel happy, participants in the low and moderate likelihood of change conditions 
should no longer experience happiness and should feel greater amounts of fear, anxiety, 
102 
 
and hope than other participants as they have less certainty in their state’s future status 
quo (Kay et al., 2002; Ortony et al., 1988; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).  This trend should 
be greater for participants in the moderate likelihood condition.  Thus, only participants 
in the lowest and highest likelihood of change condition should remain unchanged in 
their emotional state. 
Justification (Initial and second measurements). 
Threatened conditions. 
In accordance with Hypothesis 3, participants in the threatened, lowest likelihood 
condition should vote against the ballot initiative (second vote).  These participants 
should justify their vote by endorsing the system justifications (Brescoll et al., 2013; Jost, 
Glaser, et al., 2003; Jost et al., 2007).  Participants in the threatened, highest likelihood 
condition should vote for the second ballot initiative as a way to decrease uncertainty 
(Kay et al., 2002).  Thus, these participants will not endorse system justifications (i.e. 
their endorsements should be pro-equality).  Participants in the threatened, low and 
threatened, moderate conditions should vote against the ballot initiative as a way to 
decrease uncertainty (Jost et al., 2007).  Therefore, as they may experience even greater 
uncertainty than participants in the other two likelihood conditions, these participants 
should endorse system justifications to a greater extent. 
Affirmation conditions. 
Participants in the system affirmation conditions should not feel uncertainty from 
the threat manipulation (Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003; Jost, et al., 2007; Kay et al., 2002).  
These participants should only be affected by the likelihood conditions (see Hypothesis 2, 
above).   
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Mediation. 
Emotion should mediate the effect of system threat and likelihood of a new status 
quo upon participants’ second ballot, such that threat and greater levels of likelihood 
uncertainty should lead to greater anxiety, fear, and hope (Laurin et al., 2008; Ortony et 
al., 1988).  Experiencing these emotions should then influence participants’ votes such 
that they would be less likely to vote for equality initiatives as voting against the equality 
initiatives allows participants to reduce uncertainty through maintaining the status quo 
(Laurin et al., 2008; Ortony et al., 1988).  Similarly, system justification should mediate 
system threat and the likelihood manipulation effects upon the second ballot decision, 
such that threat and greater levels of likelihood uncertainty should lead to greater 
endorsement of heterosexist system justifications, thereby resulting in votes against the 
second ballot initiative (Brescoll et al., 2013; Wakslak et al., 2007).  Although emotion 
and system justifications are expected to mediate this relationship in the affirmation 
condition, participants in the affirmation condition should be more affected by their 
likelihood condition and individual differences variables than participants in the threat 
condition.   
Hypothesis 4: Individual differences (Situational system justification, global 
belief in a just world, and attitudes toward lesbians and gay men). 
Vote (Initial and second ballots). 
Participants individual differences, measured by the Situational System 
Justification scale (SSJ), the Global Belief in a Just World scale (GBJW), and the 
Attitudes toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale (ATLG), should predict their votes on both 
ballot measures.  Participants with greater endorsement of the current system (SSJ), belief 
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in a just world (GBJW), and negative attitudes toward sexual minorities (ATLG) should 
be more likely to vote against the ballot initiatives than other participants as the ballot 
initiatives change the current system, question the fairness of the world, and lead to 
greater equality for sexual minorities (Brescoll et al., 2013; Herek, 2004; Jost et al., 2004; 
Jost, Blount, et al., 2003; Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003). 
Emotion (Initial and second measurements). 
Participants with greater endorsement of the status quo, belief that the world is 
just, and negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men should have greater fear, anger, 
disgust, and anxiety after reading the political science report (as it discusses sexual 
minority issues), but only in the greater likelihood conditions as these conditions tend to 
threaten participants’ beliefs and attitudes (Balzer & Jacobs, 2011; Cunningham et al., 
2013; Embrick et al., 2007; Herek, 2004; Inbar et al., 2009; Zeichner & Reidy, 2009).  
Thus, the content of the political science report should trigger some negative emotions in 
these individuals.  Similarly, participants with lesser endorsement of the status quo, belief 
that the world is just, and more positive attitudes towards sexual minorities should feel 
more fear, anger, disgust, anxiety, compassion, and pity in the low likelihood conditions 
as these conditions intimate that greater sexual minority equality is unlikely to occur.  
These participants should feel more happiness and hope in the moderate and highest 
likelihood conditions (Zeichner & Reidy, 2009).   
Justification (Initial and second measurements). 
Participants with greater endorsement of the status quo, belief in a just world, and 
negative attitudes toward sexual minorities should be more likely than other participants 
to endorse marriage and housing equality-specific justifications against sexual minority 
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equality (Brescoll et al., 2013; Herek, 2004; Jost et al., 2004; Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003).  
However, the threat and likelihood manipulations may override these dispositional 
influences. 
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 671 community members recruited through Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an online site that allows researchers to “access an on-
demand, scalable workforce” (www.mturk.com/mturk).  The studies were conducted 
concurrently between April 20 and June 11, 2015.  Thus, participants completed the 
research prior to the Supreme Court ruling in Obergefell on June 26, 2015.  Participants 
were at least 19 years old, registered to vote, self-identified as “straight” for sexual 
orientation, and resided in states that did not have statewide marriage and housing 
equality (i.e. Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Texas) (HRC, 2015). 
Participants received $.10 for completing an initial demographic form to determine 
eligibility, then $1 for their participation if they were eligible for the main study (6,111 
community members completed the initial demographic form).  Once participants 
selected the study, the website redirected them to Qualtrics, an online data collection site 
that allows researchers to create studies involving random assignment to conditions 
(qualtrics.com).  They completed all the study materials online.   
Of the 900 individuals who participated in this study, 65 were dropped due to 
technological error (i.e. the computer software allowed them to participate, but they did 
not fit the requirements for the study).  Five more participants were dropped due to a 
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different technological error (i.e. the software allowed these individuals to participate in 
the study after they had previously participated).  Of the 830 remaining participants, one 
was dropped because the participant did not understand the concepts within the study 
(this individual wrote to me explaining their conception of the study, which did not match 
the actual meaning of the research).  Finally, 158 participants were dropped because they 
did not complete the study.  Participants who completed the study answered most items 
throughout the study (i.e. there were no long intervals of item non-completion and more 
than 90% of items were completed).  Completion of the manipulation checks 
immediately prior to the demographics questions was used as a cutoff point for full 
participation in the research.  Thus, overall, 229 individuals who took part in the research 
were dropped from the final sample (25.44%).  Approximately half of the 671 
participants (337) completed Study 1 (Marriage Equality) and half of the participants 
(334) completed Study 2 (Housing Equality).   
In the Marriage Equality study, 50.4% of participants were men and 46% were 
women.  The average age was 34.56 years old and the sample was 76.9% White (non-
Latino), 7.1% African American (Black), 4.7% Asian American, 3.6% Latino/a, 2.1% 
Native American, and 2.4% identified as “Other”.  Participant religious affiliation varied, 
with the largest group identifying as having no religious affiliation (32.9%), followed by 
Protestant (31.2%), Catholic (16.3%), “Other” (14.8%), Muslim (.9%), and Jewish (.6%).  
For political affiliation, 38.3% of participants were Democrats, 22% were Independents, 
15.7% were Republicans, 12.8% had “No Affiliation”, 6.5% were Libertarians, .9% were 
“Other” affiliation, and .6% were Green Party members.  Many participants were married 
or in a marriage-like relationship (43.3%), believed marriage was important (77.4%), and 
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considered themselves to be middle class (43.9%).  Slightly more than half owned their 
home (51.9%), most had rented housing at some point in their lives (85.5%), and most 
thought that owning one’s home was important (77.7%).  Participants were fairly well-
educated with 32.3% having some college or were in college when they participated, 
42.4% having a college degree (Associate’s or Bachelor’s), and 14.2% having an 
advanced degree.  Most participants were employed, with 51.3% employed full time, 
17.5% employed part-time, 14.5% unemployed, and 13.4% identifying as Students.  All 
participants identified as “straight” and resided within a state that did not have either 
marriage equality or state-wide housing equality. 
In the Housing Equality study, 46.7% of participants were men and 47.9% were 
women.  The average age was 35.77 years old and the sample was 75.4% White (non-
Latino), 7.8% African American (Black), 4.2% Asian American, 5.1% Latino/a, 1.5% 
Native American, and .6% identified as “Other”.  Participant religious affiliation varied, 
with the largest group identifying as having no religious affiliation (35.9%), followed by 
Protestant (29%), “Other” (15.6%), Catholic (12.9%), Muslim (.6%), and Jewish (.6%).  
For political affiliation, 35% of participants were Democrats, 18.9% were Independents, 
18.9% were Republicans, 10.2% were Libertarians, 9.3% had “No Affiliation”, 1.5% 
were Green Party members, and .9% were “Other” affiliation.  Many participants were 
married or in a marriage-like relationship (44.9%), believed marriage was important 
(75.1%), and considered themselves to be middle class (43.1%).  Slightly more than half 
owned their home (50.3%), most had rented housing at some point in their lives (87.1%), 
and most thought that owning one’s home was important (79.9%).  Participants were 
fairly well-educated with 30.2% having some college or were in college when they 
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participated, 44% having a college degree (Associate’s or Bachelor’s), and 14.7% having 
an advanced degree.  Most participants were employed, with 48.2% employed full time, 
19.2% employed part-time, 16.5% unemployed, and 10.8% identifying as Students.  All 
participants identified as “straight” and resided within a state that did not have either 
marriage equality or state-wide housing equality.  In this research, the samples from the 
two studies were very similar. 
Procedure 
 Participants first completed an Informed Consent document that described the 
initial demographic questionnaire, its purpose, the possibility of taking part in the larger 
study, and their consent to participate in both parts of the study (Appendix A).  After 
completing the informed consent, participants completed a short demographic form that 
asked them to provide their age, driver’s license, gender, sexual orientation, whether they 
are registered to vote (and, if so, in what state they are registered to vote), state in which 
they reside, and other, filler items (Appendix B).  All participants who completed the 
informed consent form and initial demographics form received $.10 for their 
participation.  The Qualtrics program directed participants who qualified to the main 
study website where they read a brief instruction form that stated that the current project 
actually encompasses several studies to be administered in one sitting (Appendix C).  
Each of these “studies” had different font and individualized instructions to convey that 
they were separate studies brought together for convenience.  For the “News Article 
Reactions Study” (study A), participants then read part of a purported news article (the 
system threat manipulation).  Half of participants read that most Americans believe the 
country has hit a low point in terms of economic, political, and social factors (system 
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threat) (Appendix D).  The other half of participants read that most Americans believe the 
country is relatively stable, but prosperous compared to other countries in terms of 
economic, political, and social factors (system affirmation) (Appendix D).   
Participants rated, on 5-point scales, the degree to which they felt anger, fear, 
disgust, hope, happiness, compassion, and anxiety regarding the news article they read 
(See Appendix E for the exact language in this survey) and then completed manipulation 
check measures (i.e., questions asking what the article was about).  The emotion 
measures included synonyms for specific emotions that the studies may trigger within 
participants.  By using multiple forms of the emotions, I was able to calculate reliability 
coefficients for each emotion (except anxiety, which was a single item) (see Table 1).  
The emotion measures for happiness, anger, fear, and disgust were modifications of the 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule – Expanded Form (PANAS-X) (Watson & Clark, 
1994) that other researchers have frequently used.  Anxiety is treated as an aspect of fear 
within the PANAS-X; as such, it was analyzed separately and with fear.  The emotion 
measures for hope used synonyms from the thesaurus (Oxford Dictionaries, 2015) and 
are based upon Ortony, Clore, and Collins’ (1988) description of prospect-based 
emotions.  The emotion measures for compassion (Batson, Lishner, Cook, & Sawyer, 
2005) also used synonyms from the thesaurus (Oxford Dictionaries, 2015) and are based 
upon Batson’s (1987) self-reported empathy measure and Ortony et al.’s (1988) 
description of “sorry for” emotions.  The emotion measures were thought to capture the 
feelings experienced by participants when the status quo was threatened, thereby 
providing greater explication regarding the system justification process.   
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Table 1 
   
Emotion Reliabilities (Cronbach’s α) after Current Status Quo and Status Quo 
Likelihood Manipulations According to Marriage Equality and Housing Equality Studies 
 
 Marriage Equality Housing Equality 
Emotion After Current 
Status Quo 
After Status 
Quo Likelihood 
After Current 
Status Quo 
After Status 
Quo Likelihood 
 
Fearful 
 
.91 
 
.91 
 
.92 
 
.91 
     
Happiness .95 .96 .95 .96 
     
Anger .81 .88 .86 .85 
     
Disgust 
 
.80 .85 .78 .84 
Hope 
 
.77 .84 .77 .84 
Compassion .82 .77 .77 .79 
     
 
After completing the emotion measures, participants completed system 
justification items that measure the extent to which participants believed sexual 
orientation to be a suspect class (created using the four criteria cited by courts) (Sevcik, 
2012) and housing and marriage system justification items (i.e. purported state interests) 
(Alexander, 2001; Bruning, 2008; Jackson, 2012; Price et al., 2005; Rahman, 2004; 
Sevcik, 2012).  The items served as potential justifications that participants may use to 
support the then-current (anti-marriage and housing equality) status.  The equal 
protection suspect class items asked participants their beliefs regarding lesbians and gay 
men’s history of discrimination experience, ability to contribute to society, immutability, 
and political powerlessness.  The marriage and housing system justification items asked 
participants the extent to which they agreed with the purported state interests listed in the 
anti-marriage and “special rights” cases (e.g., “traditional marriage, i.e. heterosexual-
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couple marriage should be protected”).  The extent that participants agreed with both the 
equal protection suspect class items and the marriage and housing system justification 
items were thought to depend upon participants’ experimental condition (see Hypotheses 
1(c), 2(c), and 3(c), above), thereby providing mediation for participants’ votes on the 
ballot initiative (see Hypotheses 1(d), 2(d), and 3(d), above). 
For the “Ballot Initiative Study” (study B), all participants read a proposed ballot 
initiative for their state and determined whether they would vote for this as an 
amendment to their state constitution and how likely they would be to vote for the 
amendment on a scale of 1 to 5 (with 1 being “Very Unlikely to Vote for this 
Amendment” and 5 being “Very Likely to Vote for this Amendment”) (Appendix F).  For 
Study 1, the ballot initiative concerned redefining marriage within the participants’ state 
to include same-sex couples.  For Study 2, the ballot initiative concerned extension of 
civil rights law within the participants’ state to include sexual orientation as a protected 
class.  These ballot initiatives measured participants’ beliefs in the current status quo, i.e. 
the system itself.     
 Participants then read that they would complete a third study (“Study C: Political 
Science Report Study”) developed by a different political science researcher (Appendix 
G).  Again, the intention of this instruction was to encourage participants to distinguish 
between the different parts of the study.  Participants read a “Political Science Report” 
that stated that law and political science experts believed that the United States would 
have country-wide marriage (Study 1) or housing (Study 2) equality by 2016.  This 
statement qualified the likelihood of a new equality status using different percentages 
according to four conditions.  In the first condition (lowest likelihood), participants read 
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that experts believe the likelihood for countrywide equality to be 10%.  In the second 
condition (low likelihood), the likelihood was 30%.  In the third condition (moderate 
likelihood), the likelihood was 60%.  In the fourth condition (highest likelihood), the 
likelihood was 90%.  The likelihood manipulation tested whether participants felt the 
need to support a new status quo when there was a greater likelihood of it occurring.  
Again, participants completed the same set of emotion measures, a set of manipulation 
checks regarding the report they read, and a second set of system justification measures 
based on suspect class and marriage and housing equality (Appendix H).  All participants 
then read the same proposed ballot initiative for their state that they read previously and 
determined whether they would vote for this as an amendment to their state constitution if 
it were on the ballot and how likely they would be to vote for the amendment on a scale 
of 1 to 5 (with 1 being “Very Unlikely to Vote for this Amendment” and 5 being “Very 
Likely to Vote for this Amendment”).       
 Participants then read that they would complete a fourth and final study (“Study 
D: General Political Attitudes Study”) assessing a broad array of attitudes (Appendix I).  
The questionnaires for this study assessed the extent that participants rationalize/ justify 
the current system and included items assessing individual differences variables.  For 
justifications thought to represent individual differences variables that affect support for 
the current system, the current study measured participants’ endorsement of items from 
Kay and Jost’s Situational System Justification scale (2003), Herek’s Attitudes Towards 
Lesbians and Gay men scale (ATLG) (1988), and Lipkus’ Global Belief in a Just World 
scale (1991).     
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As originally theorized, Kay and Jost (2003) created the Situational System 
Justification scale as a measure of participants’ needs to justify the status quo in specific, 
experimental situations.  Thus, this variable was conceptualized as depending upon 
context.  In the current research, it was hypothesized to act as an individual differences 
variable (see Hypothesis 4) (Cronbach’s α = .84 for the Marriage Equality study and 
Cronbach’s α = .86 for the Housing Equality study).   
Herek’s ATLG scale includes stereotypical statements regarding lesbians and gay 
men and remains the standard for measuring negative attitudes held toward lesbians and 
gay men (see Hypothesis 4) (Cronbach’s α = .96 for the Marriage Equality study and 
Cronbach’s α = .96 for the Housing Equality study; Herek, 1988; 1994; 2000; Hudepohl, 
Parrott, & Zeichner, 2010; Parrott & Gallagher, 2008).  After the ATLG, participants 
completed the Global Belief in a Just World scale (Lipkus, 1991), which measures the 
extent that they believe the world is just, an individual differences, trait-like variable 
(Cronbach’s α = .93 for the Marriage Equality study and Cronbach’s α = .92 for the 
Housing Equality study).  System justification researchers link this latent-trait variable to 
overall tendencies to support the status quo, making it essential to include it in the current 
research (Jost et al., 2004; Jost, Glaser et al., 2003; Jost & Hunyady, 2005).   
Prior research suggests that conflict between groups arises when the out-group’s 
culture poses a threat to the in-group’s culture (Stephan, Diaz-Loving, & Duran, 2000; 
Stephan, Ybarra, & Bachman, 1999).  This threat takes the form of realistic threats (i.e. 
subjectively perceived threats to the in-group’s existence, economic and political power, 
and physical well-being) and symbolic threats (i.e. the out-group’s perceived different 
worldview that threatens the in-group’s worldview).  Symbolic threat takes the form of 
114 
 
the two groups holding seemingly different norms, beliefs, attitudes, etc. (Stephan et al., 
2000).  When the in-group feels threatened by the out-group, they may experience 
intergroup anxiety, i.e. anxiety about intergroup interactions due to fear of suffering 
negative outcomes.  Intergroup anxiety, in turn, leads in-group members to hold negative 
feelings and attitudes (prejudice) toward the out-group.  These attitudes and feelings are 
then reinforced by negative stereotypes (beliefs) regarding the out-group because the 
stereotypes justify feelings of threat and anxiety by providing reasons for the in-group 
member’s experience.  Although much of the research regarding integrated threat theory 
involves conflict between groups according to race or ethnicity, integrated threat theory 
may also explain the way the heterosexual majority treats sexual minorities.   
Participants completed shortened (four out of seven items measuring Realistic 
Threat and four out of eight items measuring Symbolic Threat) versions of the Realistic 
and Symbolic Threat scale (Stephan et al., 1999).  The original scales (Stephan et al., 
1999) focused upon perceived threats posed by out-groups within the context of 
immigration.  Thus, because I was unable to modify certain items to fit the sexual 
minority context (e.g., “Immigration from Asia is undermining American culture”), I did 
not include these items.  Modified versions of the remaining eight items referred to the 
in-group as either “most Americans” (matching the original scale language) or 
“heterosexual” and the out-group was “lesbians and gay men”.  As separate factors, the 
scales lacked reliability, but an overall scale for threat (Cronbach’s α = .87 for the 
Marriage Equality study and Cronbach’s α = .88 for the Housing Equality study) did 
show more than adequate reliability.  In addition, Stephan and colleagues (1999) 12 item 
Intergroup Anxiety scale was used to measure the anxiety participants felt toward 
115 
 
lesbians and gay men (Cronbach’s α = .94 for the Marriage Equality study and 
Cronbach’s α = .95 for the Housing Equality study).   
Next, participants completed manipulation checks (Appendix J).  Finally, 
participants completed a demographic questionnaire answering questions about their 
political party affiliation; how liberal/conservative they are on economic, social, and 
political issues; and several religious items intended to gauge whether they belong to 
conservative or religious affiliations, each of which could impact the likelihood of 
individuals to support the status quo (Jost et al., 2004; Jost et al., 2014; Kay, Whitson et 
al., 2009) (Appendix K).  To complete the study, participants were debriefed and 
received payment for their participation (Appendix L). 
Statistical Analyses 
 The statistical analyses for this project for each hypothesis depended upon 
whether the goal was to test differences between means or to predict a vote/ support 
decision, whether mediators were involved, and whether moderators were involved.  In 
general, I conducted Analyses of Variances (ANOVAs) and Multivariate Analyses of 
variances (MANOVAs) to compare means between groups on continuous variables and 
logistic regression for dichotomous variables i.e., votes in favor or opposed to assuring 
equality.  Therefore, I used these models for most of the variables including either scales 
or individual items on the Herek’s ATLG scale, the suspect class items, the trait-like 
system justification items (Situational System Justification scale and Global Belief in a 
Just World scale), and the system justification questions for marriage and housing 
equality.  Thus, I analyzed the effects of system threat and likelihood conditions with a 
factorial design: 2 (System condition: Threat vs. Affirmation) x 4 (Likelihood condition: 
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10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%).  Because the likelihood of voting for the ballot initiative, 
the emotion measures, and the system justification measures are asked after both the 
system threat and likelihood manipulations, I analyzed these measures using a repeated 
measures ANOVA to see whether participant’s emotions, justifications, and ballot votes 
change after the likelihood manipulation (see Hypothesis 3).  When using the emotional 
reactions items, Herek’s ATLG scale, the suspect class items, the system justification 
items, and the system justification questions for marriage and housing equality to predict 
the likelihood that participants would vote for the ballot initiative and the extent that they 
support the new status quo, I used a multiple regression analysis. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
Marriage Equality 
Hypothesis 1: Current status quo manipulation (Main Effect). 
Current status quo manipulation’s effects on Ballot 1 decisions. 
Current status quo manipulation’s effect on voting for Ballot 1. 
A between subjects One-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) testing whether 
participants differed in their initial ballot according to current status quo condition 
(threating participants current status quo) failed to yield a significant result, F(1, 331) = 
.79, MSE = .21, p > .05, ηρ² = .00.  Of those who voted on Ballot 1 (four participants did 
not vote), 69.7% voted for marriage equality.   
Individual differences variables’ effects on voting for Ballot 1. 
Correlation analyses revealed that the individual differences variables (Attitudes 
Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale (ATLG), Situational System Justification scale 
(SSJ), Global Belief in a Just World scale (GBJW), Realistic and Symbolic Threat, and 
Intergroup Anxiety) were significantly correlated with Ballot 1 such that participants 
were less likely to vote for marriage equality with more negative attitudes toward 
lesbians and gay men (ATLG), , r = -.77, p < .01, stronger views that lesbians and gay 
men constituted realistic and symbolic threats, r = -.67, p < .01, greater anxiety felt 
toward lesbians and gay men (Intergroup Anxiety), r = -.46, p < .01, stronger belief that 
American society is fair, legitimate, and justifiable (SSJ) r = -.20, p < .01, and stronger 
global belief in a just world (GBJW), r = -.23, p < .01.    (Note: r values are point, bi-
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serial correlations for the Ballot 1 dichotomous outcome – voting against marriage 
equality = 0 and voting in favor of marriage quality = 1).  
Main effects and interactions for current status quo emerged when individual 
difference covariates were added to the binary logistic regressions, separately, one at a 
time.  Table 2 displays the results. The main effects for the covariates were similar to the 
correlation analyses described above (except for SSJ and GBJW, which were not 
significant predictors for the marriage equality vote).  However, as shown in Table 2, 
there was a significant regression model with the SSJ covariate, Nagelkerke R2 = .07, 
X2(3) = 17.44, p < .01, revealing a main effect for current status quo but qualified by a 
quo by SSJ interaction.  For those in the affirmation condition, SSJ was a significant 
predictor such that the more that participants believed American society to be fair, 
legitimate, and justifiable, the less likely they were to vote for marriage equality, Β = -
.47, p < .01, Nagelkerke R2 = .13, X
2(1) = 15.88, p < .01.  For those in the threat 
condition, SSJ was not a significant predictor, Nagelkerke R2 = .01, X
2(1) = 1.04, p > .05.   
  Similarly, the GBJW covariate produced a significant model, Nagelkerke R2 = 
.11, X2(3) = 25.92, p < .01, with a main effect for current status quo but again qualified 
by a significant current status quo by GBJW interaction.  For participants in the 
affirmation condition, GBJW was a significant predictor, Β = -.90, p < .01, Nagelkerke R2 
= .20, X2(1) = 24.32, p < .01.  For participants in the threat condition, GBJW was not a 
significant predictor, Nagelkerke R2 = .01, X
2(1) = 1.07, p > .05.  Thus, threat appears to 
disrupt the relationship between GBJW and the marriage equality vote.   
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Table 2 
   
Binary Logistic Regressions with Current Status Quo and Individual Differences 
Covariates Predicting Initial Ballot Decision (Marriage Equality) 
 
Covariate 
Predictor 
Model 
Current Status Quo 
(CSQ) and Individual 
Differences Covariates 
(Predictors) 
Β Wald p Exp(B) 
 
ATLG 
 
ATLG 
                    
-2.20 (.33) 
 
 
44.58 
 
.00 
 
.11 
SSJ SSJ -.12 (.12) 1.02 .31 .89 
 
SSJ 
 
CSQ  
 
1.83 (.86) 
 
4.58 
 
.03 
 
 
6.23 
      
SSJ 
 
CSQ x SSJ Interaction -.36 (.17) 4.18 .04 .70 
SSJ 
(Affirmation) 
 
CSQ x SSJ Interaction -.47 (.13) 
 
13.80 .00 
 
.62 
GBJW 
 
GBJW -.17 (.16) 1.06 .30 .85 
GBJW CSQ 2.49 (.89) 
 
7.87 .00 
 
12.08 
GBJW 
 
CSQ x GBJW 
Interaction 
-.73 (.26) 8.00 .01 .48 
GBJW 
(Affirmation) 
CSQ x GBJW 
Interaction 
-.90 (.20) 19.72 .00 
 
.41 
      
Realistic & 
Symbolic 
Threat 
Realistic & Symbolic 
Threat 
-1.77 (.28) 41.17 .00 
 
.17 
      
Intergroup 
Anxiety 
 
Intergroup Anxiety -.59 (.11) 28.20 .00 .55 
Notes. ATLG, SSJ, GBJW, and CSQ stand for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale, 
Situational System Justification scale, Global Belief in a Just World scale, and Current Status 
Quo.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Dfs = 1. 
 
 
Current status quo manipulation’s effect on likelihood to vote for Ballot 1. 
A between subjects One-way ANOVA testing whether participants differed in 
their initial ballot likelihood according to current status quo condition failed to yield a 
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significant result, F(1, 330) = 2.05, MSE = 5.77, p > .05, ηρ² = .01.  Of those that rated 
their likelihood to vote for Ballot 1 (five participants did not complete this item), 67.2% 
of participants were at least somewhat likely to vote for marriage equality (with 41.9% 
very likely) and 28.9% were at least somewhat unlikely to vote for marriage equality 
(with 21.4% very unlikely).   
Individual differences variables’ effects on likelihood to vote for Ballot 1. 
Correlation analyses revealed that the individual differences variables were 
significantly correlated with Ballot 1 likelihood such that participants were less likely to 
vote for marriage equality with more negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men 
(ATLG), r = -.79, p < .01, stronger views that lesbians and gay men constituted realistic 
and symbolic threats, r = -.71, p < .01, greater anxiety felt toward lesbians and gay men 
(Intergroup Anxiety), r = -.50, p < .01, stronger belief that American society is fair, 
legitimate, and justifiable (SSJ), r = -.24, p < .01, and stronger global belief in a just 
world (GBJW), r = -.25, p < .01.   
Main effects and interactions for current status quo emerged when individual 
difference covariates were added to the basic ANOVA one at a time, thereby creating a 
series of Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) designs.  Table 3 displays the results. The 
main effects for the covariates were similar to the correlation analyses described above.  
However, as shown in Table 3, a marginally significant main effect emerged for current 
status quo in the SSJ ANCOVA such that participants in the affirmation condition were 
more likely to vote for Ballot 1 (M = 5.07) than were participants in the threat condition 
(M = 4.76).    
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Similarly, for the GBJW ANCOVA, a significant main effect emerged for current 
status quo, but was qualified by a significant current status quo by GBJW interaction.  
For participants in the affirmation condition, GBJW was a significant predictor, β = -.40, 
p < .01, R2 = .16, F(1, 162) = 30.87, MSE = 4.78.  For participants in the threat condition, 
GBJW was not a significant predictor, β = -.10, p > .05, R2 = .01, F(1, 161) = 1.56, MSE 
= 5.72.  Thus, threat appears to disrupt the relationship between GBJW and the likelihood 
to vote for marriage equality. 
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Table 3 
   
ANCOVA Models with Current Status Quo and Individual Differences Covariates 
Predicting Initial Ballot Decision (Marriage Equality) 
 
Covariate 
Predictor 
Model 
Current Status Quo 
(CSQ) and 
Individual 
Differences 
Covariates 
(Predictors) 
Df F MSE p β ηρ² 
 
ATLG 
 
ATLG 
 
1, 323 
 
541.96 
 
2.14 
 
.000 
 
-.84 
 
.63 
 
SSJ 
 
SSJ  
 
1, 323 
 
18.35 
 
5.36 
 
.000 
 
-.32 
 
.05 
        
SSJ 
 
CSQ 1, 323 3.67 5.36 .056 -.32 .01 
GBJW GBJW 1, 323 21.70 5.25 .000 -.40 .06 
        
GBJW 
 
CSQ 1, 323 8.66 5.25 .003 -.48 .03 
GBJW 
 
CSQ x GBJW 
Interaction 
 
1, 323 7.89 5.25 .005 -.50 .02 
GBJW 
(Affirmation) 
CSQ x GBJW 
Interaction 
1, 162 30.87 4.78 .000 -.40 .16 
        
Realistic & 
Symbolic 
Threat 
Realistic & 
Symbolic Threat 
1, 323 328.01 2.84 .000 -.70 .50 
        
Intergroup 
Anxiety 
 
Intergroup Anxiety 1, 323 109.06 4.28 .000 -.55 .25 
Notes. ATLG, SSJ, GBJW, and CSQ stand for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale, 
Situational System Justification scale, Global Belief in a Just World scale, and Current Status 
Quo. 
 
When the individual differences covariates were added to the linear regression 
model, the linear regression was significant, R2 = .64, F(6, 320) = 93.02, p < .01.  
Participants with more negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men and those who 
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believed that gay men and lesbians represent a realistic and symbolic threat were 
significantly less likely to vote for marriage equality (See Table 4).         
Table 4 
   
Linear Regressions with Individual Differences Covariates Predicting Initial Ballot 
Likelihood Decision (Marriage Equality) 
 
Covariate 
Predictor 
Model 
Β S.E. Β t p 
 
ATLG 
 
-1.52 
 
.15 
 
-.68 
 
-10.05 
 
.00 
      
Realistic & 
Symbolic 
Threat 
 
-.29 .12 -.16 -2.46 .01 
Note. ATLG stands for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale. 
 
 
Current status quo manipulation’s effect on emotion. 
A 2 (Current Status Quo: Affirmation v. Threat) x 7 (Emotion: Fear v. Anxiety v. 
Anger v. Disgust v. Compassion v. Happiness v. Hope) Multivariate Analysis of 
Variance (MANOVA) testing the extent that participants felt different emotions when 
threatened revealed a significant multivariate main effect for current status quo, MultF(7, 
329) = 11.03, p < .01, ηρ² = .19 (See Table 5 for the means).  Follow-up univariates 
showed that threat condition participants were more fearful, F(1, 335) = 26.36, MSE = 
.44, p < .01, ηρ² = .07; anxious, F(1, 335) = 23.09, MSE = .71, p < .01, ηρ² = .06; angry, 
F(1, 335) = 20.04, MSE = .65, p < .001, ηρ² = .06; disgusted, F(1, 335) = 18.22, MSE = 
.54, p < .001, ηρ² = .05; and compassionate, F(1, 335) = 9.60, MSE = .68, p < .01, ηρ² = 
.03.  Affirmation condition participants were happier and more hopeful, F(1, 335) = 
34.58, MSE = 1.10, p < .01, ηρ² = .09 and F(1, 335) = 19.38, MSE = .91, p < .001, ηρ² = 
.06, respectively.  No other effects were significant. 
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Table 5 
   
Differences across Emotions According to Current Status Quo after Current Status Quo 
Manipulation (Marriage Equality) 
 
 Affirmation Threat 
Emotion M SE M SE 
 
Fear 
 
 
1.26 
 
.05 
 
1.64 
 
.05 
Anxiety 
 
1.31 .07 1.75 .06 
Anger 1.50 .06 1.90 .06 
     
Disgust 
 
1.38 .06 1.72 .06 
Compassion 1.68 .06 1.96 .06 
     
Happiness 2.32 .08 1.64 .08 
     
Hope 2.50 .07 2.05 .07 
     
Notes. All means are significantly different for each emotion according to current status quo at p 
< .01.  NAffirmation = 165 and NThreat = 172. 
 
 
Current status quo manipulation’s effect on sexual minority system  
justification. 
A 2 (Current Status Quo: Affirmation v. Threat) x 17 (Sexual Minority System 
Justifications (SMSJ): 17 individual items) MANOVA testing whether participants 
differed according to current status quo condition for seventeen system justification items 
did not attain significance, MultF(17, 309) = .78, p > .05, ηρ² = .04 (See Table 6).  Threat 
condition participants were marginally significantly more likely than affirmation 
condition participants to believe that lesbians and gay men are selfish (in general), F(1, 
325) = 3.81, MSE = 1.29, p =.05, ηρ² = .01; significantly more likely to believe that 
lesbians and gay men are selfish because they put themselves before others, F(1, 325) = 
4.02, MSE = 1.28, p < .05, ηρ² = .01 and significantly less likely to believe that lesbians 
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and gay men have a history of experiencing discrimination in the United States, F(1, 325) 
= 4.10, MSE = 1.20, p < .05, ηρ² = .01.   
Table 6 
  
Differences across System Justifications According to Current Status Quo after Current 
Status Quo Manipulation (Marriage Equality) 
 
Sexual Minority 
System 
Justification 
Affirmation Threat 
M SE M SE 
 
LG Selfish – 
General 
 
1.59* 
 
.09 
 
1.83* 
 
 
.09 
     
LG Selfish – put 
themselves 
before others 
 
1.58 .09 1.83 .09 
LG History of 
Discrimination 
 
4.42 .09 4.17 .08 
Note. LG stands for Lesbians and Gay men.  Means are significantly different at p < .05 level, 
unless denoted with a *.  Means with a * are marginally significantly different at p = .05.  
NAffirmation = 160 and NThreat = 167. 
 
 
To examine the social justifications groupings, I performed an exploratory factor 
analysis of the 17 SMSJ items, which produced two significant internally reliable factors.  
The first factor, entitled LGSelfish, included eight items representing participants’ views 
of lesbians and gay men as selfish, immature, immoral, privileged, desirous of “special 
rights”, and willing to use undemocratic means to gain these rights (Eigenvalue = 8.59; 
explained variance 50.52%; cut off loading score = .40).  LGSelfish was internally 
consistent at both time 1 (after the current status quo manipulation) and at time 2 (after 
the status quo likelihood manipulation), Cronbach’s α = .91 and α = .93, respectively.  
The second factor included six items representing participants’ views that homosexuality 
is unnatural; sexual orientation can be changed; “traditional”, heterosexual marriage 
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should be protected; heterosexual, married couples provide the ideal parenting 
environment for raising children; states should move slowly when deciding whether to 
include same-sex couples within the definition of marriage; and restricting marriage to 
heterosexual couples encourages natural procreation (Eigenvalue = 1.18; explained 
variance 6.95%; cut off loading score = .40).  Entitled NaturalHeterosexualMarriage, this 
factor was internally consistent at both time 1 and at time 2, Cronbach’s α = .89 and α = 
.90, respectively.  The three remaining items (i.e. that lesbians and gay men have a 
history of discrimination in the United States (Discrimination History), that lesbians and 
gay men have enough political power to achieve their goals through the ordinary political 
process (Political Power), and that sexual orientation is related to an individual’s ability 
to contribute to society (Societal Contribution)) did not load on either of the two factors 
and lowered the two factors’ internal reliabilities; thus, these items were left as individual 
items.   
A 2 (Current Status Quo: Affirmation v. Threat) x 5 (SMSJ – Reduced number of 
items at Time 1) MANOVA testing whether participants differed according to current 
status quo condition for the two factors and the three standalone items approached 
multivariate significance, MultF(5, 329) = 1.98, p = .08, ηρ² = .03.  Threat condition 
participants were marginally more likely than affirmation condition participants to 
believe that lesbians and gay men are selfish (LGSelfish factor), F(1, 333) = 3.61, MSE = 
1.02, p = .058, ηρ² = .01 and marginally less likely to believe that lesbians and gay men 
have a history of experiencing discrimination in the United States, F(1, 333) = 3.62, MSE 
= 1.22, p = .058, ηρ² = .01 (See Table 7).  
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Table 7 
   
Differences across Sexual Minority System Justifications (Reduced Model) according to 
Current Status Quo after Current Status Quo Manipulation (Marriage Equality) 
 
Sexual Minority 
System 
Justification 
Affirmation Threat 
M SE M SE 
 
LGSelfish 
 
1.85 
 
.08 
 
2.06 
 
 
.08 
     
LG History of 
Discrimination 
 
4.40 .09 4.17 .08 
Note. LG stands for Lesbians and Gay Men.  Means are marginally significantly different at p = 
.058.  NAffirmation = 165 and NThreat = 170. 
 
 
Mediation of the relationship between current status quo and marriage equality 
ballot decisions by emotion and sexual minority system justification. 
 Participants did not differ in their Ballot 1 decisions according to current status 
quo.  In a series of binary logistic regressions that controlled for the effect of the 
individual differences variables on marriage equality Ballot 1, the main effect of current 
status quo did not attain statistical significance, ps > .05.  Although current status quo 
was a marginally significant predictor within the SSJ ANCOVA model for likelihood to 
vote for Ballot 1 (See Above), when the interaction between SSJ and current status quo 
was removed from the model, current status quo was no longer marginally significant, p 
> .10.  Similarly, although there was a main effect for current status quo and an 
interaction effect between current status quo and GBJW within the GBJW ANCOVA 
model, when the interaction was removed from the model, current status quo was no 
longer significant, p > .05.  I performed no mediation analyses because there were no 
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significant differences for status quo to test for emotion or system justification 
mediations.  
Hypothesis 2: Status quo likelihood manipulation (Main effect). 
Status quo likelihood manipulation’s effects on Ballot 2 decisions. 
Status quo likelihood manipulation’s effect on voting for Ballot 2. 
A between subjects One-way ANOVA testing whether participants differed in 
their second ballot according to status quo likelihood condition (10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 
90%) failed to yield a significant result, F(3, 326) = .06, MSE = .21, p > .05, ηρ² = .00.  
Of those that voted (seven participants did not vote), 70.6% voted for marriage equality.  
Individual differences variables’ effects on voting for Ballot 2. 
Correlation analyses revealed that the individual differences variables were 
significantly correlated with Ballot 2 such that participants were less likely to vote for 
marriage equality with more negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men (ATLG), r = 
-.78, p < .01; stronger views that lesbians and gay men constituted realistic and symbolic 
threats, r = -.68, p < .01; greater anxiety felt toward lesbians and gay men (Intergroup 
Anxiety), r = -.49, p < .01; stronger belief that American society is fair, legitimate, and 
justifiable (SSJ) r = -.21, p < .01; and stronger global belief in a just world (GBJW), r = -
.24, p < .01.  Main effects and interactions for status quo likelihood emerged when 
individual difference covariates were added to the binary logistic regressions for Ballot 2, 
separately, one at a time.  Although each individual differences variable resulted in 
significant models, status quo likelihood was not a significant predictor in any of the 
models.  Table 8 displays the results. The main effects for the covariates were similar to 
the correlation analyses described above.   
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Table 8 
  
Binary Logistic Regressions with Individual Differences Covariates Predicting Second 
Ballot Decision (Marriage Equality) 
 
Covariate 
Predictor 
Model 
Individual Differences 
Covariates 
(Predictors) 
Β Wald p Exp(B) 
 
ATLG 
 
ATLG 
                    
-3.19  (.70) 
 
20.66 
 
.00 
 
.04 
 
SSJ 
 
SSJ 
 
-.66 (.20) 
 
10.51 
 
.00 
 
 
.52 
GBJW GBJW -.64 (.28) 
 
5.22 .02 
 
.53 
Realistic & 
Symbolic 
Threat 
Realistic & Symbolic 
Threat 
-2.67 (.61) 19.11 .00 
 
.07 
      
Intergroup 
Anxiety 
 
Intergroup Anxiety -.61 (.15) 17.27 .00 .54 
Notes. ATLG, SSJ, and GBJW stand for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale, 
Situational System Justification scale, and Global Belief in a Just World scale.  Standard errors 
are in parentheses.  Dfs = 1. 
 
 
Status quo likelihood manipulation’s effect on likelihood to vote for Ballot 2. 
A between subjects One-way ANOVA testing whether participants differed in 
their second ballot likelihood according to status quo likelihood condition failed to yield 
a significant result, F(3, 325) = .20, MSE = 5.71, p > .05, ηρ² = .00.  Of those that 
completed this item (eight participants did not), 68.4% were at least somewhat likely to 
vote for marriage equality (40.1% were very likely) whereas 27% were at least somewhat 
unlikely to vote for marriage equality (21.6% were very unlikely).   
Individual differences variables’ effects on likelihood to vote for Ballot 2. 
Correlation analyses revealed that the individual differences variables were 
significantly correlated with Ballot 2 likelihood.  Participants were less likely to vote for 
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marriage equality with more negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men (ATLG), r = 
-.81, p < .01, stronger views that lesbians and gay men constituted realistic and symbolic 
threats, r = -.72, p < .01, greater anxiety felt toward lesbians and gay men (Intergroup 
Anxiety), r = -.51, p < .01, stronger beliefs that American society is fair, legitimate, and 
justifiable (SSJ), r = -.25, p < .01, and stronger global belief in a just world (GBJW), r = -
.26, p < .01.  Main effects emerged when individual difference covariates were added to 
the basic ANOVA one at a time, thereby creating a series of ANCOVA designs for 
likelihood to vote for Ballot 21.  Table 9 displays the results. The main effects for the 
covariates were similar to the correlation analyses.   
Table 9 
   
ANCOVA Models with Individual Differences Covariates Predicting Second Ballot 
Decision (Marriage Equality) 
 
Covariate 
Predictor 
Model 
Individual 
Differences 
Covariates 
(Predictors) 
Df F MSE p β ηρ² 
 
ATLG 
 
ATLG 
 
1, 320 
 
605.60 
 
1.96 
 
.000 
 
-.84 
 
.65 
 
SSJ 
 
SSJ  
 
1, 320 
 
22.32 
 
5.35 
 
.000 
 
-.37 
 
.06 
        
GBJW GBJW 1, 320 22.58 5.35 .000 -.27 .07 
        
Realistic & 
Symbolic 
Threat 
Realistic & 
Symbolic 
Threat 
1, 320 349.60 2.73 .000 -.81 .52 
        
Intergroup 
Anxiety 
 
Intergroup 
Anxiety 
1, 320 109.52 4.19 .000 -.53 .26 
Note. ATLG, SSJ, and GBJW stand for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale, 
Situational System Justification scale, and Global Belief in a Just World scale.   
 
                                                 
1 I created three vectors for status quo likelihood to compare the four groups (10%, 30%, 60%, and 90%) 
when conducting the regression model.  Unless otherwise noted, the standard reference group was the 90% 
condition. 
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A significant model was attained when individual differences covariates were 
added to the linear regression to see whether participants’ likelihood to vote for the 
second ballot differed according to status quo likelihood, R2 = .66, F(6, 321) = 104.94, p 
< .01. (See Table 10).  Participants with more negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay 
men and greater beliefs that lesbians and gay men represent threats were less likely to 
vote for marriage equality. 
Table 10 
   
Linear Regressions with Individual Differences Covariates Predicting Second Ballot 
Likelihood Decisions (Marriage Equality) 
 
Covariate 
Predictor 
Model 
Β S.E. β t p 
 
ATLG 
 
-1.58 
 
.14 
 
-.71 
 
-10.93 
 
.00 
      
Realistic & 
Symbolic 
Threat 
 
-.25 .11 -.14 -2.23 .03 
Note. ATLG stands for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale. 
 
Status quo likelihood manipulation’s effect on emotion. 
A 4 (Status Quo Likelihood: 10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) MANOVA testing the 
extent that participants felt different emotions (Fear v. Anxiety v. Anger v. Disgust v. 
Compassion v. Happiness v. Hope) under each status quo likelihood condition revealed a 
significant model, MultF(21, 919.422) = 1.77, p < .05, ηρ² = .04.  However, further 
inspection showed that only happiness differed marginally significantly across 
conditions, F(3, 326) = 2.63, MSE = 1.52, p = .05, ηρ² = .02 (See Table 11).  Participants 
                                                 
2 All omnibus multivariate tests in this experiment used the Wilks’ Lambda adjustment for correlated error 
terms, which result in adjusted degrees of freedom that may not always be whole numbers. 
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in the 90% condition felt significantly happier than participants in either the 10% or 30% 
conditions, ps < .05.   
Table 11 
 
Differences for Happiness According to Status Quo Likelihood after Status Quo 
Likelihood Manipulation (Marriage Equality) 
 
 10% 30% 60% 90% 
Emotion M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) 
     
Happiness 2.08a (.14) 2.03b (.14) 2.36 (.14) 2.48a, b (.13) 
     
Notes. Means with shared subscripts indicate significant differences at p < .05 level.  N10% = 83, 
N30% = 81, N60% = 80 and N90% = 86. 
 
 
Status quo likelihood manipulation’s effect on sexual minority system 
justification. 
A 4 (Status Quo Likelihood: 10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) MANOVA model 
testing the extent that participants used justifications (SMSJ: 17 items) under each status 
quo likelihood condition failed to attain significance, MultF(51, 885.02) = 1.18, p > .05, 
ηρ² = .06.  Individual justifications also failed to attain significance, ps > .05.  Similarly, 
the 4 (Status Quo Likelihood: 10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) MANOVA model for the 5 
justifications (SMSJ – Reduced number of items at Time 2 following the earlier factor 
analysis) failed to attain significance, MultF(15, 881.02) = .92, p > .05, ηρ² = .01.  Again, 
the individual justifications failed to attain significance, ps > .05.   
Mediation of the relationship between status quo likelihood and marriage 
equality ballot decisions by emotion and sexual minority system justification. 
 Participants did not differ in their Ballot 2 decisions according to status quo 
likelihood.  In a series of binary logistic regressions that controlled for the effect of the 
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individual differences variables on marriage equality Ballot 2, the main effect of status 
quo likelihood did not attain statistical significance, ps > .05.  In the series of ANCOVA 
models involving likelihood to vote for Ballot 2 (See Above), none of the models 
included a significant main effect or interaction for status quo likelihood.  I performed no 
mediation analyses because there were no significant differences for status quo to test for 
emotion or system justification mediations 
Hypothesis 3: Current status quo by status quo likelihood (Interaction 
effect). 
Current status quo and status quo likelihood manipulations’ effects on Ballot 2 
decisions. 
A 2 (Current Status Quo: Affirmation v. Threat) x 4 (Status Quo Likelihood: 10% 
v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) x 2 (Time: Initial v. Second ballot) repeated measures MANOVA 
testing the different hypotheses for Ballot change failed to attain significance, p > .05.  
Crosstabs revealed that only 2% of participants changed their vote (seven participants) 
between the initial and subsequent ballot.  However, a marginally significant current 
status quo by time interaction emerged, F(1, 321) = 3.37, MSE = .01, p = .067, ηρ² = .01.  
Follow up analyses did not reveal significant differences according to current status quo 
across time, i.e. participants in the threat and affirmation conditions did not change their 
votes across time, F(1, 163) = 1.00, MSE = .00, p > .05, ηρ² = .01 and F(1, 164) = 2.69, 
MSE = .02, p > .05, ηρ² = .02, respectively.  Similarly, participants did not differ at time 1 
or time 2 according to current status quo condition, t(331) = .89, p > .05 and t(328) = .29, 
p > .05, respectively, for Ballot 1 and Ballot 2 across current status quo condition.  A 2 x 
4 x 2 MANOVA for likelihood to vote also failed to attain significance, p > .05, because 
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only 7.9% of participants changed their likelihood to vote (26 of 328 participants) 
between the initial and subsequent ballot.   
Current status quo and status quo likelihood manipulations’ interaction effect on 
Ballot 2 decisions with individual differences variables included. 
 Correlational analyses revealed that individual differences variables were 
significantly correlated with the four ballot decisions (i.e. the initial ballot, the initial 
ballot likelihood, the subsequent ballot, and the subsequent ballot likelihood) (See Table 
12).  Participants were less likely to vote for marriage equality with more negative 
attitudes toward lesbians and gay men (ATLG), stronger views that lesbians and gay men 
constituted realistic and symbolic threats, greater anxiety felt toward lesbians and gay 
men, stronger beliefs that American society is fair, legitimate, and justifiable (SSJ), and 
stronger global belief in a just world (GBJW)3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Covariate analyses of these variables can be found in the Hypothesis 2 and 3 Results sections. 
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Table 12 
   
Correlations between Ballot Decisions and Individual Differences variables 
 
 Ballot Decision 
Individual 
Difference 
variable 
Ballot 1 Ballot 2 Ballot 1 
Likelihood 
Ballot 2 
Likelihood 
     
ATLG 
 
-.77 -.78 -.79 -.81 
SSJ 
 
-.20 -.21 -.24 -.25 
GBJW 
 
-.23 -.24 -.25 -.26 
Realistic & 
Symbolic Threat 
 
-.67 -.68 -.71 -.72 
Intergroup 
Anxiety 
-.46 -.49 -.50 -.51 
     
Notes. ATLG, SSJ, and GBJW stand for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale, 
Situational System Justification scale, and Global Belief in a Just World scale.  All correlations 
are significant at p < .01 level.  NBallot 1 = 328, NBallot 2 = 329, NBallot 1 Likelihood = 327, NBallot 2 Likelihood 
= 328.   
 
 
Individual differences variables’ effects on the relationship between manipulated 
variables (Current status quo and status quo likelihood) and voting for marriage 
equality. 
Binary logistic regression involving current status quo and status quo likelihood 
as predictors for Ballot 2 failed to attain significance, Nagelkerke R2 = .01, X
2(7) = 1.55, 
p > .05.  As shown in the results for Hypothesis 2, individual differences variables 
significantly predicted participants’ votes for Ballot 2.  Therefore, in a series of models, I 
added individual differences variables one at a time as covariates to the original binary 
logistic regression models used to predict Ballot 2.  Table 13 displays the results. The 
main effects for the covariates were similar to the correlation analyses described above.  
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However, as shown in Table 12 (Below), there was a significant regression model with 
the ATLG covariate, Nagelkerke R2 = .74, X
2(8) = 240.75, p < .01, revealing a main 
effect for status quo likelihood such that participants in the 10%, Β = 1.80, 30%, Β = 2.28, 
and 90%, Β = 1.95, conditions were significantly more likely to vote for marriage 
equality than participants in the 60% condition, ps < .05.   
Similarly, when the binary logistic regression model included all main effects and 
interactions for current status quo (Affirmation v. Threat), status quo likelihood (90% v. 
10%, 30%, and 60%), and GBJW with 90% and affirmation as the reference groups, a 
significant model emerged, Nagelkerke R2 = .17, X
2(15) = 40.76, p < .01, with a main 
effect for current status quo, but qualified by a significant current status quo by GBJW 
interaction.  After splitting the file for status quo conditions, binary logistic regression 
revealed that, for participants in the affirmation condition, GBJW was a significant 
predictor, Β = -.54, p < .01, Nagelkerke R2 = .28, X
2(7) = 35.37.  For participants in the 
threat condition, GBJW was not a significant predictor, Nagelkerke R2 = .04, X
2(7) = 
5.35, p > .05.  Thus, threat again appears to disrupt the relationship between GBJW and 
the marriage equality vote. 
Within the original, built model, a marginally significant interaction between 
current status quo and status quo likelihood emerged, p = .06; however, a marginally 
significant three-way interaction among current status quo, status quo likelihood, and 
GBJW, p = .06, qualified the two-way interaction.  Splitting the file according to current 
status quo and status quo likelihood allowed a finer look at the effects of GBJW under 
each of the status quo conditions.  A significant model emerged for the affirmation, 30% 
cell, Β = -1.23, p < .01, Nagelkerke R2 = .39, X
2(1) = 12.74; affirmation, 60% cell, B = -
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.65, p = .05, Nagelkerke R2 = .12, X
2(1) = 3.81; and affirmation, 90% cell, B = -2.54, p < 
.01, Nagelkerke R2 = .49, X
2(1) = 17.49, p < .01, such that participants within these 
conditions who held global belief in a just world were less likely to vote for Ballot 2.   
Table 13 
   
Binary Logistic Regressions with Current Status Quo, Status Quo Likelihood, and 
Individual Differences Covariates Predicting Second Ballot Decisions (Marriage 
Equality) 
 
Covariate 
Predictor 
Model 
Current Status Quo 
(CSQ), Status Quo 
Likelihood (SQL), and 
Individual Differences 
Covariates 
(Predictors) 
Β Wald d.f. p Exp(B) 
 
ATLG 
 
ATLG 
 
-2.92 
(.33) 
 
77.24 
 
1 
 
.00 
 
.05 
 
ATLG 
 
 
SQL (60% as 
reference group) 
 
                      
8.88 
 
3 
 
.03 
 
 
 SQL (10% v. 60%) 
 
 
1.80 
(.84) 
4.55 1 .03 6.04 
 SQL (30% v. 60%) 2.28 
(.91) 
6.30 1 .01 9.83 
 
 
 SQL (90% v. 60%) 1.95 
(.82) 
5.66 1 .02 7.02 
 
SSJ 
 
SSJ 
 
-.33 
(.09) 
 
14.71 
 
1 
 
.00 
 
 
.72 
GBJW GBJW -.54 
(.13) 
 
18.34 1 .00 
 
.58 
GBJW (Built 
Model) 
CSQ (Affirmation as 
reference group) 
8.54 
(3.27) 
6.84 1 .01 
 
5140.40 
       
 GBJW x CSQ 
Interaction 
(Affirmation as 
reference group) 
-2.51 
(.93) 
7.32 1 .01 .08 
       
 CSQ x SQL 
Interaction 
 7.37 3 .06 
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(Affirmation and 90% 
as reference groups) 
 
 GBJW x CSQ x SQL 
Interaction 
(Affirmation and 90% 
as reference groups) 
 7.30 3 .06  
       
GBJW (Built 
Model – Split 
by CSQ) 
GBJW (Affirmation 
condition) 
 
-2.54 
(.87) 
8.48 1 .00 .08 
       
GBJW (Built 
Model – Split 
by CSQ and 
SQL) 
GBJW (Affirmation 
and 30% condition) 
-1.23 
(.41) 
8.80 1 .00 .29 
 GBJW (Affirmation 
and 60% condition) 
-.65 
(.35) 
3.42 1 .06 .52 
  
GBJW (Affirmation 
and 90% condition) 
 
-2.54 
(.87) 
 
8.48 
 
1 
 
.00 
 
.08 
       
Realistic & 
Symbolic 
Threat 
Realistic & Symbolic 
Threat 
-1.94 
(.22) 
78.38 1 .00 
 
.14 
       
Intergroup 
Anxiety 
 
Intergroup Anxiety -.66 
(.08) 
59.48 1 .00 .52 
Notes. ATLG, SSJ, GBJW, CSQ, and SQL stand for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men 
scale, Situational System Justification scale, Global Belief in a Just World scale, Current Status 
Quo, and Status Quo Likelihood.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
Individual differences variables’ effects on the relationship between manipulated 
variables (Current status quo and status quo likelihood) and likelihood to vote for 
marriage equality. 
A series of mixed model ANCOVAs included individual differences variables as 
covariates in the 2 (Current Status Quo: Affirmation v. Threat) x 4 (Status Quo 
Likelihood: 10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) x 2 (Time: Ballot 1 Likelihood v. Ballot 2 
Likelihood) with repeated measures on the last factor tested the main effects and 
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interactions the continuous factor, likelihood to vote for marriage equality.  However, 
when the individual differences variables were added, one at a time, to the model, time of 
the ballot was not significant as a main effect or interaction, ps > .05.  Thus, the 
dependent variables were collapsed across time to create an overall likelihood to vote for 
marriage equality.   
A series of 2 (Current status quo: Affirmation v. Threat) x 4 (Status quo 
likelihood: 10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) ANCOVAs with the individual differences 
variables as covariates produced results similar to the correlation analyses performed 
above4 (see Tables 12 and 14).  In the GBJW ANCOVA model, significant main effects 
for current status quo and GBJW emerged, but were qualified by a significant interaction 
between current status quo and GBJW5 (See Table 14).  Splitting the file according to 
current status quo revealed that the significant effect of GBJW was in the affirmation 
condition, β = -.53, p < .01, F(1, 156) = 29.21, MSE = 4.78, ηρ² = .16.  As the effect of 
GBJW was not significant in the threat condition, this indicates that threat may disrupt 
the effect of GBJW on marriage equality decisions, β = -.09, p > .05, F(1, 156) = 2.48. 
Significant three-way interactions emerged among current status quo, status quo 
likelihood, and individual differences for ATLG and realistic and symbolic threat (See 
Table 14).  After splitting the file according to current status quo and status quo 
likelihood (separately), I conducted ANCOVAs and correlations for the individual 
difference factors.  Correlations between ATLG and likelihood to vote for marriage 
                                                 
4 The reference groups for regression analyses were the affirmation condition and the 90% condition, unless 
otherwise noted. 
5 The significant beta weights were found within the model using the 30% status quo likelihood as the 
reference group.  Therefore, the 30% condition was the reference group throughout the GBJW analyses. 
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equality were significant in all eight cells, ps < .01 (See Table 15).  Correlations were 
significantly different between the affirmation, 10% (r = -.906) and affirmation, 60% (r = 
-.708), z = -2.73, p < .01, and affirmation, 90% (r = -.780), z = -2.00, p < .05, cells 
(Fisher r-to-z transformation, Richard Lowry, 2001-2015, vassarstats.net/rdiff.html).  
Similarly, correlations were significantly different between the affirmation, 30% (r = -
.883) and affirmation, 60% (r = -.708), z = -2.20, p < .05, cells.  Correlations were 
significantly different between the threat, 10% (r = -.909) and threat, 30% (r = -.714), z = 
-2.78, p < .01, cells and marginally significantly different between the threat, 10% (r = -
.909) and threat, 60% (r = -.791), z = -1.93, p = .054, cells.  Finally, for the 30% 
condition, correlations were significantly different between affirmation (r = -.883) and 
threat (r = -.714), z = -2.14, p < .05.  
Correlations between realistic and symbolic likelihood and likelihood to vote for 
marriage equality were significant in all cells such that the more participants believed 
lesbians and gay men to represent realistic and symbolic threats, the less likely they were 
to vote for marriage equality (See Table 16).  None of the correlations were significantly 
different from each other within either the threat or affirmation conditions, ps > .05 
(Lowry, 2001-2015). 
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Table 14 
   
ANCOVA Models with Current Status Quo, Status Quo Likelihood, and Individual 
Differences Covariates Predicting Second Ballot Decision (Marriage Equality) 
 
Covariate 
Predictor 
Model 
Current Status Quo 
(CSQ), Status Quo 
Likelihood (SQL), 
and Individual 
Differences 
Covariates 
(Predictors) 
Df F MSE p β ηρ² 
 
ATLG 
 
ATLG 
 
 
1, 312 
 
627.36 
 
1.86 
 
.000 
 
-.78 
 
.67 
 CSQ x SQL x 
ATLG Interaction 
 
3, 312 3.96 1.86 .009 .392 .04 
ATLG (Split 
by CSQ) 
SQL x ATLG 
(Threat condition) 
 
3, 156 4.22 1.88 .007 .35 .08 
ATLG (Split 
by SQL) 
CSQ x ATLG (30% 
condition) 
1, 77 10.34 1.89 .002 .53 .12 
 
SSJ 
 
SSJ  
 
1, 312 
 
20.85 
 
5.22 
 
.000 
 
-.47 
 
.06 
        
GBJW GBJW 1, 312 23.38 5.13 .000 -.54 .07 
        
 CSQ 
 
1, 312 6.94 5.13 .009 -.63 .02 
 CSQ x GBJW 
Interaction 
 
1, 312 6.40 5.13 .012 .74 .02 
GBJW (Split 
by CSQ) 
 
GBJW (Affirmation 
condition) 
1, 156 29.21 4.78 .000 -.53 .16 
Realistic & 
Symbolic 
(R&S) Threat 
R&S Threat 1, 312 365.56 2.58 .000 -.67 .54 
        
 CSQ x SQL x R&S 
Threat Interaction 
 
3, 312 3.59 2.58 .014 .56 .03 
R&S Threat 
(Split by 
CSQ) 
 
SQL x R&S Threat 
Interaction (Threat 
condition) 
 
3, 156 4.38 2.19 .005 .56 .08 
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R&S Threat 
(Split by 
SQL) 
CSQ x R&S Threat 
Interaction (30% 
condition) 
1, 77 4.88 2.43 .030 .43 .06 
        
 CSQ x R&S Threat 
Interaction (90% 
condition) 
1, 79 5.02 2.52 .028 -.41 .06 
        
Intergroup 
Anxiety 
 
Intergroup Anxiety 1, 312 109.98 4.12 .000 -.54 .26 
Notes. ATLG, SSJ, GBJW, CSQ, and SQL stand for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men 
scale, Situational System Justification scale, Global Belief in a Just World scale, Current Status 
Quo, and Status Quo Likelihood.   
 
 
Table 15 
   
Correlations between ATLG (Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale) and 
Likelihood to Vote for Ballot 2 at Different Levels of Current Status Quo and Status Quo 
Likelihood (Marriage Equality) 
 
 Status Quo Likelihood Conditions 
Current Status 
Quo 
10% 30% 60% 90% 
 
Affirmation 
 
 
-.906a, b (40) 
 
-.883c, e (39) 
 
-.708a, c (43) 
 
-.780b (42) 
Threat 
 
-.909d* (43) -.714d, e (42) -.791* (38) -.815 (41) 
Notes. Correlations are significant at p < .01.  Correlations with shared subscripts indicate 
significant differences at p < .05 or less level.  Shared * indicate marginally significantly different 
at p = .05 level.  Ns are in parentheses. 
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Table 16 
 
Correlations between Realistic and Symbolic Threat scale and Likelihood to Vote for 
Ballot 2 at Different Levels of Current Status Quo and Status Quo Likelihood (Marriage 
Equality) 
 
 Status Quo Likelihood Conditions 
Current Status 
Quo 
10% 30% 60% 90% 
 
Affirmation 
 
 
-.640 (40) 
 
-.774 (39) 
 
-.634 (43) 
 
-.719 (42) 
Threat 
 
-.805 (43) -.729 (42) -.762 (38) -.811 (41) 
Notes. Correlations are significant at p < .001.  Ns are in parentheses. 
 
 
Current status quo and status quo likelihood manipulations’ effects on emotion. 
A 2 (Current Status Quo: Affirmation v. Threat) x 4 (Status Quo Likelihood: 10% 
v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) x 7 (Emotions: Fear v. Anxiety v. Anger v. Disgust v. 
Compassion v. Happiness v. Hope) x 2 (Time: After current status quo manipulation v. 
After status quo likelihood manipulation) mixed model ANOVA with repeated measures 
on the last two factors revealed significant main effects and interactions for reported 
emotion.  A significant main effect for emotion emerged, F(2.34, 753.166) = 108.29, MSE 
= 2.03, p < .01, ηρ² = .25, that was qualified by an emotion by current status quo 
interaction, F(2.34, 753.16) = 11.24, MSE = 2.03, p < .01, ηρ² = .03.  A significant time 
by emotion interaction emerged, F(2.21, 711.82) = 8.55, MSE = 1.48, p < .01, ηρ² = .03, 
that was qualified by two significant three-way interactions: one being time by emotion 
by current status quo, F(2.21, 711.82) = 16.21, MSE = 1.48, p < .01, ηρ² = .05, and the 
                                                 
6 All repeated measures tests in this experiment used the Huynh-Felt adjustment for correlated error terms, 
which result in adjusted degrees of freedom that may not always be whole numbers. 
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other being time by emotion by status quo likelihood, F(6.63, 711.82) = 2.56, MSE = 
1.48, p < .05, ηρ² = .02.   
 A series of 2 (Current Status Quo: Affirmation v. Threat) x 4 (Status Quo 
Likelihood: 10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) x 2 (Time: After current status quo 
manipulation (Time 1) v. After status quo likelihood manipulation (Time 2)) repeated 
measures ANOVAs were performed on each emotion.  Significant time main effects 
appeared for most emotions (except for anxiety and disgust): fear, F(1, 323) = 5.16, MSE 
= .34, p < .05, ηρ² = .02; anger, F(1, 323) = 6.55, MSE = .60, p < .05, ηρ² = .02; 
compassion, F(1, 323) = 27.32, MSE = .38, p < .01, ηρ² = .08; happiness, F(1, 323) = 
11.13, MSE = .97, p < .01, ηρ² = .03; and hope, F(1, 323) = 4.77, MSE = .81, p < .05, ηρ² 
= .02.  Similarly, a main effect for current status quo emerged for each emotion: fear, 
F(1, 323) = 12.22, MSE = .60, p < .01, ηρ² = .04; anxiety, F(1, 322) = 10.83, MSE = .93, 
p < .01, ηρ² = .03; anger, F(1, 323) = 7.84, MSE = .95, p < .01, ηρ² = .02; disgust, F(1, 
323) = 9.00, MSE = .86, p < .01, ηρ² = .03; compassion, F(1, 323) = 5.37, MSE = 1.07, p 
< .05, ηρ² = .02; happiness, F(1, 323) = 8.25, MSE = 1.66, p < .01, ηρ² = .02; and hope, 
F(1, 323) = 5.87, MSE = 1.37, p < .05, ηρ² = .02.  However, all of these main effects were 
qualified by significant time by current status quo interactions: fear, F(1, 323) = 13.11, 
MSE = .34, p < .01, ηρ² = .04; anxiety, F(1, 322) = 9.43, MSE = .63, p < .01, ηρ² = .03; 
anger, F(1, 323) = 8.84, MSE = .60, p < .01, ηρ² = .03; disgust, F(1, 323) = 4.71, MSE = 
.53, p < .05, ηρ² = .01; compassion, F(1, 323) = 5.56, MSE = .38, p < .05, ηρ² = .02; 
happiness, F(1, 322) = 24.19, MSE = .97, p < .01, ηρ² = .07; and hope, F(1, 323) = 10.88, 
MSE = .81, p < .01, ηρ² = .03. 
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After splitting the file according to current status quo, repeated measure ANOVAs 
and One-way ANOVAs for each time were conducted to explore these relationships (See 
Table 17).  Table 17 shows that for all the negative emotions participants experienced 
stronger negative emotions at Time 1 under the threat condition than under the 
affirmation condition and that this effect dissipated over time so that there were no 
differences in negative emotions at Time 2 for the status quo manipulation.  Further, 
participants felt stronger negative emotions under threat at Time 1 than at Time 2.  Table 
17 shows the opposite pattern for the positive emotions of happiness and hope where 
participants felt stronger positive emotions at Time 1 in the affirmation condition than 
threat condition but this effect dissipated at Time 2 where participants felt equivalent 
happiness and hope in the affirmation and threat conditions.  Compassion did not follow 
this trend such that threat condition participants felt greater compassion than affirmation 
condition participants at time 1, but this effect dissipated at Time 2.  
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Table 17 
   
Differences across Emotions and Time According to Current Status Quo (Marriage 
Equality) 
 
 Time 1 Time 2 
Emotion Affirmation Threat Affirmation Threat 
 
Fear 
 
1.26a (.05) 
 
1.64a, b (.05) 
 
1.33 (.06) 
 
1.37b (.06) 
     
Anxiety 1.31c (.07) 1.75c, d (.07) 1.45 (.07) 1.50d (.07) 
     
Anger 1.50e (.06) 1.89e, f (.06) 1.53 (.07) 1.56f (.07) 
     
Disgust 
 
1.38g (.06) 1.72g, h (.06) 1.46 (.07) 1.56h (.07) 
Compassion 1.67i, j (.06) 1.97i, k (.06) 2.04j (.07) 2.11k (.07) 
     
Happiness 2.32l (.08) 1.65l, m (.08) 2.19 (.10) 2.28m (.10) 
     
Hope 2.50n (.08) 2.05n, o (.07) 2.42 (.09) 2.44o (.09) 
     
Notes. Means with shared subscripts are significantly different at p < .05 or less level for the same 
emotion.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
Significant and marginally significant time by status quo likelihood interactions 
also emerged: anger, F(3, 323) = 2.53, MSE = .60, p < .06, ηρ² = .02; compassion, F(3, 
323) = 2.43, MSE = .38, p = .06, ηρ² = .02; happiness, F(3, 323) = 3.00, MSE = .97, p < 
.05, ηρ² = .03; and hope, F(3, 323) = 2.57, MSE = .81, p < .06, ηρ² = .02.  After splitting 
the file according to status quo likelihood, repeated measured ANOVAs were conducted 
to explore these relationships (See Table 18).  Time main effects emerged in the 60%, 
F(1, 79) = 8.48, MSE = .52, p < .01, ηρ² = .10; and 90%, F(1, 84) = 7.31, MSE = .48, p < 
.01, ηρ² = .08, conditions such that participants were angrier at time 1 than at time 2.  
Participants in the 10%, F(1, 81) = 11.81, MSE = .45, p < 01, ηρ² = .13; 60%, F(1, 79) = 
10.61, MSE = .32, p < 01, ηρ² = .12; and 90%, F(1, 84) = 10.48, MSE = .42, p < .01, ηρ² = 
.11 conditions felt less compassion at time 1 than at time 2.  Participants in the 60%, F(1, 
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79) = 3.82, MSE = 1.04, p = .05, ηρ² = .05, and 90%, F(1, 84) = 11.36, MSE = 1.38, p < 
.01, ηρ² = .12 conditions were happier at time 2 than at time 1.  Participants in the 90% 
likelihood condition, F(1, 84) = 8.02, MSE = 1.12, p < .01, ηρ² = .09, were more hopeful 
at time 2 than at time 1.   
Table 18 
   
Differences across Emotions and Time According to Status Quo Likelihood (Marriage 
Equality) 
 
 Time 1 Time 2 
Emotion 10% 30% 60% 90% 10% 30% 60% 90% 
 
Anger 
 
 
 
1.56 
(.07) 
 
1.76 
(.10) 
 
1.69a 
(.09) 
 
1.79b 
(.09) 
 
1.64 
(.10) 
 
1.68 
(.13) 
 
1.36a 
(.08) 
 
1.51b 
(.10) 
Compassion 1.84c 
(.08) 
2.01 
(.10) 
1.83d 
(.09) 
1.62e 
(.08) 
2.19c 
(.10) 
2.04 
(.10) 
2.12d 
(.09) 
1.94e 
(.10) 
 
Happiness 
 
 
2.04 
(.12) 
 
1.95 
(.11) 
 
2.06* 
(.13) 
 
1.88f 
(.10) 
 
2.07 
(.13) 
 
2.03 
(.13) 
 
2.37* 
(.12) 
 
2.48f 
(.15) 
         
Hope 2.38 
(.11) 
2.26 
(.10) 
2.29 
(.11) 
2.17g 
(.10) 
2.31 
(.12) 
2.35 
(.13) 
2.43 
(.11) 
2.63g 
(.14) 
         
Notes. Means with shared subscripts indicate significant differences at p < .01 for the same 
emotion.  Shared * indicate marginally significant differences at p = .05 level for the same 
emotion.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
Current status quo and status quo likelihood manipulations’ effects on sexual 
minority system justification. 
A 17 (SMSJ: 17 items) x 2 (Current Status Quo: Affirmation v. Threat) x 4 
(Status Quo Likelihood: 10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) x 2 (Time: Time 1 v. Time 2) 
repeated measures MANOVA tested the change hypotheses.  Only a main effect for 
SMSJ emerged, indicating that participants differed in their endorsement of different 
system justifications, F(5.62, 1685.73) = 170.83, MSE = 5.82, p < .01, ηρ² = .36.   
148 
 
 In addition, a 5 (SMSJ – Reduced number of items based upon the earlier factor 
analysis) x 2 (Current Status Quo: Affirmation v. Threat) x 4 (Status Quo Likelihood: 
10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) x 2 (Time: Time 1 v. Time 2) repeated measures MANOVA 
tested these hypotheses.  A main effect for SMSJ emerged, F(2.65, 841.13) = 413.47, 
MSE = 2.77, p < .01, ηρ² = .57, qualified with an interaction between SMSJ and current 
status quo, F(2.65, 841.13) = 3.13, MSE = 2.77, p < .05, ηρ² = .01. 
 A series of 2 (Current Status Quo: Affirmation v. Threat) x 4 (Status Quo 
Likelihood: 10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) x 2 (Time: Time 1 v. Time 2) repeated measures 
MANOVAs were performed on each justification.  A significant main effect for current 
status quo emerged for Discrimination History, such that affirmation condition 
participants (M = 4.42) were more likely than threat condition participants (M = 4.14) to 
believe that lesbians and gay men have a history of discrimination in the United States, 
F(1, 321) = 6.14, MSE = 2.05, p < .05, ηρ² = .02.  
Mediation of the relationship between current status quo, status quo likelihood, 
and marriage equality ballot decisions by emotion and sexual minority system 
justification. 
 Participants did not differ in their Ballot 2 decisions according to status quo 
likelihood.  In addition, participants did not differ in their Ballot 2 decisions according to 
current status quo, Nagelkerke R2 = .00, X
2(1) = .08, p > .05, or according to both current 
status quo and status quo likelihood, Nagelkerke R2 = .001, X
2(2) = .24, p > .05.  In a 
series of binary logistic regressions that controlled for the effect of the individual 
differences variables on marriage equality Ballot 2, the main effects of current status quo 
and status quo likelihood did not attain statistical significance, ps > .05.  I performed no 
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mediation analyses because there were no significant differences for status quo to test for 
emotion or system justification mediations  
Hypothesis 4: Individual differences variables (Attitudes Toward Lesbians 
and Gay Men (ATLG), Situational System Justification (SSJ), and Global Belief in a 
Just World (GBJW) scales) 
Individual differences variables’ effects on Ballot decisions. 
Individual differences variables strongly affected participants’ ballot decisions  
(See Results for Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3). 
Individual differences variables’ effects on emotion. 
ATLG as individual differences covariate. 
A 4 (Status Quo Likelihood: 10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) x 8 (Emotion: Fear v.  
Anxiety v. Anger v. Disgust v. Compassion v. Pity v. Happiness v. Hope) x 2 (Time: 
Time 1 v. Time 2) repeated measures MANCOVA with ATLG covariate resulted in a 
significant four-way interaction between time, emotion, status quo likelihood, and ATLG, 
F(10.003, 1060.34) = 4.25, MSE = .91, p < .01, ηρ² = .04.  Thus, a series of 4 (Status Quo 
Likelihood: 10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) x 2 (Time: Time 1 v. Time 2) repeated measures 
ANCOVAs with ATLG covariate were conducted for each emotion (ATLG repeated 
measures ANCOVA).  Significant time main effects appeared for each emotion, with the 
differences across time mostly matching the time by current status quo effect (See Tables 
17 and 19), with greater means for negative emotions at time 1 than time 2.  However, 
whereas happiness and pity had greater means at time 1 than time 2, hope and 
compassion had greater means at time 2 than at time 1.   Similarly, an ATLG main effect 
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emerged for most emotions, except compassion (See Table 20).  However, all of these 
main effects were qualified by significant time by ATLG interactions (See Table 21).  
Table 19 
   
Repeated Measures ANCOVA Models with Individual Differences Covariates Predicting 
Emotions: Time Main Effect (Marriage Equality) 
 
Individual 
Differences 
Covariate 
Model 
Predicted Emotion Df F MSE p ηρ² 
 
ATLG 
 
Fear 
 
1, 321 
 
46.20 
 
.31 
 
.000 
 
.13 
  
Anxiety 
 
1, 320 
 
25.40 
 
.60 
 
.000 
 
.07 
  
Anger 
 
1, 321 
 
75.28 
 
.50 
 
.000 
 
.19 
  
Disgust 
 
1, 321 
 
67.22 
 
.41 
 
.000 
 
.17 
  
Compassion 
 
 
1, 321 
 
77.96 
 
.34 
 
.000 
 
.20 
 Pity 
 
1, 319 19.42 .57 .000 .06 
 Happiness 
 
1, 321 122.13 .75 .000 .28 
 Hope 1, 321 126.40 .58 .000 .28 
       
SSJ Fear  
 
1, 321 18.75 .33 .000 .06 
 Anxiety 1, 320 7.37 .64 .007 .02 
  
Anger 
 
1, 321 
 
24.37 
 
.56 
 
.000 
 
.07 
  
Disgust 
 
1, 321 
 
15.44 
 
.50 
 
.000 
 
.05 
  
Compassion 
 
 
1, 321 
 
12.33 
 
.38 
 
.001 
 
.04 
 Pity 
 
1, 319 6.42 .59 .012 .02 
 Happiness 
 
1, 321 22.88 .98 .000 .07 
 Hope 1, 321 29.18 .77 .000 .08 
       
Notes. ATLG and SSJ stand for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale and Situational 
System Justification scale. 
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Table 20 
   
Repeated Measures ANCOVA Models with Individual Differences Covariates Predicting 
Emotions: Covariate Main Effect (Marriage Equality) 
 
Individual 
Differences 
Covariate 
Model 
Predicted 
Emotion 
Df F MSE p β ηρ² 
 
ATLG 
 
Fear 
 
1, 321 
 
71.58 
 
.51 
 
.000 
 
.48 
 
.18 
  
Anxiety 
 
1, 320 
 
35.36 
 
.86 
 
.000 
 
.25 
 
.10 
  
Anger 
 
1, 321 
 
107.82 
 
.70 
 
.000 
 
.60 
 
.25 
  
Disgust 
 
 
1, 321 
 
127.90 
 
.61 
 
.000 
 
.74 
 
.28 
 Pity 
 
1, 319 37.67 .79 .000 .52 .11 
 Happiness 
 
1, 321 9.85 1.60 .002 -.45 .03 
 Hope 1, 321 12.58 1.32 .000 -.41 .04 
        
SSJ Compassion  1, 321 4.96 1.07 .027 -.127 .02 
        
Notes. ATLG and SSJ stand for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale and Situational 
System Justification scale. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 The beta weights were not significant using the different status quo likelihood comparison groups.  
Therefore, status quo likelihood vectors were removed from the regression model in order to find the 
significant relationship (beta weight) between SSJ and Compassion.  
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Table 21 
   
Repeated Measures ANCOVA Models with Individual Differences Covariates Predicting 
Emotions: Time by Covariate Interaction (Marriage Equality) 
 
Individual 
Differences 
Covariate 
Model 
Predicted Emotion Df F MSE p ηρ² 
 
ATLG 
 
Fear 
 
1, 321 
 
41.21 
 
.31 
 
.000 
 
.11 
  
Anxiety 
 
1, 320 
 
27.74 
 
.60 
 
.000 
 
.08 
  
Anger  
 
1, 321 
 
67.29 
 
.50 
 
.000 
 
.17 
  
Disgust 
 
1, 321 
 
76.30 
 
.41 
 
.000 
 
.19 
  
Compassion 
 
 
1, 321 
 
50.49 
 
.34 
 
.000 
 
.14 
 Pity 
 
1, 319 20.28 .57 .000 .06 
 Happiness  
 
1, 321 109.70 .75 .000 .26 
 Hope  1, 321 128.04 .58 .000 .28 
       
SSJ Fear  
 
1, 321 14.87 .33 .000 .04 
 Anxiety 1, 320 6.91 .64 .009 .02 
  
Anger 
 
1, 321 
 
18.98 
 
.56 
 
.000 
 
.06 
  
Disgust 
 
1, 321 
 
15.72 
 
.50 
 
.000 
 
.05 
  
Compassion 
 
 
1, 321 
 
3.88 
 
.38 
 
.050 
 
.01 
 Pity 
 
1, 319 5.80 .59 .017 .02 
 Happiness 
 
1, 321 15.79 .98 .000 .05 
 Hope 1, 321 24.76 .77 .000 .07 
       
Notes. ATLG and SSJ stand for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale and Situational 
System Justification scale. 
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 One-way ANCOVA follow ups were conducted to explore these relationships 
(See Table 22).  For fear, the effect of ATLG was significant at both time 1, β = .25, p < 
.01, and at time 2, β = .52, p < .01.  For anxiety, the relationship was only significant at 
time 2, β = .27, p < .01, such that participants with negative attitudes toward lesbians and 
gay men were anxious at time 2.  For anger, the relationship was significant at both time 
1, β = .22, p < .05, and at time 2, β = .69, p < .01.  For compassion, the relationship was 
significant at time 1, β = .148, p < .01, and at time 2, β = -.23, p < .01, but in opposite 
directions, with participants having more compassion at time 1.  For pity, the relationship 
was significant at time 2, β = .64, p < .01, such that participants with negative attitudes 
toward lesbians and gay men felt pity.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 A significant beta weight could not be found between ATLG and Compassion at time 1 using the different 
status quo likelihood references groups.  Therefore, for both times, the status quo likelihood vectors were 
removed from the regression model in order to find the significant relationship (beta weight) between 
ATLG and Compassion. 
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Table 22 
   
One-way ANCOVA Models with Individual Differences Covariates Predicting Emotions: 
Time 1 v. Time 2 (Marriage Equality) 
 
Individual 
Differences 
Covariate 
Model 
Predicted Emotion Df F MSE p β ηρ² 
 
ATLG 
 
Fear (Time 1)  
 
 
1, 321 
 
6.50 
 
.47 
 
.011 
 
.25 
 
.02 
 Fear (Time 2)  1, 321 132.15 .35 .000 .52 .29 
  
Anxiety (Time 2) 
 
1, 320 
 
66.75 
 
.69 
 
.000 
 
.27 
 
.17 
  
Anger (Time 1)  
 
 
1, 321 
 
6.30 
 
.68 
 
.013 
 
.22 
 
.02 
 Anger (Time 2)  1, 321 200.71 .52 .000 .69 .38 
  
Disgust (Time 1) 
 
 
1, 321 
 
9.39 
 
.55 
 
.002 
 
.30 
 
.03 
 Disgust (Time 2) 
 
1, 321 222.06 .47 .000 .82 .41 
 Compassion (Time 1)  
 
1, 321 7.02 .67 .008 .149 .02 
 Compassion (Time 2)  
 
1, 321 17.79 .76 .000 -.23 .05 
 Pity (Time 2)  
 
1, 320 60.52 .65 .000 .64 .16 
 Happiness (Time 1) 
 
1, 321 11.17 1.17 .001 .5010 .03 
 Happiness (Time 2) 
 
1, 321 71.75 1.19 .000 -.42 .18 
 Hope (Time 1) 
 
1, 321 11.20 .94 .001 .3711 .03 
 Hope (Time 2) 1, 321 83.57 .97 .000 -.48 .21 
        
SSJ Fear (Time 1)  1, 321 7.05 .47 .008 -.1512 .02 
                                                 
9 Significant beta weights could not be found between ATLG and Compassion using the same status quo 
likelihood reference groups for both time 1 and time 2.  Therefore, for both times, the status quo likelihood 
vectors were removed from the model in order to find the significant relationship (beta weight) between 
ATLG and Compassion. 
10 The significant beta weights were found within the model using the 60% status quo likelihood as the 
reference group for both Time 1 and Time 2. 
11 The significant beta weights were found within the model using the 60% status quo likelihood as the 
reference group for both Time 1 and Time 2. 
12 Significant beta weights could not be found between SSJ and Fear using the same status quo likelihood 
reference groups for both time 1 and time 2.  Therefore, for both times, the status quo likelihood vectors 
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 Fear (Time 2)  
 
1, 321 3.63 .49 .058 .11 .01 
 Anxiety (Time 1) 
 
1, 321 6.14 .75 .014 -.2313 .02 
 Disgust (Time 1) 
 
1, 321 11.11 .56 .001 -.2414 .03 
 Compassion (Time 2)  
 
1, 321 7.98 .78 .005 -.1515 .02 
 Hope (Time 1) 
 
1, 321 6.75 .92 .010 .1516 .02 
 Hope (Time 2)  1, 321 11.11 1.21 .001 -.18 .03 
        
Notes. ATLG and SSJ stand for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale and Situational 
System Justification scale. 
 
 
 For anger, a significant interaction emerged for time by status quo likelihood (See 
Table 23).  After splitting the file by status quo likelihood, the ATLG repeated measures 
ANCOVA revealed a significant main effect for time for participants in the 30%, 60%, 
and 90% conditions, such that participants were angrier at time 1 than at time 2 (See 
Table 24).   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
were removed from the model in order to find the significant relationship (beta weight) between SSJ and 
Fear. 
13 The significant beta weight was found within the model using the 30% status quo likelihood as the 
reference group. 
14 The significant beta weight was found within the model using the 60% status quo likelihood as the 
reference group. 
15 A significant beta weight could not be found between SSJ and Compassion at time 2 using the different 
status quo likelihood references groups.  Therefore, the status quo likelihood vectors were removed from 
the model in order to find the significant relationship (beta weight) between SSJ and Compassion. 
16 Significant beta weights could not be found between SSJ and Hope using the same status quo likelihood 
reference groups for both time 1 and time 2.  Therefore, for both times, the status quo likelihood vectors 
were removed from the model in order to find the significant relationships (beta weights) between SSJ and 
Hope. 
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Table 23 
 
Repeated Measures ANCOVA Models with Individual Differences Covariates Predicting 
Emotions: Status Quo Likelihood Effects (Marriage Equality) 
 
Individual 
Differences 
Covariate 
Model 
Predicted Emotion 
(SQL Effects) 
Df F MSE p β ηρ² 
 
ATLG 
 
Anger (Time x 
SQL Interaction)  
 
3, 321 
 
3.61 
 
.50 
 
.014 
 
 
 
.03 
  
Anger (Time x 
SQL Interaction: 
30% condition) 
 
1, 79 
 
26.84 
 
.53 
 
.000 
  
.25 
  
Anger (Time x 
SQL Interaction: 
60% condition) 
 
 
1, 79 
 
32.86 
 
.42 
 
.000 
  
.29 
 Anger (Time x 
SQL Interaction: 
90% condition)  
1, 82 34.29 .38 .000  .30 
  
Disgust (Time x 
SQL Interaction) 
 
 
3, 321 
 
4.76 
 
.41 
 
.003 
  
.04 
 Disgust (SQL x 
ATLG Interaction) 
 
3, 321 2.96 .61 .033 -.35 .03 
 Disgust (Time x 
SQL x ATLG 
Interaction) 
 
3, 321 4.84 .41 .003  .04 
 Disgust (Time x 
SQL x ATLG 
Interaction: 30% 
condition) 
 
1, 79 44.25 .44 .000  .36 
 Disgust (Time x 
SQL x ATLG 
Interaction: 60% 
condition)  
 
1, 79 22.38 .32 .000  .22 
 Disgust (Time x 
SQL x ATLG 
Interaction: 90% 
condition) 
1, 82 37.39 .32 .000  .31 
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 Happiness (SQL) 
 
3, 321 3.25 1.60 .022  .03 
 Happiness (Time x 
SQL Interaction)  
 
3, 321 11.14 .75 .000  .09 
 Happiness (SQL x 
ATLG Interaction) 
 
3, 321 3.08 1.60 .027 .40 .03 
 Happiness (Time x 
SQL x ATLG 
Interaction) 
 
3, 321 8.74 .75 .000  .08 
 Happiness (Time x 
SQL x ATLG 
Interaction: 30% 
condition)  
 
1, 79 24.86 .60 .000  .24 
 Happiness (Time x 
SQL x ATLG 
Interaction: 60% 
condition) 
 
1, 79 50.65 .69 .000  .39 
 Happiness (Time x 
SQL x ATLG 
Interaction: 90% 
condition)  
 
1, 82 53.09 .87 .000  .39 
 Hope (Time x SQL 
Interaction) 
3, 321 7.29 .58 .000  .06 
        
 Hope (Time x SQL 
x ATLG 
Interaction)  
 
3, 321 5.22 .58 .002  .05 
 Hope (Time x SQL 
x ATLG 
Interaction: 10% 
condition)  
 
1, 81 14.36 .55 .000  .15 
 Hope (Time x SQL 
x ATLG 
Interaction: 30% 
condition)  
 
1, 79 21.63 .49 .000  .22 
 Hope (Time x SQL 
x ATLG 
Interaction: 60% 
condition)  
 
1, 79 41.27 .60 .000  .34 
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 Hope (Time x SQL 
x ATLG 
Interaction: 90% 
condition) 
 
1, 82 54.46 .70 .000  .40 
SSJ Anger (Time x 
SQL Interaction) 
 
3, 321 4.44 .56 .005  .04 
 Anger (Time x 
SQL x SSJ 
Interaction)  
 
3, 321 3.08 .56 .028  .03 
 Anger (Time x 
SQL x SSJ 
Interaction: 30% 
condition)  
 
1, 79 4.44 .70 .038  .05 
 Anger (Time x 
SQL x SSJ 
Interaction: 60% 
condition)  
 
1, 79 16.98 .45 .000  .18 
 Anger (Time x 
SQL x SSJ 
Interaction: 90% 
condition) 
 
1, 82 13.39 .42 .000  .14 
 Disgust (Time x 
SQL Interaction)  
 
3, 321 2.66 .50 .048  .02 
 Disgust (Time x 
SQL Interaction: 
60% condition)  
 
1, 79 20.61 .35 .000  .21 
 Disgust (Time x 
SQL Interaction: 
90% condition) 
 
1, 82 11.12 .40 .001  .12 
 Pity (Time x SQL 
Interaction) 
 
3, 319 3.46 .59 .017  .03 
 Pity (Time x SQL x 
SSJ Interaction)  
 
3, 319 2.95 .59 .033  .03 
 Pity (Time x SQL x 
SSJ Interaction: 
60% condition) 
 
1, 79 13.78 .50 .000  .15 
 Happiness (Time x 
SQL Interaction) 
3, 321 3.23 .98 .023  .03 
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 Happiness (Time x 
SQL x SSJ 
Interaction) 
 
3, 321 2.55 .98 .056  .02 
 Happiness (Time x 
SQL x SSJ 
Interaction: 30% 
condition)  
 
1, 79 11.48 .69 .001  .13 
 Happiness (Time x 
SQL x SSJ 
Interaction: 60% 
condition)  
 
1, 79 8.79 1.02 .004  .10 
 Happiness (Time x 
SQL x SSJ 
Interaction: 90% 
condition)  
1, 82 5.30 1.34 .024  .06 
        
Notes. ATLG, SSJ, and SQL stand for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale, Situational 
System Justification scale, and Status Quo Likelihood. 
 
 
Table 24 
 
Differences for Anger According to Status Quo Likelihood at Different Times (Marriage 
Equality) 
 
 Status Quo Likelihood Conditions 
Time 10% 30% 60% 90% 
 
Time 1 
 
 
1.57 (.08) 
 
1.76a (.10) 
 
1.68b (.09) 
 
1.81c (.10) 
Time 2 
 
1.64 (.10) 1.68a (.09) 1.36b (.06) 1.49c (.07) 
Notes. Means with shared subscripts indicate significantly different correlations at p < .05 level.  
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
 For disgust, significant effects emerged for time by status quo likelihood and 
status quo likelihood by ATLG (See Table 23).  For happiness, significant effects 
emerged for status quo likelihood, time by status quo likelihood, and status quo 
likelihood by ATLG.  For hope, a significant effect emerged for time by status quo 
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likelihood.  However, these effects were explained by significant three-way interactions 
among status quo likelihood, ATLG, and time. 
 After splitting the file according to status quo likelihood, the ATLG repeated 
measures ANCOVA and correlations were conducted for each emotion.  For disgust, 
significant interactions emerged between ATLG and time for the 30%, 60%, and 90% 
conditions.  At time 2, participants in these conditions had significantly stronger 
relationships between their negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men and their 
feelings of disgust than participants in the 10% condition, z = -2.93, p < .01; z = -2.35, p 
< .05; and z = -3.74, p < .01, respectively (See Table 25).  Participants in the 90% 
condition had significantly stronger relationships at time 2 than at time 1, z = -4.73, p < 
.01.   
Table 25 
   
Correlations between Disgust and ATLG (Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men 
scale) According to Status Quo Likelihood at Different Times (Marriage Equality) 
 
 Status Quo Likelihood Conditions 
Time 10% 30% 60% 90% 
 
Time 1 
 
 
.314 (83) 
 
.09ns (81) 
 
-.026ns (81) 
 
.282d (84) 
Time 2 
 
.416a, b, c (83) .721a (81) .673b (81) .775c, d (84) 
Notes. Correlations with shared subscripts are significantly different at p < .05 or less.  NS 
subscripts indicate the correlation was not significant at p < .05 level.  Ns are in parentheses. 
 
 
For happiness, significant interactions emerged between ATLG and time for the 
30%, 60%, and 90% conditions (See Table 23).  At time 2, participants in the 90% 
condition had a stronger relationship between their negative attitudes toward lesbians and 
gay men and their feelings of unhappiness than those in the 30% and 60% conditions, z = 
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2.49, p < .05 and z = 2.31, p < .05, respectively (Lowry, 2001-2015).  Participants in the 
60% condition had significantly different correlations between time 1 and 2, indicating 
that knowledge of increased likelihood for marriage equality elicited stronger feelings of 
unhappiness in people who have negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men, z = 
5.36, p < .01 (See Table 26).   
Table 26 
   
Correlations between Happiness and ATLG (Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men 
scale) According to Status Quo Likelihood at Different Times (Marriage Equality) 
 
 Status Quo Likelihood Conditions 
Time 10% 30% 60% 90% 
 
Time 1 
 
 
.003ns (83) 
 
.16ns (81) 
 
.401c (81) 
 
.109ns (84) 
Time 2 
 
-.183ns (83) -.384a (81) -.408b, c (81) -.664a, b (84) 
Notes. Correlations with shared subscripts are significantly different at p < .05 or less.  NS 
subscripts indicate the correlation was not significant at p < .05 level.  Ns are in parentheses. 
 
 
For hope, significant interactions emerged between ATLG and time for each 
condition (See Tables 23).  At time 2, participants in the 90% condition had a stronger 
r0elationship between their negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men and their 
feelings of hopelessness than participants in the 10% and 30% conditions, z = 2.86, p < 
.01 and z = 2.44, p < .05, respectively (Lowry, 2001-2015).  Participants in the 60% 
condition had a significantly different correlation between time 1 and at time 2, z = 5.27, 
p < .01, such that participants with greater negative attitudes felt less hope with time (See 
Table 27).   
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Table 27 
   
Correlations between Hope and ATLG (Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale) 
According to Status Quo Likelihood at Different Times (Marriage Equality) 
 
 Status Quo Likelihood Conditions 
Time 10% 30% 60% 90% 
 
Time 1 
 
 
.127ns (83) 
 
.127ns (81) 
 
.311c (81) 
 
.139ns (84) 
Time 2 
 
-.296a (83) -.353b (81) -.480c (81) -.639a, b (84) 
Notes. Correlations with shared subscripts are significantly different at p < .05 or less.  NS 
subscripts indicate the correlation was not significant at p < .05 level.  Ns are in parentheses. 
 
 
SSJ as individual differences covariate. 
A 4 (Status Quo Likelihood: 10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) x 8 (Emotion: Fear v. 
Anxiety v. Anger v. Disgust v. Compassion v. Pity v. Happiness v. Hope) x 2 (Time: 
Time 1 v. Time 2) repeated measures MANCOVA with SSJ covariate resulted in a 
significant four-way interaction between time, emotion, status quo likelihood, and SSJ, 
F(8.11, 860.01) = 2.07, MSE = 1.38, p < .05, ηρ² = .02.  Thus, a series of 4 (Status Quo 
Likelihood: 10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) x 2 (Time: Time 1 v. Time 2) repeated measures 
ANCOVAs with SSJ covariate were run for each emotion (the SSJ repeated measures 
ANCOVA).  Significant time main effects emerged for each emotion (See Table 19).  A 
significant main effect for SSJ emerged for compassion (See Table 20).  However, all of 
these effects were qualified by significant or marginally significant time by SSJ 
interactions (See Table 21).   
One-way ANCOVA follow ups between the emotions and SSJ were conducted to 
explore these relationships (See Table 22).  For fear, the relationship was significant at 
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time 1, β = -.1517, p < .01, and marginally significant time 2, β = .11, p = .058, suggesting 
that participants who believed that the American system is fair and legitimate were more 
fearful at time 2.  For anxiety, the relationship was significant only at time 1, β = -.2318, p 
< .05, such that participants who believed in American system legitimacy were anxious at 
time 1.  For disgust, the relationship was significant at time 1, β = -.2419, p < .01, such 
that greater beliefs in American system legitimacy engendered less disgust.  For 
compassion, the relationship was significant at time 2, β = -.1520, p < .01, such that 
greater beliefs in American system legitimacy predicted reduced compassion.  For hope, 
the relationship was significant at both time 1, β = .1521, p < .05, and at time 2, β = -.18, p 
< .01, but in opposite directions, suggesting that the more participants believed in the 
legitimacy of the American system, the less hopeful they were with time.  
For disgust, a significant interaction emerged for time by status quo likelihood 
(See Tables 23 and 28).  After splitting the file according to status quo likelihood, the SSJ 
repeated measures ANCOVA revealed significant main effects for time for participants in 
the 60% and 90% conditions, with greater disgust at time 1.  
 
                                                 
17 Significant beta weights could not be found between SSJ and Fear using the same status quo likelihood 
reference groups for both time 1 and time 2.  Therefore, for both times, the status quo likelihood vectors 
were removed from the model in order to find the significant relationships (beta weights) between SSJ and 
Fear. 
18 The significant beta weight was found within the model using the 30% status quo likelihood as the 
reference group. 
19 The significant beta weight was found within the model using the 60% status quo likelihood as the 
reference group. 
20 A significant beta weight could not be found between SSJ and Compassion at time 2 using the different 
status quo likelihood references groups.  Therefore, the status quo likelihood vectors were removed from 
the model in order to find the significant relationship (beta weight) between SSJ and Compassion. 
21Significant beta weights could not be found between SSJ and Hope using the same status quo likelihood 
reference groups for both time 1 and time 2.  Therefore, for both times, the status quo likelihood vectors 
were removed from the model in order to find the significant relationships (beta weights) between SSJ and 
Hope.  
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Table 28 
 
Differences for Disgust According to Status Quo Likelihood at Different Times (Marriage 
Equality) 
 
 Status Quo Likelihood Conditions 
Time 10% 30% 60% 90% 
 
Time 1 
 
 
1.48 (.09) 
 
1.51 (.08) 
 
1.58a (.08) 
 
1.61b (.09) 
Time 2 
 
1.55 (.10) 1.62 (.12) 1.31a (.06) 1.55b (.10) 
Notes. Means with shared subscripts indicate significant differences at p < .05 level.  Standard 
errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
For anger, pity, and happiness, significant interactions emerged for time by status 
quo likelihood (See Table 23).  However, the effects for these emotions were qualified by 
significant and marginally significant three-way interactions among status quo likelihood, 
SSJ, and time.  After splitting the file according to status quo likelihood, the SSJ repeated 
measures ANCOVA and correlations were conducted for each emotion.  For anger, 
significant interactions between SSJ and time emerged for the 30%, 60%, and 90% 
conditions.  Participants in the 60% condition had a significantly different correlation 
between time 1 and 2, such that greater beliefs in the legitimacy of the American system 
led to more anger felt at time 2, z = -3.8, p < .001 (Lowry, 2001-2015) (See Table 29).   
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Table 29 
 
Correlations between Anger and SSJ (Situational System Justification scale) According 
to Status Quo Likelihood at Different Times (Marriage Equality) 
 
   Status Quo Likelihood Conditions 
Time 10% 30% 60% 90% 
 
Time 1 
 
 
-.087ns (83) 
 
-.281 (81) 
 
-.276a (81) 
 
-.131ns (84) 
Time 2 
 
-.113ns (83) .019ns (81) .314a (81) .278 (84) 
Notes. Correlations with shared subscripts are significantly different at p < .05 or less.  NS 
subscripts indicate the correlation was not significant at p < .05 level.  Ns are in parentheses. 
 
 
For pity, significant interactions between SSJ and time emerged for the 60% 
condition at time 2, r = .23, p < .05, such that the more participants believed in the 
legitimacy of the American system, the more pity they felt (See Table 23).  For 
happiness, significant interactions between SSJ and time emerged for the 30%, 60%, and 
90% conditions (See Table 23).  Only participants in the 30% (r = .41, p < .01) and 60% 
(r = .38, p < .01) conditions (at time 1) had significant correlations between SSJ and 
feelings of happiness, such that the more that participants believed in the legitimacy of 
the American system, the happier they felt.  These participants did not differ significantly 
from each other in relationship strength, z = .200, p > .05 (Lowry, 2001-2015).   
Individual differences variables’ effects on sexual minority system justification. 
 Separate 5 (SMSJ – Reduced at Time 2) x 2 (Current Status Quo: Affirmation v. 
Threat) x 4 (Status Quo Likelihood: 10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) MANCOVA models 
with ATLG and SSJ covariates failed to attain significant three-way interactions for the 
individual SMSJ items, ps > .05.  However, in a series of ANCOVAs with current status 
quo and status quo likelihood as predictor variables, ATLG, SSJ, or GBJW as the 
covariates, and the individual SMSJs dependent variables, and, ATLG, SSJ, and GBJW 
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significantly predicted participants’ endorsement of the SMSJs.  The more that 
participants held negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men (ATLG), believed 
American society to be fair, legitimate, and justifiable (SSJ), and believed that the world 
is fair and that individuals are punished according to dessert (GBJW) the more likely they 
were to believe that sexual minorities are selfish, immature, immoral, and desirous of 
“special rights” above others (LGSelfish factor); heterosexual marriage and parenting 
represent the natural and ideal form of marriage and child rearing 
(NaturalHeterosexualMarriage factor); lesbians and gay men do not have a history of 
experiencing discrimination in America; sexual orientation is related to an individual’s 
ability to contribute to society (except for SSJ model); and sexual minorities do not have 
enough political power, as a group, to achieve their goals through the ordinary political 
process (See Table 30).   
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Table 30 
   
ANCOVA Models with Individual Differences Covariates Predicting Sexual Minority 
System Justifications (Marriage Equality) 
 
Individual 
Differences 
Covariate 
Model 
Predicted SMSJ Df F MSE p Β ηρ² 
 
ATLG 
 
LGSelfish 
 
 
1, 313 
 
852.11 
 
.29 
 
.000 
 
.97 
 
.73 
 Natural 
Heterosexual 
Marriage 
 
1, 313 949.43 .37 .000 .85 .75 
 LG History of 
Discrimination 
 
1, 313 97.31 1.38 .000 -.83 .24 
 Sexual Orientation 
related to Societal 
Contribution 
1, 310 119.86 .48 .000 .53 .28 
        
 Sexual Minorities 
have Political Power  
1, 311 87.03 1.38 .000 -.66 .22 
        
SSJ LGSelfish 1, 313 
 
16.76 1.06 .000 .33 .05 
 Natural 
Heterosexual 
Marriage 
 
1, 313 24.32 1.39 .000 .34 .07 
 LG History of 
Discrimination 
 
1, 313 11.69 1.79 .001 -.45 .04 
 Sexual Minorities 
have Political Power  
1, 311 7.41 1.77 .007 -.38 .02 
        
GBJW LGSelfish 
 
1, 313 39.52 .98 .000 .51 .11 
 Natural 
Heterosexual 
Marriage  
 
1, 313 33.54 1.34 .000 .53 .10 
 LG History of 
Discrimination 
 
1, 313 7.88 1.79 .005 -.61 .02 
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 Sexual Orientation 
related to Societal 
Contribution  
1, 310 119.86 .48 .002 .3522 .28 
        
 Sexual Minorities 
have Political Power  
1, 311 7.10 1.78 .008 -.36 .02 
        
Notes. ATLG, SSJ, GBJW, and LG stand for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale, 
Situational System Justification scale, Global Belief in a Just World scale, and Lesbians and Gay 
men. 
 
 
The 5 (SMSJ – Reduced at Time 2) x 2 (Current Status Quo: Affirmation v. 
Threat) x 4 (Status Quo Likelihood: 10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) MANCOVA model 
with GBJW covariate had a four-way significant interaction for only one of the SMSJ 
items, Discrimination History, F(3, 308) = 2.67, MSE = 1.79, p < .05, ηρ² = .02.  When 
analyzed with the GBJW ANCOVA model the three-way interaction remained 
significant, F(3, 313) = 2.92, MSE = 1.79, p < .05, ηρ² = .03.  After splitting the file by 
current status quo and status quo likelihood (separately), GBJW ANCOVA models and 
correlations were calculated.  A significant status quo likelihood by GBJW interaction 
emerged in the affirmation condition, F(3, 156) = 3.26, MSE = 1.47, p < .05, ηρ² = .06, 
and a significant current status quo by GBJW interaction emerged in the 90% condition, 
F(1, 80) = 4.53, MSE = 2.15, p < .05, ηρ² = .05.  In the affirmation, 90% cell, greater 
global belief in a just world predicted the belief that lesbians and gay men do not have a 
history of discrimination, r = -.49, p < .01.  
 
 
 
                                                 
22 The significant beta weight was found within the model using the 30% status quo likelihood as the 
reference group. 
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Housing Equality 
Hypothesis 1: Current status quo manipulation (Main Effect). 
Current status quo manipulation’s effects on Ballot 1 decisions. 
Current status quo manipulation’s effect on voting for Ballot 1. 
A between subjects One-way ANOVA testing whether participants differed in 
their initial ballot according to current status quo condition (threatening participants 
current status quo) failed to yield a significant result, F(1, 324) = .71, MSE = .14, p > .05, 
ηρ² = .00.  Of the participants that voted on Ballot 1 (eight did not vote), 83.1% voted for 
housing equality. 
Individual differences variables’ effects on voting for Ballot 1. 
Correlation analyses revealed that the individual differences variables were 
significantly correlated with Ballot 1 such that participants were less likely to vote for 
housing equality with more negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men (ATLG), r = -
.48, p < .01, stronger views that lesbians and gay men constituted realistic and symbolic 
threats, r = -.48, p < .01, greater anxiety felt toward lesbians and gay men (Intergroup 
Anxiety), r = -.26, p < .01, stronger beliefs that American society is fair, legitimate, and 
justifiable (SSJ), r = -.14, p < .01, and stronger global belief in a just world (GBJW), r = -
.18, p < .01.  Main effects were only significant for the individual difference covariates, 
which I added to the binary logistic regressions one at a time.  Table 31 displays the 
results. The main effects for the covariates were similar to the correlation analyses 
described above.  There were no significant effects for manipulated factors or interactions 
between manipulated factors and covariates. 
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Table 31 
 
Binary Logistic Regressions with Individual Differences Covariates Predicting Initial 
Ballot Decision (Housing Equality) 
 
Covariate 
Predictor 
Model 
Individual Differences 
Covariates 
(Predictors) 
β Wald p Exp(B) 
 
ATLG 
 
ATLG 
                    
-1.18 (.23) 
 
26.93 
 
.00 
 
.31 
 
SSJ 
 
SSJ 
 
-.34 (.14) 
 
5.50 
 
.02 
 
 
.71 
      
GBJW GBJW -.54 (.20) 
 
6.90 .01 
 
.58 
Realistic & 
Symbolic 
Threat 
Realistic & Symbolic 
Threat 
-1.09 (.21) 25.64 .00 
 
.34 
      
Intergroup 
Anxiety 
 
Intergroup Anxiety -.37 (.12) 10.12 .00 .69 
Notes. ATLG, SSJ, and GBJW stand for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale, 
Situational System Justification scale, and Global Belief in a Just World scale.  Standard errors 
are in parentheses.  Dfs = 1. 
 
 
Current status quo manipulation’s effect on likelihood to vote for Ballot 1. 
A between subjects One-way ANOVA testing whether participants differed in 
their initial ballot likelihood according to current status quo condition failed to yield a 
significant result, F(1, 324) = .28, MSE = 3.70, p > .05, ηρ² = .00.  Of those participants 
who completed this item (eight did not), 80.7% were at least somewhat likely to vote for 
housing equality (47.5% were very likely) whereas 16.3% were at least somewhat 
unlikely to vote for housing equality (8% were very unlikely). 
Individual differences variables’ effects on likelihood to vote for Ballot 1. 
Correlation analyses revealed that the individual differences variables were 
significantly correlated with Ballot 1 likelihood such that participants were less likely to 
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vote for housing equality with more negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men 
(ATLG), r = -.54, p < .01, stronger views that lesbians and gay men constituted realistic 
and symbolic threats, r = -.58, p < .01, greater anxiety felt toward lesbians and gay men 
(Intergroup Anxiety), r = -.35, p < .01, stronger beliefs that American society is fair, 
legitimate, and justifiable (SSJ), r = -.23, p < .01, and stronger global belief in a just 
world (GBJW), r = -.19, p < .01.  Main effects and interactions for current status quo 
emerged when individual difference covariates were added to the basic ANOVA one at a 
time, thereby resulting in a series of ANCOVA designs for post-hoc tests.  Table 32 
displays the results.  The main effects for the covariates were similar to the correlation 
analyses described above. 
Table 32 
 
ANCOVA Models with Individual Differences Covariates Predicting Initial Ballot 
Decision (Housing Equality) 
 
Covariate 
Predictor 
Model 
Individual 
Differences 
Covariates 
(Predictors) 
Df F MSE p β ηρ² 
 
ATLG 
 
ATLG 
 
1, 315 
 
129.61 
 
2.60 
 
.000 
 
-.54 
 
.29 
 
SSJ 
 
SSJ  
 
1, 315 
 
15.95 
 
3.48 
 
.000 
 
-.19 
 
.05 
        
GBJW GBJW 1, 314 11.45 3.54 .001 -.18 .04 
        
Realistic & 
Symbolic 
Threat 
Realistic & 
Symbolic Threat 
1, 315 153.78 2.46 .000 -.57 .33 
        
Intergroup 
Anxiety 
 
Intergroup Anxiety 1, 315 43.99 3.22 .000 -.37 .12 
Note. ATLG, SSJ, and GBJW stand for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale, 
Situational System Justification scale, and Global Belief in a Just World scale. 
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When the individual differences covariates were added to the linear regression 
model, the linear regression was significant, R2 = .35, F(6, 311) = 27.41, p < .001.  
However, current status quo did not predict ballot likelihood (See Table 33).  Participants 
with more negative attitudes towards lesbians and gay men and those who believed that 
gay men and lesbians represent a realistic and symbolic threat were significantly less 
likely to vote for housing equality.   
Table 33 
 
Linear Regressions with Individual Differences Covariates Predicting Initial Ballot 
Likelihood Decision (Housing Equality) 
 
Covariate 
Predictor 
Model 
Β S.E. β t p 
 
ATLG 
 
-.36 
 
.16 
 
-.20 
 
-2.22 
 
.03 
      
Realistic & 
Symbolic 
Threat 
 
-.67 .14 -.46 -4.86 .00 
Note.  ATLG stands for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale. 
 
 
Current status quo manipulation’s effect on emotion. 
A 2 (Current Status Quo: Affirmation v. Threat) MANOVA tested the effects of 
current status quo on the seven emotions (Fear, Anxiety, Anger, Disgust, Compassion, 
Happiness, and Hope) revealed a significant multivariate significant main effect, 
MultF(7, 326) = 12.39, p < .001, ηρ² = .21 (See Table 34).  Threat condition participants 
were more fearful, F(1, 332) = 18.75, MSE = .46, p < .001, ηρ² = .05; anxious, F(1, 332) 
= 17.79, MSE = .66, p < .001, ηρ² = .05; angry, F(1, 332) = 14.47, MSE = .66, p < .001, 
ηρ² = .04; disgusted, F(1, 332) = 14.05, MSE = .49, p < .001, ηρ² = .04; and 
compassionate, F(1, 332) = 5.37, MSE = .66, p < .05, ηρ² = .02.  Affirmation condition 
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participants were happier and more hopeful, F(1, 332) = 44.28, MSE = 1.12, p < .001, ηρ² 
= .12 and F(1, 332) = 29.07, MSE = .93, p < .001, ηρ² = .08, respectively. 
Table 34 
 
Differences across Emotions According to Current Status Quo after Current Status Quo 
Manipulation (Housing Equality) 
 
 Affirmation Threat 
Emotion M SE M SE 
 
Fear 
 
 
1.31 
 
.05 
 
1.63 
 
.05 
Anxiety 
 
1.33 .06 1.71 .06 
Anger 1.46 .06 1.80 .06 
     
Disgust 
 
1.37 .06 1.66 .05 
Compassion 1.78 .06 1.99 .06 
     
Happiness 2.44 .08 1.67 .08 
     
Hope 2.55 .08 1.98 .07 
     
Note. All means are significantly different at p < .05 or less level for same emotion.  NAffirmation = 
160 and NThreat = 174. 
 
 
Current status quo manipulation’s effect on sexual minority system 
justification. 
A 2 (Current Status Quo: Affirmation v. Threat) x 17 (SMSJ: 17 items) 
MANOVA did not reveal a significant effect for current status quo across the seventeen 
SMSJ items, MultF(17, 305) = .94, p > .05, ηρ² = .05.  None of the SMSJs were 
significantly different according to current status quo, ps > .05.  
 The same factors produced in the Marriage Equality study were used in the 
Housing Equality study.  LGSelfish was internally consistent at both time 1 (after the 
current status quo manipulation) and at time 2 (after the status quo likelihood 
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manipulation), Cronbach’s α = .92 and α = .92, respectively.  
NaturalHeterosexualMarriage was internally consistent at both time 1 and at time 2, 
Cronbach’s α = .87 and α = .88, respectively.  The three left remaining items (i.e. 
Discrimination History, Political Power, and Societal Contribution) were left as 
individual items.   
A 2 (Current Status Quo: Affirmation v. Threat) x 5 (SMSJ – Reduced number of 
items at Time 1) MANOVA testing whether participants differed according to current 
status quo condition for the five system justification items failed to attain significance, 
MultF(5, 325) = .21, p > .05, ηρ² = .003.  None of the individual factors or items were 
significant, ps > .05.   
Mediation of the relationship between current status quo and housing equality 
ballot decisions by emotion and sexual minority system justification. 
 Participants did not differ in their Ballot 1 decisions according to current status 
quo.  In a series of binary logistic regressions that controlled for the effect of the 
individual differences variables on housing equality Ballot 1, the main effect of current 
status quo did not attain statistical significance, ps > .05.  None of the ANCOVA models 
included significant main effects or interactions for current status quo.  I performed no 
mediation analyses because there were no significant differences for status quo to test for 
emotion or system justification mediations. 
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Hypothesis 2: Status quo likelihood manipulation (Main effect). 
Status quo likelihood manipulation’s effects on Ballot 2 decisions. 
Status quo likelihood manipulation’s effect on voting for Ballot 2. 
A between subjects One-way ANOVA testing whether participants differed in 
their second ballot according to status quo likelihood condition (10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 
90%) failed to yield a significant result, F(3, 316) = .74, MSE = .14, p > .05, ηρ² = .01.  
Of those participants who voted on Ballot 2 (fourteen did not vote), 82.8% voted for 
housing equality. 
Individual differences variables’ effects on voting for Ballot 2. 
Correlation analyses revealed that the individual differences variables were 
significantly correlated with Ballot 2 such that participants were less likely to vote for 
housing equality with more negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men (ATLG), r = -
.51, p < .01; stronger views that lesbians and gay men constituted realistic and symbolic 
threats, r = -.50, p < .01; greater anxiety felt toward lesbians and gay men (Intergroup 
Anxiety), r = -.30, p < .01; stronger beliefs that American society is fair, legitimate, and 
justifiable (SSJ) r = -.14, p < .01; and stronger global belief in a just world (GBJW), r = -
.17, p < .01.  Main effects and interactions for status quo likelihood did not emerge when 
individual difference covariates were added to the logistic regressions one at a time.  
Although three individual differences variables (ATLG, Realistic and Symbolic threat, 
and Intergroup Anxiety) resulted in significant models, status quo likelihood was not a 
significant predictor in any of the models.  Table 35 displays the results. The main effects 
for the covariates were similar to the correlation analyses described above.   
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Table 35 
 
Binary Logistic Regressions with Individual Differences Covariates Predicting Second 
Ballot Decision (Housing Equality) 
 
Covariate 
Predictor 
Model 
Individual 
Differences 
Covariates 
(Predictors) 
Β Wald p Exp(B) 
 
ATLG 
 
ATLG 
   
-1.13 (.30) 
 
14.72 
 
.00 
 
.32 
      
Realistic & 
Symbolic 
Threat 
Realistic & 
Symbolic 
Threat 
-1.08 (.29) 14.06 .00 
 
.34 
      
Intergroup 
Anxiety 
 
Intergroup 
Anxiety 
-.43 (.16) 7.53 .01 .65 
Notes. ATLG stands for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses.  Dfs = 1. 
 
 
Status quo likelihood manipulation’s effect on likelihood to vote for Ballot 2. 
A between subjects One-way ANOVA testing whether participants differed in 
their second ballot likelihood according to status quo likelihood condition failed to yield 
a significant result, F(3, 315) = .37, MSE = 3.63, p > .05, ηρ² = .00.  Of those who 
completed this item (fifteen did not), 80.2% of participants were at least somewhat likely 
to vote for housing equality (46.1% were very likely) whereas 16.6% were at least 
somewhat unlikely to vote for housing equality (7.5% were very unlikely). 
Individual differences variables’ effects on likelihood to vote for Ballot 2. 
Correlation analyses revealed that the individual differences variables were 
significantly correlated with Ballot 2 likelihood.  Participants were less likely to vote for 
housing equality with more negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men (ATLG), r = -
.60, p < .01, stronger views that lesbians and gay men constituted realistic and symbolic 
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threats, r = -.61, p < .01, greater anxiety felt toward lesbians and gay men (Intergroup 
Anxiety), -.38, p < .01, stronger beliefs that American society is fair, legitimate, and 
justifiable (SSJ), r = -.24, p < .01, and stronger global belief in a just world (GBJW), r = -
.21, p < .01.  Main effects emerged when individual difference covariates were added to 
the basic ANOVA, one at a time, resulting in a series of ANCOVA designs for likelihood 
to vote for Ballot 2 post-hoc tests.  Table 36 displays the results.  The main effects for the 
covariates were similar to the correlation analysis.     
However, a significant interaction between ATLG and status quo likelihood also 
emerged, F(3, 310) = 3.29, MSE = 2.28, p < .05, ηρ² = .03, with a significant effect for 
ATLG in each status quo likelihood condition, 10%: β = -.71, p < .01, F(1, 78) = 77.91, 
MSE = 2.17, ηρ² = .50; 30%: β = -.68, p < .01, F(1, 76) = 65.77, MSE = 2.07, ηρ² = .46; 
60%: β = -.45, p < .01, F(1, 81) = 20.72, MSE = 2.59, ηρ² = .20; and 90%: β = -.56, p < 
.01, F(1, 75) = 33.70, MSE = 2.27, ηρ² = .31.  Relationships between ATLG and 
likelihood to vote for Ballot 2 were significantly different between the 10% (β = -.71) and 
60% (β = -.45) conditions, z = -2.48, p < .05; and the 30% (β = -.68) and 60% (β = -.45) 
conditions, z = -2.15, p < .05 (Lowry, 2001-2015).  The relationship between negative 
attitudes toward lesbians and gay men and likelihood not to vote for housing equality was 
stronger when participants thought equality was unlikely.   
A significant interaction between realistic and symbolic threat and status quo 
likelihood emerged, F(3, 310) = 4.53, MSE = 2.19, p < .01, ηρ² = .04 such that realistic 
and symbolic threat was a significant effect for each status quo likelihood condition, 
10%: β = -.74, p < .01, F(1, 78) = 91.66, MSE = 2.00, ηρ² = .54; 30%: β = -.70, p < .01, 
F(1, 76) = 73.46, MSE = 1.96, ηρ² = .49; 60%: β = -.51, p < .01, F(1, 81) = 28.28, MSE = 
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2.41, ηρ² = .26; and 90%: β = -.52, p < .01, F(1, 75) = 28.08, MSE = 2.39, ηρ² = .27.  
Relationships between realistic and symbolic threat and likelihood to vote for Ballot 2 
were significantly different between the 10% (β = -.74) and 60% (β = -.51) conditions, z 
= -2.37, p < .05; and 10% (β = -.74) and 90% (β = -.52) conditions, z = -2.21, p < .05, 
(Lowry, 2001-2015).  A marginally significant difference arose between the 30% (β = -
.70) and 60% (β = -.51) conditions, z = -1.92, p = .055.  Beliefs in the realistic and 
symbolic threat of sexual minorities had a stronger relationship with likelihood to vote 
for housing equality when participants believed housing equality was unlikely.   
Table 36 
 
ANCOVA Models with Individual Differences Covariates Predicting Second Ballot 
Decision (Housing Equality) 
 
Covariate 
Predictor 
Model 
Individual 
Differences 
Covariates 
(Predictors) 
Df F MSE p β ηρ² 
 
ATLG 
 
ATLG 
 
1, 310 
 
182.18 
 
2.28 
 
.000 
 
-.48 
 
.37 
 
SSJ 
 
SSJ  
 
1, 310 
 
20.86 
 
3.44 
 
.000 
 
-.25 
 
.06 
        
GBJW GBJW 1, 309 13.43 3.54 .000 -.2323 .04 
        
Realistic & 
Symbolic 
Threat 
Realistic & 
Symbolic Threat 
1, 310 203.27 2.19 .000 -.45 .40 
        
Intergroup 
Anxiety 
 
Intergroup Anxiety 1, 310 54.96 3.12 .000 -.41 .15 
Note. ATLG, SSJ, and GBJW stand for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale, 
Situational System Justification scale, and Global Belief in a Just World scale.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 The significant beta weight was found within the model using the 30% status quo likelihood as the 
reference group. 
179 
 
Status quo likelihood manipulation’s effect on emotion. 
A 4 (Status Quo Likelihood: 10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) MANOVA with the 7 
emotions (Fear, Anxiety, Anger, Disgust, Compassion, Happiness, and Hope) as 
measures that tested the extent that participants felt different emotions under each status 
quo likelihood condition revealed a significant model, MultF(21, 884.96) = 1.74, p < .05, 
ηρ² = .04.  Follow up univariate tests showed that participants differed according to status 
quo likelihood in their feelings of fear, F(3, 314) = 3.46, MSE = .25, p < .05, ηρ² = .03; 
anxiety, F(3, 314) = 3.80, MSE = .48, p < .05, ηρ² = .04; anger, F(3, 314) = 4.49, MSE = 
.48, p < .01, ηρ² = .04; and disgust, F(3, 314) = 4.81, MSE = .46, p < .01, ηρ² = .04.  
Participants in the 10% condition showed greater levels of fear, anxiety, and disgust than 
participants in the 30%, 60%, and 90% conditions (See Table 37).  Participants in the 
10% condition showed greater levels of anger than participants in the 60% and 90% 
conditions.   
Table 37 
 
Differences across Emotions According to Status Quo Likelihood after Status Quo 
Likelihood Manipulation (Housing Equality) 
 
 Status Quo Likelihood Conditions 
Emotion 10% 30% 60% 90% 
 
Fear 
 
 
1.38a, b, c (.06) 
 
1.19a (.06) 
 
1.15b (.06) 
 
1.21c (.06) 
Anxiety 1.59d, e, f (.08) 1.30d (.08) 1.29e (.08) 1.26f (.08) 
     
Anger 1.60g, h (.08) 1.40 (.08) 1.21g (.08) 1.33h (.08) 
     
Disgust 
 
1.57i, j, k (.08) 1.34i (.08) 1.18j (.07) 1.29k (.08) 
Notes. Means with shared subscripts denote significant differences (p < .05) between means 
within each emotion.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  N10% = 80, N30% = 79, N60% = 83, N90% = 
76. 
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Status quo likelihood manipulation’s effect on sexual minority system 
justification. 
A 4 (Status Quo Likelihood: 10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) MANOVA with the 17 
SMSJ items as dependent measures that tested the extent to which participants used 
justifications under each status quo likelihood condition failed to attain significance, 
MultF(51, 864.18) = .91, p > .05, ηρ² = .05.  Individual justifications also failed to attain 
significance, p > .05.  Similarly, the 4 (Status Quo Likelihood: 10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 
90%) MANOVA with the 5 SMSJ – Reduced number of items at Time 2 failed to attain 
significance, MultF(15, 856.18) = .41, p > .05, ηρ² = .01.  Again, the individual 
justifications failed to attain significance, ps > .05.   
Mediation of the relationship between status quo likelihood and housing 
equality ballot decisions by emotion and sexual minority system justification. 
Participants did not differ in their Ballot 2 decisions according to status quo 
likelihood.  In a series of binary logistic regressions that controlled for the effect of the 
individual differences variables on housing equality Ballot 2, the main effect of status 
quo likelihood did not attain statistical significance, ps > .05.  Although both the ATLG 
and the Realistic and Symbolic Threat models contained significant interactions with 
status quo likelihood, when the interaction between the covariates and status quo 
likelihood were removed from the ANCOVAs, the main effects for status quo likelihood 
were not significant, ps > .05. I performed no mediation analyses because there were no 
significant differences for status quo to test for emotion or system justification 
mediations. 
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Hypothesis 3: Current status quo by status quo likelihood (Interaction 
effect). 
Current status quo and status quo likelihood manipulations’ effects on Ballot 2 
decisions. 
The 2 (Current Status Quo: Affirmation v. Threat) x 4 (Status Quo Likelihood: 
10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) x 2 (Time: Initial v. Second ballot) mixed model ANOVA 
with repeated measures on the last factor tested the different hypotheses for Ballot change 
and failed to attain significance, p > .05.  Crosstabs revealed that only 2.5% of 
participants changed their vote (eight participants) between the initial and subsequent 
ballot.  A 2 x 4 x 2 ANOVA collapsing across time also failed to attain significance for 
vote likelihood, p > .05.   
Current status quo and status quo likelihood manipulations’ interaction effect on 
Ballot 2 decisions with individual differences variables included. 
Correlational analyses revealed that individual differences variables were 
significantly correlated with the four ballot decisions (See Table 38).  Participants were 
less likely to vote for housing equality with more negative attitudes toward lesbians and 
gay men (ATLG), stronger views that lesbians and gay men constituted realistic and 
symbolic threats, greater anxiety felt toward lesbians and gay men, stronger beliefs that 
American society is fair, legitimate, and justifiable (SSJ), and stronger global belief in a 
just world (GBJW)24. 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 Covariate analyses of these variables can be found in the Hypothesis 2 and 3 Results sections. 
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Table 38 
 
Correlations between Ballot Decisions and Individual Differences variables (Housing 
Equality) 
 
 Ballot Decision 
Individual 
Difference 
variable 
Ballot 1 Ballot 2 Ballot 1 
Likelihood 
Ballot 2 
Likelihood 
     
ATLG 
 
 
-.48 
(319) 
-.51 
(319) 
-.54 
(319) 
-.60 
(318) 
SSJ 
 
 
-.14 
(319 
-.14* 
(319) 
-.23  
(319 
-.24 
(318) 
GBJW 
 
 
-.18 
(318) 
-.17 
(318) 
-.19 
(318) 
-.21 
(317) 
Realistic & 
Symbolic 
Threat 
 
-.48 
(319) 
-.50 
(319) 
-.58 
(319) 
-.61 
(318) 
Intergroup 
Anxiety 
 
-.26 
(319) 
-.30 
(319) 
-.35 
(319) 
-.38 
(318) 
Notes. ATLG, SSJ, and GBJW stand for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale, 
Situational System Justification scale, and Global Belief in a Just World scale.  All correlations 
are significant at p < .01 level, except for *.  Correlations with * are significant at p < .05 level.  
Ns are in parentheses. 
   
 
Individual differences variables’ effects on the relationship between manipulated 
variables (Current status quo and status quo likelihood) and voting for housing equality. 
Binary logistic regression involving current status quo and status quo likelihood 
as predictors for Ballot 2 failed to attain significance, Nagelkerke R2 = .03, X
2(7) = 5.42, 
p > .05.  As shown in the results for Hypothesis 2, individual differences variables 
significantly predicted participants’ votes for Ballot 2.  Therefore, in a series of models, I 
added individual differences variables one at a time as covariates to the original binary 
logistic regression models used to predict Ballot 2.  Table 39 displays the results.  The 
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main effects for the covariates were similar to the correlation analyses described above.  
Although SSJ and GBJW were significant predictors, the overall models did not attain 
significance, Nagelkerke R2 = .06, X
2(8) = 12.01, p > .05 and Nagelkerke R2 = .08, X
2(8) 
= 14.99, p < .06, respectively. 
Table 39 
 
Binary Logistic Regressions with Individual Differences Covariates Predicting Second 
Ballot Decisions (Housing Equality) 
 
Covariate 
Predictor 
Model 
Individual Differences 
Covariates 
(Predictors) 
Df Β Wald p Exp(B) 
 
ATLG 
 
ATLG 
 
1 
 
-1.28 
(.17) 
 
56.22 
 
.00 
 
.28 
 
SSJ 
 
SSJ 
 
1 
 
-.26 
(.10) 
 
6.40 
 
.01 
 
 
.77 
       
GBJW GBJW 1 -.46 
(.15) 
 
9.14 .00 
 
.63 
       
Realistic & 
Symbolic 
Threat 
Realistic & Symbolic 
Threat 
1 -1.15 
(.16) 
51.79 .00 
 
.32 
       
Intergroup 
Anxiety 
 
Intergroup Anxiety 1 -.42 
(.09) 
23.33 .00 .66 
Note. ATLG, SSJ, and GBJW stand for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale, 
Situational System Justification scale, and Global Belief in a Just World scale.  Standard errors 
are in parentheses. 
 
 
Individual differences variables’ effects on the relationship between manipulated 
variables (Current status quo and status quo likelihood) and likelihood to vote for 
housing equality. 
A series of ANCOVAs that included individual differences variables as covariates 
in the 2 (Current Status Quo: Affirmation v. Threat) x 4 (Status Quo Likelihood: 10% v. 
184 
 
30% v. 60% v. 90%) x 2 (Time: Ballot 1 Likelihood v. Ballot 2 Likelihood) model 
explored further the vote for housing equality.  Both ATLG and realistic and symbolic 
threat showed significant effects for time and for their specific individual differences 
variable (See Table 40).  However, both were qualified by significant time by individual 
differences interactions: time by ATLG, F(1, 302) = 7.55, MSE = .23, p < .01, ηρ² = .02 
and time by realistic and symbolic threat, F(1, 302) = 4.14, MSE = .23, p < .05, ηρ² = .01.  
One-way ANCOVAs revealed significant ATLG effects for the likelihood of voting for 
Ballot 1, β = -.47, p < .01, and Ballot 2, β = -.55, p < .01.  One-way ANCOVAs revealed 
significant realistic and symbolic threat effects for the likelihood of voting for Ballot 1, β 
= -.42, p < .01, and Ballot 2, β = -.48, p < .01.  Both results suggest that the relationships 
were stronger at time 2. 
For both MANCOVAs, significant status quo likelihood by individual differences 
variables interactions emerged: ATLG, F(3, 302) = 3.07, MSE = 4.66, p < .05, ηρ² = .03 
and realistic and symbolic threat, F(3, 302) = 4.54, MSE = 4.36, p < .01, ηρ² = .04.  
ANCOVAs with likelihood to vote for housing equality collapsed across time (overall 
likelihood to vote for housing equality) revealed significant status quo likelihood by 
ATLG, F(3, 303) = 3.08, MSE = 2.33, p < .05, ηρ² = .03 and status quo likelihood by 
realistic and symbolic threat, F(3, 303) = 4.55, MSE = 2.18, p < .01, ηρ² = .04, 
interactions.  After the file was split according to status quo likelihood, significant ATLG 
effects emerged in each condition: 10%, β = -.67, p < .01; 30%, β = -.74, p < .01; 60%, β 
= -.38, p < .01; and 90%, β = -.60, p < .01.  Significant realistic and symbolic effects 
emerged in each condition as well: 10%, β = -.83, p < .01; 30%, β = -.84, p < .01; 60%, β 
= -.43, p < .01; and 90%, β = -.54, p < .01.  These results indicate that participants’ 
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negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men and perceptions that sexual minorities 
represent realistic and symbolic threats had a greater impact on their likelihood to vote 
for housing equality in the 10% and 30% likelihood conditions. 
When I added the remaining individual differences variables (SSJ, GBJW, and 
Intergroup Anxiety), one at a time, to the ANCOVA model, time was not a significant 
main effect in any of the models, ps > .05, so that I collapsed across time.  A series of 2 
(Current Status Quo: Affirmation v. Threat) x 4 (Status Quo Likelihood: 10% v. 30% v. 
60% v. 90%) ANCOVAs with the individual differences variables as covariates produced 
main effects for the covariates that were similar to the correlation analyses performed 
above (see Tables 36 and 37).  Although both SSJ and GBJW had significant and 
marginally significant current status quo by status quo likelihood interactions, these 
interactions were qualified by significant and marginally significant three-way 
interactions involving the individual differences variables, β = -1.0025, p < .05, F(3, 303) 
= 3.36, MSE = 3.32, ηρ² = .03 and β = -.9226, p = .063, F(3, 302) = 2.46, MSE = 3.43, ηρ² 
= .02, respectively.  After splitting the files according to current status quo and status quo 
likelihood (separately), ANCOVA analyses and correlations revealed a significant current 
status quo by SSJ interaction in the 90% condition, β = -.99, p < .01, F(1, 73) = 7.74, 
MSE = 2.78, ηρ² = .10, such that, for participants in the threat, 90% cell, the more they 
believed in the legitimacy of the American system, the less likely they were to vote for 
                                                 
25 In the regression model, SSJ did not have a significant beta weight when using the 90% reference group 
(see footnote 16).  Therefore, the beta weights for SSJ used 10% as the reference group throughout these 
analyses. 
26 In the regression model, GBJW did not have a significant beta weight when using the 90% reference 
group (see footnote 17).  Therefore, the beta weights for GBJW used 10% as the reference group 
throughout these analyses. 
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housing equality, r = -.42, p < .01.  A marginally significant current status quo by GBJW 
interaction emerged in the 10% condition, β = .77, p = .05, F(1, 75) = 3.88, MSE = 4.07, 
p = .05, ηρ² = .05, such that, for participants in the affirmation, 10% cell, the more they 
held global belief in a just world, the less likely they were to vote for housing equality, r 
= -.34, p < .05.  
Table 40 
 
MANCOVA and ANCOVA Models with Time, Current Status Quo, Status Quo 
Likelihood, and Individual Differences Covariates Predicting Second Ballot Decision 
(Housing Equality) 
 
Covariate 
Predictor 
Model 
Time, Current 
Status Quo (CSQ), 
Status Quo 
Likelihood (SQL), 
and Individual 
Differences 
Covariates 
(Predictors) 
Df F MSE p β ηρ² 
 
ATLG 
MANCOVA 
 
Time 
 
 
1, 302 
 
7.08 
 
.23 
 
.008 
 
 
 
.02 
 ATLG 
 
1, 302 157.51 4.66 .000 -.52 .34 
 Time x ATLG 
Interaction  
 
1, 302 7.55 .23 .006  .02 
 ATLG (Ballot 1 
Likelihood)  
 
1, 303 128.46 2.59 .000 -.47 .30 
 ATLG (Ballot 2 
Likelihood)  
 
1, 302 175.91 2.30 .000 -.55 .37 
 SQL x ATLG  
 
3, 302 3.07 4.66 .028  .03 
ATLG 
ANCOVA  
SQL x ATLG 
Interaction  
 
3, 303 3.08 2.33 .028 -.35 .03 
ATLG 
ANCOVA 
(Split by SQL) 
ATLG (10% 
condition) 
1, 76 70.85 2.24 .000 -.67 .48 
 ATLG (30% 
condition) 
1, 75 60.23 2.01 .000 -.74 .44 
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 ATLG (60% 
condition) 
 
1, 79 16.86 2.73 .000 -.38 .18 
 ATLG (90% 
condition) 
1, 73 28.26 2.31 .000 -.60 .28 
 
SSJ ANCOVA 
 
SSJ  
 
1, 303 
 
17.36 
 
3.32 
 
.000 
 
-.4827 
 
.05 
        
 CSQ x SQL 
Interaction 
 
3, 303 3.18 3.32 .024 .98 .03 
 CSQ x SQL x SSJ 
Interaction 
 
3, 303 3.36 3.32 .019 -1.00 .03 
SSJ ANCOVA 
(Split by SQL) 
 
CSQ x SSJ (90% 
condition) 
1, 73 7.74 2.78 .007 -.99 .10 
GBJW 
ANCOVA 
GBJW 1, 302 12.07 3.43 .001 -.4328 .04 
 CSQ x SQL 
Interaction 
 
3, 302 2.40 3.43 .068 .90 .02 
 CSQ x SQL x 
GBJW Interaction 
 
3, 302 2.46 3.43 .063 -.92 .02 
GBJW 
ANCOVA 
(Split by SQL) 
 
CSQ x GBJW (10% 
condition) 
1, 75 3.88 4.07 .053 .77 .05 
Realistic & 
Symbolic 
(R&S) Threat 
MANCOVA 
Time  1, 302 4.02 .23 .046  .01 
 R&S Threat  
 
1, 302 192.34 4.34 .000 -.46 .39 
 Time x R&S Threat 
Interaction  
 
1, 302 4.14 .23 .043  .01 
 R&S Threat (Ballot 
1 Likelihood) 
 
1, 303 163.39 2.40 .000 -.42 .35 
 R&S Threat (Ballot 
2 Likelihood) 
 
1, 302 205.26 2.18 .000 -.48 .40 
                                                 
27 The significant beta weight was found within the model using the 10% status quo likelihood as the 
reference group. 
28 The significant beta weight was found within the model using the 10% status quo likelihood as the 
reference group. 
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 SQL x R&S Threat 
Interaction 
 
3, 302 4.54 4.36 .004  .04 
R&S Threat 
ANCOVA  
SQL x R&S Threat 
Interaction 
 
3, 303 4.55 2.18 .004 -.51 .04 
R&S Threat 
ANCOVA 
(Split by SQL) 
R&S Threat (10% 
condition) 
1, 76 87.14 2.01 .000 -.83 .53 
 R&S Threat (30% 
condition) 
 
1, 75 73.28 1.83 .000 -.84 .49 
 R&S Threat (60% 
condition) 
 
1, 79 28.50 2.44 .000 -.43 .26 
 R&S Threat (90% 
condition) 
1, 73 23.53 2.42 .000 -.54 .24 
        
Intergroup 
Anxiety 
ANCOVA 
 
Intergroup Anxiety 1, 303 52.41 3.08 .000 -.33 .15 
Notes. ATLG, SSJ, GBJW, R&S Threat, CSQ, and SQL stand for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and 
Gay Men scale, Situational System Justification scale, Global Belief in a Just World scale, 
Realistic and Symbolic Threat scale, Current Status Quo, and Status Quo Likelihood.   
 
 
Current status quo and status quo likelihood manipulations’ effects on emotion. 
A 2 (Current Status Quo: Affirmation v. Threat) x 4 (Status Quo Likelihood: 10% 
v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) x 7 (Emotions: Fear v. Anxiety v. Anger v. Disgust v. 
Compassion v. Happiness v. Hope) x 2 (Time: After current status quo manipulation v. 
After status quo likelihood manipulation) mixed model ANOVA with repeated measures 
on the last two factors revealed a significant main effect for emotion, F(2.22, 688.04) = 
148.21, MSE = 1.98, p < .01, ηρ² = .32, qualified by an emotion by current status quo 
interaction, F(2.22, 688.04) = 12.31, MSE = 1.98, p < .01, ηρ² = .04.  A significant time 
by emotion interaction also resulted, F(2.46, 7.36) = 18.38, MSE = .99, p < .01, ηρ² = .06; 
however, a significant three-way interaction among time, emotion, and current status quo, 
F(2.46, 7.36) = 27.00, MSE = .99, p < .01, ηρ² = .08 subsumed these effects.  
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 A series of 2 (Current Status Quo: Affirmation v. Threat) x 4 (Status Quo 
Likelihood: 10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) x 2 (Time: After current status quo 
manipulation (Time 1) v. After status quo likelihood manipulation (Time 2)) mixed 
model ANOVAs with repeated measures on the last factor served as post hoc analyses for 
each emotion.  Each of the following emotions registered a time by current status quo 
interaction: fear, F(1, 313) = 12.06, MSE = .22, p < .01, ηρ² = .04; anxiety, F(1, 310) = 
8.68, MSE = .35, p < .01, ηρ² = .03; anger, F(1, 313) = 13.79, MSE = .41, p < .01, ηρ² = 
.04; disgust, F(1, 313) = 11.53, MSE = .32, p < .01, ηρ² = .04; compassion, F(1, 313) = 
11.30, MSE = .36, p < .01, ηρ² = .04; happiness, F(1, 313) = 27.41, MSE = .81, p < .01, 
ηρ² = .10; and hope, F(1, 313) = 24.21, MSE = .75, p < .01, ηρ² = .07. 
After splitting the file according to current status quo, repeated measure ANOVAs 
and One-way ANOVAs for each time were conducted to explore these relationships (See 
Table 41).  As depicted in Table 38, feelings of fear, anxiety, anger, and disgust under 
threat were stronger at time 1 than at time 2, and participants felt all four of these 
negative emotions more strongly under threat than affirmation at time 1.  Compassion 
feelings were stronger under affirmation at time 2 compared to time 1 but also stronger 
under threat at time 1 than affirmation at time 1.  Happiness ratings were greater under 
affirmation than threat at time 1 but under threat increased at time 2. Finally, hope 
followed a similar pattern as happiness.  
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Table 41 
 
Differences across Emotions and Time According to Current Status Quo (Housing 
Equality) 
 
 Time 1 Time 2 
Emotion Affirmation Threat Affirmation Threat 
 
Fear 
 
1.30a, b (.06) 
 
1.64a, c (.05) 
 
1.20b (.04) 
 
1.29c (.04) 
     
Anxiety 
 
1.30d (.06) 1.73d, e (.06) 1.29 (.06) 1.44e (.05) 
Anger 1.45f (.07) 1.78f, g (.06) 1.42 (.06) 1.37g (.06) 
     
Disgust 
 
1.37h (.06) 1.65h, i (.05) 1.36 (.06) 1.34i (.05) 
Compassion 1.78j, k (.07) 1.99j (.06) 2.14k (.07) 2.03 (.07) 
     
Happiness 2.46l (09) 1.69l, m (.08) 2.30 (.10) 2.36m (.10) 
     
Hope 2.56n* (.08) 2.00n, o (.08) 2.37* (.09) 2.49o (.09) 
     
Notes. Means with shared subscripts are significantly different at p < .05 or less for the same 
emotion.  Shared * are marginally significantly different at p = .05 for the same emotion.  
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
Current status quo and status quo likelihood manipulations’ effects on sexual 
minority system justification. 
A 2 (Current Status Quo: Affirmation v. Threat) x 4 (Status Quo Likelihood: 10% 
v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) x 17 (SMSJ: 17 items) x 2 (Time: Time 1 v. Time 2) mixed 
model ANOVA with repeated measures on the last two factors tested the change 
hypotheses.  A marginally significant main effect for time emerged such that participants 
were more likely to endorse SMSJs at time 1, M = 2.39, than at time 2, M = 2.37, F(1, 
294) = 3.78, MSE = .27, p = .05, ηρ² = .01.  A main effect for SMSJ emerged, indicating 
that participants differed in their endorsement of different system justifications, F(6.26, 
1839.68) = 168.81, MSE = 5.08, p < .01, ηρ² = .36.  To examine the SMSJ effect further, I 
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relied on the factors and items that resulted from the 5 (SMSJ) x 2 (Current Status Quo: 
Affirmation v. Threat) x 4 (Status Quo Likelihood: 10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) x 2 
(Time: Time 1 v. Time 2) mixed model ANOVA with repeated measures on the last 
factor examined this hypothesis with a reduced number of SMSJ items based on the 
factor analysis reported above.  A main effect for time emerged, F(1, 308) = 4.88, MSE = 
.18, p < .05, ηρ² = .02 as did a main effect for SMSJ emerged, indicating that participants 
differed in their endorsement of different system justifications, F(2.54, 782.05) = 410.68, 
MSE = 2.76, p < .01, ηρ² = .57.   
 A series of 2 (Current Status Quo: Affirmation v. Threat) x 4 (Status Quo 
Likelihood: 10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) x 2 (Time: Time 1 v. Time 2) mixed model 
ANOVAs with repeated measures on the last factor served as post-hoc tests for each of 
the reduced set of justifications.  A significant main effect for time emerged for 
Discrimination History, such that participants were less likely to believe that lesbians and 
gay men have a history of discrimination at time 1, M = 4.30, than at time 2, M = 4.32, 
F(1, 310) = 4.89, MSE = .21, p < .05, ηρ² = .02.  No other significant effects resulted 
from this analysis. 
Mediation of the relationship between current status quo, status quo likelihood, 
and housing equality ballot decisions by emotion and sexual minority system 
justification. 
Participants did not differ in their Ballot 2 decisions according to status quo 
likelihood.  In addition, participants did not differ in their Ballot 2 decisions according to 
current status quo.  In a series of binary logistic regressions that controlled for the effect 
of the individual differences variables on housing equality Ballot 2, the main effects of 
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current status quo and status quo likelihood did not attain statistical significance, ps > .05.  
Although there were interactions within the different ANCOVA models (See Above), 
when the interactions were removed from the models, current status quo and status quo 
likelihood were not significant predictors of likelihood to vote for housing equality, ps > 
.05.  I performed no mediation analyses because there were no significant differences for 
status quo to test for emotion or system justification mediations. 
Hypothesis 4: Individual differences variables (Attitudes Toward Lesbians 
and Gay Men (ATLG), Situational System Justification (SSJ), and Global Belief in a 
Just World (GBJW) scales) 
Individual differences variables’ effects on Ballot decisions. 
Individual differences variables strongly affected participants’ ballot decisions 
(See Results for Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3). 
Individual differences variables’ effects on emotion. 
ATLG as individual differences covariate. 
A 4 (Status Quo Likelihood: 10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) x 8 (Emotion: Fear v. 
Anxiety v. Anger v. Disgust v. Compassion v. Pity v. Happiness v. Hope) x 2 (Time: 
Time 1 v. Time 2) mixed model ANCOVA with ATLG covariate and the last two factors 
as repeated measures resulted in a significant four-way interaction between time, 
emotion, status quo likelihood, and ATLG, F(9.05, 920.20) = 3.42, MSE = .93, p < .01, 
ηρ² = .03.  Thus, a series of 4 (Status Quo Likelihood: 10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) x 2 
(Time: Time 1 v. Time 2) repeated measures ANCOVAs with ATLG covariate were 
conducted for each emotion.  Significant time main effects appeared for all emotions 
except pity (See Tables 42 and 43).  Similarly, an ATLG main effect emerged for most 
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emotions (except compassion and pity): fear, β = .24, p < .01, anxiety, β = .1229, p < .05, 
anger, β = .39, p < .01, disgust, β = .34, p < .01, happiness, β = -.2730, p < .05, and hope, 
β = -.2931, p < .01 (See Table 44).  In general, higher bias against LGBT people resulted 
in stronger negative feelings and weaker positive feelings, especially at time 1.  
Table 42 
   
Repeated Measures ANCOVA Models with ATLG (Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay 
Men scale) Predicting Emotions: Time Main Effect (Housing Equality) 
 
Predicted Emotion Df F MSE p ηρ² 
 
Fear  
 
1, 311 
 
25.05 
 
.21 
 
.000 
 
.08 
 
Anxiety 
 
1, 308 
 
9.82 
 
.35 
 
.002 
 
.03 
 
Anger 
 
1, 311 
 
10.55 
 
.41 
 
.001 
 
.03 
 
Disgust 
 
1, 311 
 
4.83 
 
.31 
 
.029 
 
.02 
 
Compassion 
 
 
1, 311 
 
71.57 
 
.31 
 
.000 
 
.19 
Happiness 
 
1, 311 87.01 .72 .000 .22 
Hope 1, 311 92.78 .60 .000 .23 
      
Note. ATLG stands for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29 None of the status quo likelihood references groups produced significant beta weights within the 
regression models.  Therefore, the status quo likelihood vectors were removed to find the significant 
relationship between ATLG and Anxiety.  
30 The significant beta weight was found within the model using the 30% status quo likelihood as the 
reference group. 
31 The significant beta weight was found within the model using the 30% status quo likelihood as the 
reference group. 
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Table 43 
 
Differences for Emotions across Time (Housing Equality) 
 
 Time 1 Time 2 
Emotion M SE M SE 
 
Fear 
 
 
1.48 
 
.04 
 
1.23 
 
.03 
Anxiety 
 
1.53 .05 1.35 .04 
Anger 
 
1.63 .05 1.38 .04 
Disgust 
 
1.52 .04 1.34 .04 
Compassion 1.89 .05 2.08 .05 
     
Pity 
 
1.61 .05 1.47 .05 
Happiness 2.04 .06 2.34 .06 
     
Hope 2.25 .06 2.44 .06 
     
Note. All means are significantly different between Time 1 and 2 for the same emotion at p < .05 
or less, except for Pity, which was not significantly different across time. 
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Table 44 
   
Repeated Measures ANCOVA Models with ATLG (Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay 
Men scale) Predicting Emotions: ATLG Main Effect (Housing Equality) 
 
Predicted Emotion Df F MSE p β ηρ² 
 
Fear 
 
1, 311 
 
11.07 
 
.50 
 
.001 
 
.24 
 
.03 
 
Anxiety  
 
1, 308 
 
4.00 
 
.80 
 
.046 
 
.1232 
 
.01 
 
Anger  
 
1, 311 
 
19.70 
 
.72 
 
.000 
 
.39 
 
.06 
 
Disgust  
 
 
1, 311 
 
19.78 
 
.58 
 
.000 
 
.34 
 
.06 
Happiness 
 
1, 311 5.60 1.91 .019 -.2733 .02 
Hope  1, 311 9.29 1.46 .003 -.2934 .03 
       
Notes. ATLG stands for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale. 
 
 
However, some of these main effects were qualified by significant time by ATLG 
interactions: fear, compassion, happiness, and hope (See Table 45).  For anxiety, only the 
main effects emerged, such that participants felt more anxiety at time 1 than at time 2 
(See Table 43) and the greater negative attitudes participants held toward lesbians and 
gay men the greater anxiety they felt, β = .12, p < .05.  Similarly, for disgust, only the 
main effects emerged, such that participants were more disgusted at time 1 than at time 2 
(See Table 43) and greater negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men were related to 
greater disgust felt, β = .34, p < .01.  One-way ANCOVA follow ups revealed that the 
                                                 
32None of the status quo likelihood references groups produced significant beta weights within the 
regression models.  Therefore, the status quo likelihood vectors were removed to find the significant 
relationship between ATLG and Anxiety.   
33 The significant beta weight was found within the model using the 30% status quo likelihood as the 
reference group. 
34 The significant beta weight was found within the model using the 30% status quo likelihood as the 
reference group. 
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relationship between compassion and ATLG was significant at both time 1, β = .1535, p < 
.05, F(1, 311) = 6.34, MSE = .66, ηρ² = .02, and at time 2, β = -.22, p < .01, F(1, 311) = 
18.01, MSE = .78, ηρ² = .06, but in opposite directions such that those with negative 
attitudes towards lesbians and gay men were more compassionate at time 1 than at time 2. 
Table 45 
   
Repeated Measures ANCOVA Models with ATLG (Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay 
Men scale) Predicting Emotions: Time by ATLG Interaction (Housing Equality) 
 
Predicted Emotion Df F MSE p ηρ² 
 
Fear  
 
1, 311 
 
4.89 
 
.21 
 
.028 
 
.02 
 
Compassion 
 
 
1, 311 
 
54.15 
 
.31 
 
.000 
 
.15 
Happiness  
 
1, 311 67.34 .72 .000 .18 
Hope 1, 311 85.63 .60 .000 .22 
      
Notes. ATLG stands for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale. 
 
 
Significant and marginally significant time by status quo likelihood interactions  
emerged for most emotions (except for fear and anxiety) (See Table 46).  For disgust and 
compassion, I split the file according to status quo likelihood and the ATLG repeated 
measures ANCOVA was conducted to explore these interactions.  For disgust, a 
significant main effect for time emerged for participants in the 90% condition, such that 
participants were more disgusted at time 1 (M = 1.59) than at time 2 (M = 1.31).  For 
compassion, significant effects for time emerged for all of the conditions, such that 
participants felt less compassion at time 1 than at time 2 (See Table 47).   
 
                                                 
35 None of the status quo likelihood references groups produced significant beta weights within the 
regression models at the different times.  Therefore, the status quo likelihood vectors were removed to find 
the significant relationship between ATLG and Compassion.  
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Table 46 
 
Repeated Measures ANCOVA Models with ATLG (Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay 
Men scale) Predicting Emotions: Status Quo Likelihood Effects (Housing Equality) 
 
Predicted 
Emotions 
SQL Effects Df F MSE p ηρ² 
 
Fear 
 
 
Time x SQL x ATLG 
Interaction 
 
 
3, 311 
 
2.75 
 
.21 
 
.043 
 
.03 
 Time x SQL x ATLG 
Interaction: 10% 
condition 
 
1, 78 6.90 .22 .010 .08 
 Time x SQL x ATLG 
Interaction: 90% 
condition 
1, 75 5.27 .27 .025 .07 
 
Anger  
 
 
Time x SQL 
Interaction 
 
 
3, 311 
 
3.02 
 
.41 
 
.030 
 
.03 
 Time x SQL x ATLG 
Interaction 
 
3, 311 2.69 .41 .047 .02 
 Time x SQL x ATLG 
Interaction: 90% 
condition 
1, 75 10.52 .36 .002 .12 
 
Disgust  
 
Time x SQL 
Interaction 
 
3, 311 
 
2.74 
 
.31 
 
.043 
 
.03 
  
Time x SQL 
Interaction: 90% 
condition 
 
 
1, 75 
 
14.04 
 
.28 
 
.000 
 
.16 
Compassion  
 
Time x SQL 
Interaction 
 
3, 311 3.45 .31 .017 .03 
 Time x SQL 
Interaction: 10% 
condition 
 
1, 78 50.09 .30 .000 .39 
 Time x SQL 
Interaction: 30% 
condition 
 
1, 77 16.12 .29 .000 .17 
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 Time x SQL 
Interaction: 60% 
condition 
 
1, 81 11.34 .30 .001 .12 
 Time x SQL 
Interaction: 90% 
condition 
 
1, 75 6.80 .35 .011 .08 
Pity  
 
Time x SQL 
Interaction 
 
3, 308 2.60 .60 .052 .02 
 Time x SQL x ATLG 
Interaction 
 
3, 308 3.97 .60 .009 .04 
 Time x SQL x ATLG 
Interaction: 90% 
condition 
 
1, 72 10.45 .49 .002 .13 
Happiness   
 
Time x SQL 
Interaction 
 
3, 311 4.49 .72 .004 .04 
 Time x SQL x ATLG 
Interaction 
 
3, 311 3.35 .72 .019 .03 
 Time x SQL x ATLG 
Interaction: 10% 
condition 
 
1, 78 7.18 .64 .009 .08 
 Time x SQL x ATLG 
Interaction: 30% 
condition 
 
1, 77 11.43 .82 .001 .13 
 Time x SQL x ATLG 
Interaction: 60% 
condition 
 
1, 81 13.73 .61 .000 .14 
 Time x SQL x ATLG 
Interaction: 90% 
condition 
 
1, 75 45.20 .80 .000 .38 
Hope  Time x SQL 
Interaction 
3, 311 6.00 .60 .001 .06 
       
 Time x SQL x ATLG 
Interaction 
 
3, 311 5.17 .60 .002 .05 
 Time x SQL x ATLG 
Interaction: 10% 
condition 
 
1, 78 5.05 .62 .027 .06 
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 Time x SQL x ATLG 
Interaction: 30% 
condition 
 
1, 77 17.74 .58 .000 .19 
 Time x SQL x ATLG 
Interaction: 60% 
condition 
 
1, 81 18.70 .58 .000 .19 
 Time x SQL x ATLG 
Interaction: 90% 
condition 
1, 75 63.85 .63 .000 .46 
       
Notes. ATLG and SQL stand for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale and Status Quo 
Likelihood. 
 
 
Table 47 
 
Differences for Compassion According to Status Quo Likelihood at Different Times 
(Housing Equality) 
 
 Status Quo Likelihood Conditions 
Time 10% 30% 60% 90% 
 
Time 1 
 
 
1.85a (.09) 
 
1.76b (.08) 
 
1.91c (.09) 
 
2.04d (.11) 
Time 2 
 
2.22a (.10) 1.98b (.09) 1.95c (.10) 2.17d (.11) 
Notes. Means with shared subscripts indicate significant differences at p < .05 level.  Standard 
errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
Significant three-way interactions among time, status quo likelihood, and ATLG 
emerged for most of the emotions (except anxiety, disgust, and compassion) (See Table 
46).  After splitting the file according to status quo likelihood, the ATLG repeated 
measures ANCOVA and correlations served as post hoc tests for each emotion.  For fear, 
significant interactions between ATLG and time emerged in the 10% and 90% 
conditions.  However, at time 2, participants did not differ in their relationships between 
negative attitudes and feelings of fear, z = -1.07, p > .05 (Lowry, 2001-2015), such that 
participants with greater negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men experienced 
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greater fear (See Table 48).  For anger, a significant interaction emerged in the 90% 
condition such that more negative attitudes were associated with greater anger at time 2, r 
= .54, p < .01.  For pity, a significant interaction emerged in the 90% condition such that 
participants with greater negative attitudes felt a great amount of pity at time 2, r = .47, p 
< .01.   
Table 48 
 
Correlations between Fear and ATLG (Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale) 
According to Status Quo Likelihood at Different Times (Housing Equality) 
 
 Status Quo Likelihood Conditions 
Time 10% 30% 60% 90% 
 
Time 1 
 
 
-.028ns (80) 
 
.092ns (79) 
 
.206ns (83) 
 
.05ns (77) 
Time 2 
 
.278 (80) .109ns (79) .280 (83) .430 (77) 
Notes. Correlations are not significantly different from each other.  NS subscripts indicate 
correlations are not significant at p < .05 level.  Ns are in parentheses. 
 
 
For happiness, significant interactions emerged for all of the conditions (See 
Table 46).  At time 2, participants in the 90% condition (r = -.51, p < .01) had 
significantly stronger relationships between their negative attitudes toward lesbians and 
gay men and their feelings of unhappiness than participants in the 60% condition (r = -
.21, p < .06), z = 2.13, p < .05 (See Table 49) (Lowry, 2001-2015).  Participants in the 
90% condition had significantly different and stronger relationships at time 2 (r = -.51, p 
< .01) than at time 1 (r = .22, p < .06), z = 4.73, p < .01, such that they felt more unhappy 
with time.  For hope, significant interactions emerged for all of the conditions (See Table 
46).  At time 2, participants in the 90% condition (r = -.53, p < .01) had significantly 
stronger relationships between their negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men and 
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their feelings of hopelessness than participants in the 10% condition (r = -.22, p = .05), z 
= 2.29, p < .05 (See Table 50).  Participants in the 90% condition had a significantly 
different and stronger relationship at time 2 (r = -.53, p < .01) than at time 1 (r = .32, p < 
.01), z = 5.67, p < .01, such that they felt more hopeless with time (Lowry, 2001-2015).   
Table 49 
 
Correlations between Happiness and ATLG (Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men 
scale) According to Status Quo Likelihood at Different Times (Housing Equality) 
 
 Status Quo Likelihood Conditions 
Time 10% 30% 60% 90% 
 
Time 1 
 
 
.143ns (80) 
 
-.015ns (79) 
 
.164ns (83) 
 
.216a (77) 
Time 2 
 
-.175ns (80) -.409 (79) -.211b (83) -.506a, b (77) 
Notes. Correlations with shared subscripts are significantly different at p < .05 or less level.  NS 
subscripts indicate correlations are not significant at p < .05 level.  Ns are in parentheses. 
 
 
Table 50 
 
Correlations between Hope and ATLG (Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale) 
According to Status Quo Likelihood at Different Times (Housing Equality) 
 
 Status Quo Likelihood Conditions 
Time 10% 30% 60% 90% 
 
Time 1 
 
 
.065ns (80) 
 
.013ns (79) 
 
.153ns (83) 
 
.325a (77) 
Time 2 
 
-.218b (80) -.469 (79) -.310 (83) -.533a, b (77) 
Notes. Correlations with shared subscripts are significantly different at p < .05 or less.  NS 
subscripts indicate correlations are not significant at p < .05 level.  Ns are in parentheses. 
 
 
Individual differences variables’ effects on sexual minority system justification. 
 Three separate 2 (Current Status Quo: Affirmation v. Threat) x 4 (Status Quo 
Likelihood: 10% v. 30% v. 60% v. 90%) MANCOVA models with the five SMSJ 
variables as dependent measures and ATLG, SSJ, and GBJW serving as covariates, 
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entered one at a time tested the effects of these covariates on the system justification 
judgments.  The SSJ MANCOVA model failed to attain significant three-way 
interactions for the individual SMSJ items, ps > .05.  However, in a series of ANCOVAs 
with current status quo and status quo likelihood as predictor variables, the individual 
SMSJ dependent variables, and ATLG, SSJ, or GBJW as covariates, ATLG, SSJ, and 
GBJW significantly predicted participants’ endorsement of the SMSJs.  The more that 
participants held negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men (ATLG), believed 
American society to be fair, legitimate, and justifiable (SSJ), and believed that the world 
is fair and that individuals are punished according to dessert (GBJW) the more likely they 
were to believe that sexual minorities are selfish, immature, immoral, and desirous of 
“special rights” above others (LGSelfish factor).  The higher they scored on these factors 
the more likely they were to believe that heterosexual marriage and parenting represent 
the natural and ideal form of marriage and child rearing (NaturalHeterosexualMarriage 
factor) and the less likely they were to believe that lesbians and gay men have a history of 
experiencing discrimination in America (except for the GBJW model).  Finally, high 
scores on these factors also predicted beliefs that sexual orientation is related to an 
individual’s ability to contribute to society and that sexual minorities do not have enough 
political power, as a group, to achieve their goals through the ordinary political process 
(only for the ATLG model) (See Table 51).   
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Table 51 
 
ANCOVA Models with Individual Differences Covariates Predicting Sexual Minority 
System Justifications (Housing Equality) 
 
Individual 
Differences 
Covariate 
Model 
Predicted 
SMSJ 
Df F MSE p Β ηρ² 
 
ATLG 
 
LGSelfish 
 
 
1, 303 
 
775.83 
 
.29 
 
.000 
 
1.06 
 
.72 
 Natural 
Heterosexual 
Marriage 
 
1, 303 1102.69 .29 .000 .86 .78 
 LG History of 
Discrimination 
 
1, 303 61.95 1.58 .000 -.51 .17 
 Sexual 
Orientation 
related to 
Societal 
Contribution 
1, 302 26.50 .24 .000 .41 .08 
        
 Sexual 
Minorities 
have Political 
Power  
1, 303 48.06 1.55 .000 -.41 .14 
        
SSJ LGSelfish 1, 303 
 
29.78 .96 .000 .3936 .09 
 Natural 
Heterosexual 
Marriage 
 
1, 303 36.11 1.21 .000 .4037 .11 
 LG History of 
Discrimination 
 
1, 303 5.38 1.90 .021 -.1538 .02 
                                                 
36 The significant beta weight was found within the model using the 10% status quo likelihood as the 
reference group. 
37 The significant beta weight was found within the model using the 60% status quo likelihood as the 
reference group. 
38 None of the status quo likelihood references groups produced significant beta weights within the 
regression models.  Therefore, the status quo likelihood vectors were removed to find the significant 
relationship between SSJ and LG History of Discrimination. 
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 Sexual 
Orientation 
related to 
Societal 
Contribution  
1, 302 6.76 .26 .010 .1339 .02 
        
GBJW LGSelfish 
 
1, 302 37.58 .94 .000 .41 .11 
 Natural 
Heterosexual 
Marriage  
 
1, 302 22.29 1.26 .000 .2740 .07 
 Sexual 
Orientation 
related to 
Societal 
Contribution  
1, 301 5.99 .26 .015 .1641 .02 
        
Notes. ATLG, SSJ, GBJW, and LG stand for Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men scale, 
Situational System Justification scale, Global Belief in a Just World scale, and Lesbians and Gay 
men. 
 
 
The three-way interaction for ATLG, current status quo, and status quo likelihood 
in the ATLG MANCOVA model was significant, F(15, 823.05) = 1.82, p < .05, ηρ² = 
.03, but for only two SMSJ items, LGSelfish factor, F(3, 302) = 3.37, MSE = .29, p < .05, 
ηρ² = .03, and Societal Contribution item, F(3, 302) = 3.32, MSE = .24, p < .05, ηρ² = .03.  
When analyzed with the ATLG ANCOVA model, the three-way interactions remained 
significant: LGSelfish, F(3, 303) = 3.34, MSE = .29, p < .05, ηρ² = .03 and Societal 
Contribution, F(3, 302) = 3.32, MSE = .24, p < .05, ηρ² = .03.  After splitting the file by 
current status quo and status quo likelihood (separately), I conducted ATLG ANCOVA 
                                                 
39 None of the status quo likelihood references groups produced significant beta weights within the 
regression models.  Therefore, the status quo likelihood vectors were removed to find the significant 
relationship between SSJ and Sexual Orientation related to Societal Contribution. 
40 None of the status quo likelihood references groups produced significant beta weights within the 
regression models.  Therefore, the status quo likelihood vectors were removed to find the significant 
relationship between GBJW and Natural Heterosexual Marriage. 
41 None of the status quo likelihood references groups produced significant beta weights within the 
regression models.  Therefore, the status quo likelihood vectors were removed to find the significant 
relationship between GBJW and Sexual Orientation related to Societal Contribution. 
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models and correlations for each SMSJ.  For both SMSJs, a significant status quo 
likelihood by ATLG interaction emerged in the affirmation condition: LGSelfish, F(3, 
144) = 3.70, MSE = .29, p < .05, ηρ² = .07 and Societal Contribution, F(3, 143) = 4.48, 
MSE = .15, p < .01, ηρ² = .09.  For LGSelfish and Societal Contribution, significant 
current status quo by ATLG interactions emerged in the 90%, F(1, 73) = 8.97, MSE = 
.30, p < .01, ηρ² = .11 and 60%, F(1, 78) = 9.07, MSE = .14, p < .01, ηρ² = .10 conditions, 
respectively.   
For LGSelfish, although all correlations were large (rs > .79) and significant (ps < 
.01), only three correlations were significantly different from each other (See Table 52).  
In the affirmation condition, 90% condition participants (r = .924) had a significantly 
stronger relationship between ATLG and LGSelfish than 30% condition participants (r = 
.792), z = -2.16, p < .05, indicating that the relationship between their negative attitudes 
toward lesbians and gay men and their beliefs that sexual minorities are selfish grew 
stronger with the certainty of housing equality.  Similarly, the relationship between 
ATLG and LGSelfish in the affirmation condition was significantly stronger in the 90% 
(r = .924) than in the 60% (r = .797) condition, z = -2.18, p < .05.  Finally, a significant 
difference existed between the affirmation and threat conditions within the 90% 
condition, z = 2.04, p < .05, such that participants in the affirmation condition had a 
stronger correlation (r = .924) than participants in the threat condition (r = .811), 
suggesting that threat disrupts this relationship.  For Societal Contribution, significant 
correlations emerged in the affirmation, 60% (r = .477, p < .01); affirmation, 90% (r = 
.614, p < .01); and threat, 10% (r = .325, p < .05) cells such that the more negative 
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attitudes these participants held toward lesbians and gay men, the more likely they were 
to believe that sexual orientation relates to an individual’s ability to contribute to society.   
Table 52 
 
Correlations between LGSelfish and ATLG (Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men 
scale) According to Current Status Quo and Status Quo Likelihood (Housing Equality) 
 
 Status Quo Likelihood Conditions 
Current Status 
Quo 
10% 30% 60% 90% 
 
Affirmation 
 
 
.856 (42) 
 
.792a (35) 
 
.797b (40) 
 
.924a, b, c (35) 
Threat 
 
.847 (38) .854 (44) .876 (43) .811c (42) 
Notes. Correlations are significant at p < .01.  Correlations with shared subscripts are significantly 
different at p < .05.  Ns are in parentheses.  LG stands for Lesbians and Gay men. 
 
 
The three-way interaction for GBJW, current status quo, and status quo likelihood 
in the GBJW MANCOVA model was significant, F(15, 820.29) = 1.76, p < .05, ηρ² = 
.03, but only for one SMSJ item, Discrimination History, F(3, 301) = 2.78, MSE = 1.87, p 
< .05, ηρ² = .03.  When analyzed with the GBJW ANCOVA model, the three-way 
interaction remained significant, F(3, 302) = 2.79, MSE = 1.87, p < .05, ηρ² = .03.  After 
splitting the file by current status quo and status quo likelihood (separately), I conducted 
GBJW ANCOVA models and correlations.  A significant current status quo by GBJW 
interaction emerged in the 90% condition, F(1, 73) = 6.92, MSE = 2.36, p < .05, ηρ² = 
.09, such that, at time 2, greater global belief in a just world was significantly related to 
the belief that lesbians and gay men do not have a history of discrimination, r = -.367, p < 
.05. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION 
 Hypothesis 1.  The data did not support the initial hypothesis that threatened 
participants would be less likely to vote for marital or housing equality as there were no 
significant differences for votes according to current status quo.  However, there was 
partial support for the first hypothesis in the Marriage Equality study in that affirmation 
condition participants were more likely to vote according to their own beliefs in 
American system legitimacy and global beliefs in a just world.  This finding indicates 
that threat may disrupt the relationship between individual differences variables and 
voting against marital equality.  Furthermore, threat condition participants were 
significantly more likely to experience fear and anxiety than affirmation condition 
participants (Laurin et al., 2008; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).  These participants also 
experienced greater anger, disgust, and compassion and less happiness and hope.  In 
addition, in the Marriage Equality study threat condition participants were less likely to 
believe that lesbians and gay men have a history of experiencing discrimination in the 
United States and more likely to believe that lesbians and gay men are selfish (Jost et al., 
2004; Jost, Blount, et al., 2003; Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003).  However, the data did not 
support this finding in the Housing Equality study.  Finally, mediation of the relationship 
between current status quo manipulation and equality votes was not relevant because no 
significant main effects emerged for the current status quo factor.  However, individual 
differences variables moderated likelihood to vote for equality.  Thus, although threat 
impacts emotions and sexual minority system justifications, it only impacts ballot 
equality decisions in conjunction with individual differences variables.   
208 
 
 Hypothesis 2. Unfortunately, the results did not support the second hypothesis, 
that participants in the 10% and 30% likelihood conditions would be less likely to vote 
for equality than participants in the 90% condition (Kay et al., 2002), as there were no 
significant differences in votes or voting likelihood according to status quo likelihood.  
The hypothesis that participants in the 60% condition would be influenced by individual 
differences variables was partially supported (Kay et al., 2002).  Individual differences 
variables significantly predicted equality votes and voting likelihoods across all status 
quo likelihood conditions.  Contrary to Hypothesis 2, in the Housing Equality study, the 
attitudes toward lesbians and gay men (and, marginally, their beliefs that lesbians and gay 
men represent realistic and symbolic threats) of participants in the 60% condition were 
significantly less likely to influence their likelihood to vote for equality than those in the 
10% and 30% conditions.  Additionally, although not hypothesized, in the Housing 
Equality study, participants in the 10% condition were significantly more likely to be 
influenced by their beliefs that lesbians and gay men represent realistic and symbolic 
threats than participants in the 90% condition in their likelihood to vote for equality.   
In the Marriage Equality study, contrary to Hypothesis 2, participants only 
experienced significant differences for happiness (not all of the emotions) according to 
status quo likelihood.  In fact, this difference was opposite to what I had hypothesized in 
that participants in the 10% condition experienced significantly less happiness than 
participants in the 90% condition (Kay et al., 2002).  However, participants in the 90% 
condition experienced significantly more happiness than participants in the 30% 
condition hypothesis, which partially confirmed Hypothesis 2.  Again, contrary to 
Hypothesis 2, in the Housing Equality study, participants in the 10% condition felt 
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significantly greater amounts of fear and anxiety than those in the other three conditions 
(Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).  They also felt greater 
amounts of anger and disgust than those in the 60% and 90% conditions (and 30% 
condition for disgust).  Contrary to Hypothesis 2, there were no significant differences 
according to status quo likelihood for participants’ experience of happiness and joy and 
participants did not differ in sexual minority system justification endorsement according 
to status quo likelihood.  As there were no significant differences according to status quo 
likelihood for ballot votes and likelihood to vote for equality, mediation analyses were 
not relevant.  Thus, likelihood of a new status quo had little impact on emotions or 
system justifications and its impact on voting decisions was only in conjunction with 
individual differences variables.   
 Hypothesis 3.  There were no significant differences between equality votes or 
likelihood to vote for equality according to current status quo or status quo likelihood 
failing to support Hypothesis 3.  However, in support of Hypothesis 3 in the Marriage 
Equality study, global beliefs in a just world significantly predicted a reduced likelihood 
to vote for equality, but only in the affirmation condition.  However, the relationship 
between global beliefs in a just world and unlikelihood of voting for marital equality 
appeared to be weaker for participants in the affirmation, 60% condition than participants 
in the affirmation, 30% and 90% conditions (Kay et al., 2002).  Contrary to Hypothesis 3, 
although significant differences between the relationships between likelihood to vote for 
marital equality and ATLG emerged according to status quo likelihood, these differences 
were in the threat condition, with stronger relationships in the 10% condition than in the 
30% and 60% conditions.  Similarly, although beliefs in the realistic and symbolic threats 
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that lesbians and gay men pose significantly predicted likelihood to vote against marriage 
equality, there were no significant differences according to current status quo or status 
quo likelihood.  Consistent with the findings for Hypothesis 2, in the Marriage Equality 
study, GBJW significantly affected ballot decisions, but only in the affirmation condition.  
Thus, once again threat appeared to disrupt this relationship. 
 Contrary to Hypothesis 3, in the Housing Equality study, the relationship between 
negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men and unlikelihood to vote for housing 
equality appeared to be stronger in the 10%, 30%, and 90% conditions than in the 60% 
condition (Kay et al., 2002).  Similarly, the relationship between greater beliefs that 
lesbians and gay men represent realistic and symbolic threats and unlikelihood to vote for 
housing equality emerged as stronger in the 10%, 30%, and 90% conditions than in the 
60% condition.  Similar to the results for Hypothesis 2, and in contrast to Hypothesis 3, 
although beliefs in the legitimacy of the American system significantly predicted a 
reduced tendency to vote for housing equality, this relationship appeared in only the 
threat, 90% condition, not the affirmation condition.  Notably, a marginally significant 
relationship existed between global beliefs in a just world and a reduced tendency to vote 
for housing equality within the affirmation condition but the significant relationship 
existed within the affirmation, 10% cell, rather than the 60% cell, in opposition to 
Hypothesis 3.  Rather than current status quo or status quo likelihood, the strongest 
predictors for ballot decisions (whether in the Marital or Housing Equality study) were 
the individual differences variables.   
 According to Hypothesis 3, threat condition participants emotions should vary 
according to both threat (time 1) and status quo likelihood (time 2).  In contrast, 
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affirmation condition participants’ emotions should only vary as a function of status quo 
likelihood.  In confirmation, in both studies, threat condition participants felt significantly 
greater fear and anxiety than affirmation condition participants after the current status 
quo manipulation (Laurin et al., 2008).  Also in support of Hypothesis 3, threat condition 
participants felt significantly less fear and anxiety at time 2 than time 1.  Although not 
hypothesized, this pattern held for anger and disgust for threat condition participants.  
These results appear to represent a pattern in which, after the current status quo 
manipulation, participants felt significantly greater negative emotions (fear, anxiety, 
anger, and disgust) in the threat condition, greater positive emotions (happiness and hope) 
in the affirmation condition, but similar emotions across current status quo condition after 
the status quo likelihood manipulation, i.e. at time 2.  The exception to this finding 
involves compassion, in which threat condition participants feel greater compassion than 
affirmation condition participants at time 1, but both conditions feel greater amounts of 
compassion at time 2.  Although these results indicate that participants’ experiences of 
negative emotions alleviated with time, they do not provide support for the third 
hypothesis that voting in the initial ballot would alleviate initial emotions experienced 
because there were no significant differences regarding voting behaviors (Brescoll et al., 
2013; Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003; Jost et al., 2007; Wakslak et al., 2007). 
Contrary to Hypothesis 3, there were no significant differences according to status 
quo likelihood for participants in terms of happiness, hope, fear, or anxiety (Kay et al., 
2002; Ortony et al., 1988; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).  Rather, in the Marital Equality 
study, significant time by status quo likelihood interactions emerged such that 
participants in the 60% and 90% conditions were angrier at time 1 than time 2, but 
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happier at time 2 than time 1.  Participants in the 90% condition were also more hopeful 
at time 2 and participants in the 10%, 60%, and 90% conditions felt greater compassion 
at time 2.  Thus, knowledge of marriage equality’s likelihood caused participants to 
experience greater happiness, hope, and compassion, indicating that these individuals 
may have already accepted the concept of nationwide marriage equality prior to the 
study. 
 According to Hypothesis 3, participants should endorse sexual minority system 
justifications according to both threat and status quo likelihood condition (Brescoll et al., 
2013; Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003; Jost et al., 2007; Kay et al., 2002).  In contrast, 
affirmation condition participants should only be affected by status quo likelihood 
condition (Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003; Jost, et al., 2007; Kay et al., 2002).  Although, in the 
Marital Equality study, threat condition participants were significantly less likely to 
believe that lesbians and gay men have a history of experiencing discrimination within 
the United States than affirmation condition participants, this result only provides partial 
support for Hypothesis 3 because there were no significant differences according to 
current status quo or status quo likelihood for any of the other sexual minority system 
justifications.  Similarly, in the Housing Equality study, although participants were more 
likely to believe that sexual minorities have a history of discrimination at time 2 than at 
time 1, there were no significant differences according to current status quo and status 
quo likelihood for any of the sexual minority system justifications. 
 According to Hypothesis 3, emotions and sexual minority system justifications 
should mediate the relationships between the manipulated variables (current status quo 
and status quo likelihood) and the second ballot decisions.  As current status quo and 
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status quo likelihood conditions did not significantly predict the second ballot decisions, 
mediation analysis was not relevant to the findings.  The results for Hypothesis 3 suggest 
that, although threat and status quo likelihood may affect emotional experiences and 
system justification endorsement, manipulated variables only affected equality ballot 
decisions in conjunction with individual differences variables.   
 Hypothesis 4. The results of both studies offered full confirmation for individual 
difference effects in Hypothesis 4, such that greater negative attitudes toward lesbians 
and gay men (ATLG), beliefs in American system legitimacy (SSJ), and global beliefs in 
a just world (GBJW) predicted a reduced likelihood to vote for equality on both ballot 
measures (Brescoll et al., 2013; Herek, 2004; Jost et al., 2004; Jost, Blount, et al., 2003; 
Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003).   
 According to Hypothesis 4, participants should experience different levels of 
emotions according to the individual differences variables and status quo likelihood 
condition (Balzer & Jacobs, 2011; Cunningham et al., 2013; Embrick et al., 2007; Herek, 
2004; Inbar et al., 2009; Zeichner & Reidy, 2009).  Although not hypothesized, in the 
Marital Equality study, a significant time by ATLG interaction emerged such that 
participants with greater negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men felt significantly 
greater fear and anger and less compassion at time 2 than at time 1.  Similarly, these 
participants only experienced anxiety at time 2.  Interestingly, these participants also only 
felt pity at time 2.  The overall trend provided support for Hypothesis 4 in that 
participants with greater negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men experienced 
greater levels of negative emotions upon learning about marital equality.  As there were 
no differences according to status quo likelihood, mere exposure to the concept of 
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nationwide marriage equality evoked greater experiences of fear, anxiety, anger, and pity, 
but less compassion, for those with negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men.  
Participants with greater negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men had significantly 
stronger relationships between their attitudes and their feelings of disgust at time 2 in the 
30%, 60%, and 90% conditions than in the 10% condition, indicating that greater marital 
certainty elicited greater disgust.  Similarly, this relationship was stronger for participants 
in the 90% condition at time 2 than at time 1.  For happiness and hope, participants with 
less negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men had significantly stronger 
relationships between their attitudes and their feelings of happiness and hope at time 2 in 
the 90% condition than in the 30% and 60% conditions, indicating that greater certainty 
of marital equality elicited greater happiness and hope for these participants (Zeichner & 
Reidy, 2009).  Similarly, this relationship was stronger for participants in the 60% 
condition at time 2 than at time 1.  Thus, attitudes toward lesbians and gay men, in 
conjunction with status quo likelihood, greatly influenced the emotions participants 
experienced with greater marital certainty eliciting greater disgust and less happiness and 
hope for those with more negative attitudes.  These results indicate that, while fear, 
anxiety, anger, pity, and compassion may be influenced by the mere mention of marital 
equality, disgust, happiness, and hope may require greater knowledge of marriage 
equality certainty.   
 Although not hypothesized, in the Marital Equality study, a significant time by 
SSJ interaction emerged such that participants with greater beliefs in American system 
legitimacy and fairness felt significantly greater fear and less hope at time 2 than at time 
1 (Zeichner & Reidy, 2009).  Similarly, these participants felt a lack of compassion at 
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time 2.  In support of Hypothesis 4, participants had a significantly stronger relationship 
between their beliefs in American system legitimacy and anger at time 2 than at time 1 in 
the 60% condition (Herek, 2004).  Similarly, significant relationships emerged for 
participants such that greater beliefs in American system legitimacy predicted greater 
anger (90% condition) and pity (60% condition) at time 2.  There were no differences for 
GBJW; thus, for the Marital Equality study, this aspect did not support Hypothesis 4.  
Overall, these results indicate that exposure to marital equality and its likelihood led 
those with greater beliefs in American system legitimacy to feel negative emotions, 
especially as marital equality became more certain. 
 In the Housing Equality study, participants with less negative attitudes toward 
lesbians and gay men were significantly more compassionate at time 2 than at time 1, 
partially supporting Hypothesis 4.  Similarly, significant relationships emerged between 
negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men and fear in not only the 60% and 90% 
conditions (as hypothesized), but in the 10% condition (Zeichner & Reidy, 2009).  This 
relationship continued regarding anger and pity in the 90% condition, with greater 
negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men predicting significant levels of anger and 
pity felt (Herek, 2004).  For happiness and hope, participants with less negative attitudes 
toward lesbians and gay men had significantly stronger relationships between their 
attitudes and their feelings of happiness and hope at time 2 in the 90% condition than in 
the 60% condition (happiness) and 10% condition (hope).  Similarly, this relationship 
was stronger for participants in the 90% condition at time 2 than at time 1.  There were 
no differences for SSJ or GBJW; thus, for the Housing Equality study, this aspect did not 
support Hypothesis 4.  Overall, these results indicate that, for those with negative 
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attitudes toward lesbians and gay men, exposure to housing equality elicited negative 
emotions, especially when housing equality was almost certain. 
According to Hypothesis 4, participants with greater negative attitudes toward 
lesbians and gay men, beliefs in the legitimacy and fairness of the American system, and 
global beliefs in a just world will be more likely to endorse sexual minority system 
justifications; however, the extent that these participants endorse the justifications may be 
impacted by current status quo and status quo likelihood manipulations (Brescoll et al., 
2013; Herek, 2004; Jost et al., 2004; Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003).  For both equality studies, 
the data fully confirmed Hypothesis 4 in that greater negative attitudes toward lesbians 
and gay men (ATLG), beliefs that American society is fair, legitimate, and justifiable 
(SSJ), and beliefs that the world is fair and that individuals are punished according to 
dessert (GBJW) significantly predicted endorsement of sexual minority system 
justifications.  In addition, for the Marital Equality study, both current status quo and 
status quo likelihood affected the relationship between GBJW and justification 
endorsement such that, in the affirmation, 90% cell, greater global beliefs in a just world 
predicted the belief that lesbians and gay men do not have a history of discrimination.  
For the Housing Equality study, for the LGSelfish factor (i.e. endorsement of system 
justifications that lesbians and gay men are selfish, immature, immoral, and desirous of 
“special rights” above others) participants in the affirmation, 90% cell had a significantly 
stronger relationship between ATLG beliefs and LGSelfish factor endorsement than those 
in the affirmation, 30% and affirmation, 60% cells.  Thus, the relationship between 
negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men and beliefs that sexual minorities are 
selfish grew stronger with the certainty of housing equality.  These findings do not 
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support system justification theory in that, when housing equality became more certain, 
those with negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men felt the need to disparage 
lesbians and gay men.  Furthermore, only those participants in the affirmation condition 
felt the need to endorse these aspects of sexual minority stigma (Herek, 2004, 2007).  
System justification theory would predict that affirmation, 90% participants should be 
less likely to endorse system justifications than those in the less certain conditions (Jost, 
Glaser, et al., 2003; Jost, et al., 2007; Kay et al., 2002).  However, the findings provide 
overall support for the theoretical components of system justification theory in that those 
with negative attitudes toward sexual minorities felt the need to disparage lesbians and 
gay men when the minority group was most likely to gain equal rights to the majority 
(Alexander, 2001; Blain, 2005; Goldberg-Hiller & Milner, 2003; Hargis, 2000; Herek, 
2004; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost et al., 2004).  These results indicate that some majority 
group members use stereotypes to denigrate minority groups in order to maintain the 
current, hierarchical status quo (Glick & Fiske, 2001a; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost et al., 
2004; Kay, Gaucher et al., 2009; Kay and Jost, 2003; Kay, Jost, & Young, 2005).   
This difference was also found between the affirmation, 90% and threat, 90% 
cells, such that those in the affirmation condition had a stronger relationship between 
ATLG and LGSelfish endorsement, thereby suggesting that threat disrupts this 
relationship.  These findings indicate that negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men 
lead to greater system justification when threat does not disrupt the general status quo and 
when the likelihood of equality is almost certain.  Similarly, participants in the 
affirmation, 60%; affirmation, 90%; and threat, 10% cells had significant relationships 
between ATLG and their belief that sexual orientation relates to an individual’s ability to 
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contribute to society.  Finally, a significant effect emerged for the threat, 90% cell such 
that, at time 2, greater global beliefs in a just world was significantly related to the belief 
that lesbians and gay men do not have a history of discrimination in the threat condition.  
This last finding supports Hypothesis 4 showing that the effects of status quo likelihood 
in conjunction with individual differences on sexual minority system justification may be 
more complex than originally hypothesized.  Overall, the results for Hypothesis 4 
indicate that individual differences variables have a very large impact on voting 
tendencies, emotions, and system justification endorsement, especially when the general 
status quo is not threatened and as sexual minority equality becomes more certain. 
Limitations 
 Both design issues and factors outside of the research limited the current 
investigation.  The research was conducted between late April and early June, 2015.  By 
this time, following the Supreme Court’s Windsor opinion (2013), courts throughout the 
United States had ruled on the issue of marriage equality, usually by allowing same-sex 
couples to marry.  A few federal and state courts had ruled against marriage equality, 
which led to the United States Supreme Court’s choice to hear the issues involved.  The 
widely publicized nature of the issue gave individuals the chance to hear the competing 
arguments regarding marital equality and to decide where they stood on the issue.  The 
results of the current investigation indicate that voters became firm in their beliefs 
regarding marital equality as they were not swayed by either current status quo or status 
quo likelihood manipulation, as has been the case with other issues outside of sexual 
minority rights (e.g., essentialist beliefs in gender differences (Brescoll et al., 2013), 
tendency to justify institutional differences among the poor and minorities (Jost, Pelham, 
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et al., 2003), desirability of political candidates according to likelihood of being elected 
(Kay et al., 2002)).  In addition, the high levels of publicity about marital equality may 
have influenced participants within the housing equality condition, such that exposure to 
the arguments for marital equality may have led to a more egalitarian mindset regarding 
sexual minority rights, in general.  Thus, the historical context may have limited the 
current investigation.  Had the study occurred prior to the Windsor decision, the 
manipulations may have had a greater effect.  Similarly, conducting the housing equality 
study in a year or more may produce different results.  
 A methodological design limitation involved the choice of the items in the sexual 
minority system justifications.  I utilized the arguments used in court decisions and 
specific anti-sexual orientation equality campaigns as they appeared to represent the most 
likely arguments that people might have used against sexual minority equality.  However, 
it is possible that the average voter uses different arguments and beliefs to justify their 
votes.  I drew the justifications from the writings of court justices but they were not the 
sample of participants in this research.  A qualitative study in which voters were sampled 
from the relevant population may provide a better set of items that individuals may use as 
justifications for voting both for and against equal protection.   
 In this investigation, I chose not to focus upon the religious aspects potentially 
involved as the courts, in their opinions against marriage equality, specifically stated that 
their decisions were not based upon religious concerns.  However, religion is often used 
to justify current social systems (Jost et al., 2014; Kay et al., 2008; Kay, Whitson, et al., 
2009) and, potentially more relevant to the current research, marital equality opponents 
have used to justify not allowing same-sex marriage (Geiger, 2014; Kitchen, 10th Circuit, 
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2014).  Courts’ refusals to admit the influence of religion upon anti-marital equality 
legislation masks religion’s potential influence and provides another possible limitation 
of the current research.  Future studies could focus, again, on how justices make 
decisions and how lay people (i.e. voters) make decisions in equality contexts. 
 Several methodological design problems may limit the current research.  The 
repeated measures design was used so that the effect of each manipulation could be 
explored by itself and in conjunction with the other manipulation.  However, given that 
participants voted on the same ballot initiative twice within a short period of time, few 
changed their decisions, which limited the effects of the manipulations.  Potential 
solutions include creating a larger interval of time between manipulations so that 
participants could forget their original decision or conducting both manipulations at the 
same time.  Each solution brings its own set of limitations.  Another methodological 
problem involves the use of an online, research setting.  It is difficult to know the extent 
that voting for a ballot in a hypothetical situation equates with actually voting in a state 
ballot initiative.  Additionally, ballot initiatives usually involve extensive politicization of 
the issue in question.  Thus, the atmosphere for a voter may be much different from that 
of the experimental research participant.  However, the widely publicized nature of the 
current investigation may have made it comparable to what participants experience in a 
real ballot initiative.  Another methodological issue of the current investigation involved 
the possibility of the sexual minority system justifications priming participants’ votes on 
the second ballot as they provided exposure to reasons one may choose to not vote for 
sexual minority equality.  However, as participants did not change their decisions 
regarding the ballot initiatives, this potential limitation is unlikely.  Another potential 
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issue with the sexual minority system justifications was that participants in an 
experimental study completed them without pre-testing to determine whether they 
correctly measured underlying attitudes.  Given the inter-item correlations found for two 
factors in both experimental studies at different times, it is likely that the system 
justifications are measuring latent traits.  Latent trait testing prior to conducting the 
current investigation (to better understand the underlying traits) might have improved the 
methodological foundation of the current investigation.   
One final potential limitation of the current investigation involves the use of 
online research participants through Amazon Mechanical Turk.  These participants may 
be more technologically sophisticated than the average voter they are intended to 
represent.  In addition, it is unknown, at present, the extent to which these participants 
represent that population.  One way to mitigate this problem would be to conduct another 
study comparing responses from participants from both online pools and the relevant 
community to see whether they differ according to individual differences variables.  
Differences between the populations may explain the large tendency of participants in the 
current investigation to vote for equality.    
Contributions of the Current Investigation 
 In spite of the limitations, the current investigation provided strong evidence of 
the influence of individual differences variables upon sexual minority stigma.  Current 
status quo and status quo likelihood manipulations only predicted ballot decisions with 
statistical models that included individual difference variables as moderators or controls.  
In fact, in some of these models, threat only served to disrupt the influence of individual 
differences variables, suggesting that threat acted as a moderator on when participants’ 
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individual differences variables affected their ballot decisions.  The current investigation 
provided strong evidence that individuals with greater negative attitudes toward lesbians 
and gay men, strong beliefs in the legitimacy of the American system, strong global 
beliefs in a just world, greater beliefs that lesbians and gay men represent realistic and 
symbolic threats, and greater feelings of intergroup anxiety toward lesbians and gay men 
are significantly less likely to vote for sexual minority equality.  Given the requirements 
of Romer (1996) that laws that distinguish between groups of people not do so on the 
basis of animus, the current investigation’s findings regarding the influence of bias in 
decision making calls into question laws that classify according to sexual orientation.  
Additionally, the exclusion of sexual minorities from suspect or quasi-suspect 
classification in Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection clause should be reconsidered 
given the established influence of bias on legal decision making.   
 The current investigation also examined system justification theory within a 
previously unexplored context, i.e. sexual minority stigma and heterosexism.  In fact, the 
current research calls into question whether system justification theory is useful to sexual 
minority issues.  Although many courts throughout the United States had ruled in favor of 
marital equality, the current, relatively conservative Supreme Court could have created 
feelings of uncertainty helpful to the threat manipulation.  The timing had the potential to 
be ripe for this research.  However, the current status quo and status quo likelihood 
manipulations did not affect participants’ ballot decisions.  Three possible reasons for this 
finding include the timing of the study, the publicity surrounding the issues and affected 
group involved, and the possibility that system justification theory does not explain 
sexual minority stigma.  As discussed in the limitations section (above), this research 
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took place after many courts had ruled in favor of marital equality.  Perhaps people had 
too much time to consider the issue and were firmly for or against equality.  Similarly, 
the publicity involved in the marital equality issue likely made the issue prominent in 
peoples’ minds such that they were forced to consider the important aspects involved.  
Although timing and publicity provide potential reasons for why system justification 
failed to predict ballot behavior in the marital equality study, they do not account for the 
housing equality study.  Housing equality does not have the precedential history of 
marital equality.  At the time of this research equality in housing as a policy issue did not 
share the highly visible status of marital equality in the public eye.  Yet, similar results 
occurred for the housing equality study.  One potential reason could be that the 
discussion of marital equality within the local, state, and national spheres led people to 
hold broader beliefs and opinions regarding lesbians and gay men as a group.  Rather 
than focusing only upon marital equality, perhaps the thoughts, feelings, and beliefs 
regarding sexual minority marital equality spread to other issues involving sexual 
orientation to create a general, overall attitude or belief system more favorable towards 
lesbians and gay men.  This could explain why housing equality, a topic rarely, if ever, 
discussed, matched marital equality not only on the ballot variables, but often on 
emotions, sexual minority system justifications, and individual differences variables.   
One final possibility regarding the lack of differences according to system 
justification theory could be that system justification simply does not explain sexual 
minority stigma.  However, the existence of a hierarchical system in the concept of 
heterosexism (Herek, 2004) and the strong, negative sentiment towards sexual minorities 
that still affects legislation throughout the United States both suggest that aspects of 
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system justification theory could still be relevant to sexual minority system justification.  
Although many people appear to accept sexual minority equality, this research shows that 
a large minority of individuals (for the initial ballots, 30.3% for marital equality and 
16.9% for housing equality) do not accept equality.  The fact that neither group (i.e. those 
who voted for and against equality) were swayed in their votes according to the main 
manipulations suggests that system justification may not be as relevant to sexual minority 
stigma as other theories.  However, this research represents the first attempt to understand 
sexual minority stigma through the lens of system justification theory.  Perhaps careful 
consideration of the issues measured and the construction of materials could aid in 
understanding the causal relationship between threat and sexual minority stigma.  What 
the current investigation indicates is that the traditional methods of gauging system 
justification theory may not be readily applicable to sexual minority system justifications.  
As threat and likelihood appear to affect emotions and some sexual minority system 
justifications, the current research suggests that system justification theory may have a 
place in the determination of what causes sexual minority stigma.  The current research 
thus provides a starting point for the exploration of system justification theory within the 
sexual minority context.   
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Appendix A: Informed Consent 
Jordan A. Blenner, graduate student working under the supervision of Dr. Richard 
Wiener, faculty member in the Psychology Department at the University of Nebraska-
Lincoln, is conducting the present set of studies, “Psychology of Political Attitudes” (IRB 
Approval  number IRB#20150415013 EX). You are invited to participate in this project 
because you are a community member.  Participants in the states of Nebraska and 
Alabama must be at least 19 years old or older to participate, participants in the state of 
Mississippi must be at least 21 years old to participate, and participants in all other states 
must be 18 years old to participate.  Initially, you will complete a short demographic 
form that will determine whether you are eligible to complete the larger set of studies. 
You will receive $.10 for completing this form. If eligible for the studies, you will be 
asked to complete four short studies that assess your attitudes regarding different political 
topics. You will also be asked to complete a demographic sheet. Participation will take 
place at a computer station of your choice. It will take about one half hour of your time.  
You will receive $1 for your participation. 
  The potential benefits of the current study outweigh any cost that may 
accompany participation. Knowledge generated through this study will help researchers 
better understand how community members view various political topics. Such 
knowledge about perceptions can lead to greater understanding of the current political 
climate and the views of most Americans concerning political issues. Such experience 
may add significantly to participants’ education. 
 There are no known risks or discomforts associated with this research.  If you do 
not feel comfortable answering a question during the session, you can choose not to 
respond. The alternative to participating in this study is non-participation. Your 
participation is voluntary. You are free to decide not to participate in this study or to 
withdraw at any time without adversely affecting your relationship with the investigators 
or the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. Your refusal to participate will involve no penalty 
to you or loss of any benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. 
The results of this study may be published, but your name and identity will not be 
revealed and all of the data and information collected from you will remain anonymous.  
You may review the privacy policies of Amazon Mechanical Turk at the following 
website: https://www.mturk.com/mturk/privacynotice.  All data will be identified with 
numbers that have no links to you as a research participant and will be kept in a locked, 
secure lab in Burnett Hall for a period of 5 years after which it will be destroyed. 
Nonetheless, some of the questions on the demographic sheet ask about, among other 
things, your gender, your ethnicity, and your age. Feel free to leave any of those items 
unanswered if you feel that the answers may reveal your identity. 
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 Jordan A. Blenner is conducting this study, along with Richard L. Wiener of the 
Legal Decision Making Lab and the University of Nebraska-Lincoln Psychology 
Department. She will be happy to answer any questions or concerns about the study at 
(402-472-9639) or by email at jordan.blennerDS@gmail.com.  To obtain more 
information about your rights as a research participant or to report any concerns about the 
study, please contact the University of Nebraska – Lincoln Institutional Review Board 
(IRB) for Human Research at (402)  472- 6965. 
If you wish to participate in this study, please read and endorse the following 
statement:  
I have read and understood the information presented above. 
The researchers have answered all the questions I had to my 
satisfaction.  I consent to take part in this study. 
 
If you consent to take part in this study, please click “Yes” below.  Please print a copy of 
this Informed Consent sheet for your records. 
 
Jordan A. Blenner, M.A., J.D., doctoral student, Primary Investigator, 
jordan.blennerDS@gmail.com 
Richard L. Wiener, Ph.D., M.L.S., Secondary Investigator, 
LegalDecisionLabUNL@gmail.com 
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Appendix B: Short Demographic Screening Form 
(1) Please provide your age.   ______ 
(2) Please provide your ethnic origin and/or race. (Check one)  
 ___   European American ___   African American 
 ___   Asian American  ___   Latino/a 
 ___   Hispanic   ___   Native American 
 ___   Other Please specify _____________________________ 
(3) Gender 
       ____ Male ____ Female ____ Transgender MTF or FTM 
(4) Please provide your sexual orientation. 
 ____ Straight 
 ____ Mostly straight with some same-sex interest 
 ____ Bisexual 
 ____ Mostly gay/lesbian with some straight interest 
 ____ Gay/Lesbian 
(5) Marital Status: What is your marital status? 
 ___ Single 
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 ___ Dating 
 ___ Cohabiting (i.e. living with another person in a romantic relationship, but not 
engaged) 
___ Engaged 
 ___ Married or marriage-like relationship 
 ___ Divorced 
(6) Please provide your highest level of education achieved. 
 ____ Less than high school diploma 
 ____ High school diploma/ G.E.D. 
 ____ Some college/ In college 
 ____ College degree (Associate’s or Bachelor’s) 
 ____ Advanced degree (Master’s degree, Doctorate, etc.) 
(7) Do you have a current driver’s license?   ____ yes  ____ no 
(8) Where are you currently registered to vote?    
____ I am not registered to vote  ____ Select State 
(9) Do you currently live in the state in which you are registered to vote? 
____ yes  ____ no 
(10) In what state do you currently live? ____ Select State 
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(11) Are you a convicted felon?   ____ yes  ____ no 
(12) Are you a citizen of the United States?  ____ yes  ____ no 
(13) Have you ever served on a jury?   ____ yes  ____ no 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
259 
 
Appendix C: Description and Instructions for the four research studies 
Research Description: The current research project involves the completion of four, 
unrelated research studies.  Each study asks you to convey your beliefs, attitudes, and/or 
opinions regarding specific political topics.  Each study will have specific instructions 
relevant to that study.  Thank you for your time in completing this important research. 
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Appendix D: System Condition Manipulation 
Study A: News Article Reactions Study 
Instructions: Recently, an article published in a well-respected, national newspaper 
reported the results of an in-depth investigation into the level of satisfaction of ordinary 
Americans with the state of the country.  The current study is interested in your reactions 
to the summarized findings of the study.  Please read the following excerpt: 
1. System Affirmation Condition 
 
“These days, despite the difficulties the nation is facing, many people in the United States 
feel safer and more secure relative to the recent past.  Many citizens feel that the country 
is relatively stable in terms of social, economic, and political factors.  It seems that the 
US is enjoying better social, economic, and political conditions than many other 
countries.  Very few Americans express a willingness to leave the United States and 
immigrate to other nations.” 
2. System Threat Condition 
 
“These days, many people in the United States feel disappointed with the nation’s 
condition leading them to feel less safe and secure relative to the recent past.  Many 
citizens feel that the country has reached a low point in terms of social, economic, and 
political factors.  It seems that many countries are enjoying better social, economic, and 
political conditions than the U.S.  More and more Americans express a willingness to 
leave the United States and immigrate to other nations.” 
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Appendix E: System Threat Condition Manipulation Check, Emotion measures, Suspect 
class justifications, and Marital and Housing justifications 
Instructions: Think about the statement that you just read.  Below are 8 emotions that 
may or may not describe the feelings that you have about this statement.  Please answer 
the following questions based on the way you feel at this moment.  There are no right or 
wrong answers.  We are interested only in your feelings.  
1 2 3 4 5 
Very slightly or 
not at all 
A little Moderately Quite a bit Extremely 
 
Happy, angry, fearful, disgusted and hopeful items (Positive and Negative Affect 
Schedule (PANAS), Watson & Clark, 1994; Batson, 1987) 
Happy: 
1. How happy do you feel when you think about the statement?  
2. How cheerful do you feel when you think about the statement?  
3. How joyful do you feel when you think about the statement?  
 
Angry:  
4. How angry do you feel when you think about the statement?  
5. How irritated do you feel when you think about the statement?  
6. How hostile do you feel when you think about the statement?  
 
Fearful: 
7. How fearful do you feel when you think about the statement?  
8. How anxious do you feel when you think about the statement? 
9. How afraid do you feel when you think about the statement?  
10. How nervous do you feel when you think about the statement?  
11. How frightened do you feel when you think about the statement?  
 
Disgusted:  
12. How disgusted do you feel when you think about the statement?  
13. How scornful do you feel when you think about the statement?  
14. How loathful do you feel when you think about the statement?  
 
Hopeful: 
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15. How hopeful do you feel when you think about the statement? 
16. How optimistic do you feel when you think about the statement? 
17. How much anticipation do you feel when you think about the statement? (1 = very 
little or none at all; 5 = very much) (Batson, 1987) 
 
Compassion (Batson, 1987) (1 = very little or none at all; 5 = very much) 
18. How much compassion do you feel when you think about the statement?  
19. How much empathy do you feel when you think about the statement?  
20. How much sympathy do you feel when you think about the statement?  
21. How much pity do you feel when you think about the statement? 
 
Instructions: Please complete the following measures regarding the news article you just 
read by selecting one response. 
1. How did the article report that the United States is doing relative to other 
countries?  (Manipulation Check) 
a. The United States is doing worse than other countries with regard to safety 
and security. 
b. The United States is doing better than other countries with regard to safety 
and security. 
 
2. According to the article, how do most Americans feel about the condition of the United 
States?  (Manipulation Check) 
a. Most Americans feel that the country is stable in terms of social, 
economic, and political factors. 
b. Most Americans feel that the country has reached a low point in terms of 
social, economic, and political factors. 
 
Sexual Orientation as a Suspect Class Items (Developed by researcher to address system 
justifications for denying suspect or quasi-suspect class status to sexual minorities) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Disagree  Neither Agree 
nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 
1. _____ Lesbians and gay men have a history of experiencing discrimination in 
the United States.  
2. _____ Sexual orientation is immutable (i.e. it cannot be changed). 
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3. _____ Sexual orientation is related to an individual’s ability to contribute to 
society. (reverse-scored) 
4. _____ Lesbians and gay men, as a group, have enough political power to 
achieve their goals through the ordinary political process. (reverse-scored) 
System Justification Marital and Housing Equality Items (Developed by researcher to 
address system justifications used in anti-marriage equality cases and sexual minority 
“special rights” cases) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Disagree  Neither Agree 
nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 
5. _____ Traditional marriage, i.e. heterosexual couple marriage, should be 
protected. (preserving traditional marriage justification) 
6. _____ States should move slowly when deciding whether to include same-sex 
couples within the definition of marriage. (wariness of experimentation 
justification) 
7. _____ Restricting marriage to heterosexual couples encourages natural 
procreation. (natural procreation justification) 
8. _____ Heterosexual, married couples provide the ideal parenting environment 
for raising children. (ideal parenting/ raising children justification) 
9. _____ Lesbians and gay men are a privileged group. (sexual minorities as 
privileged minority justification) 
10. _____ Lesbians and gay men want “special rights” that others don’t have. 
(sexual minorities as wanting “special rights” justification) 
11. _____ Lesbians and gay men try to get “special rights” through undemocratic 
means (i.e. through judge-made law). (sexual minorities as using undemocratic 
means to secure “special rights” justification) 
12. _____ It is wrong to try to get “special rights”. (“special rights” – general – 
justification) 
13. _____ Lesbians and gay men are selfish because they put themselves before 
others. (sexual minorities as selfish – specific – justification) 
14. _____ In general, lesbians and gay men are selfish. (sexual minorities as selfish 
– general – justification) 
15. _____ In general, lesbians and gay men are immature. (sexual minorities as 
immature – general – justification) 
16. _____ In general, lesbians and gay men are immoral. (sexual minorities as 
immoral – general – justification) 
17. _____ Homosexuality is unnatural. (sexual minority as unnatural item) 
 
264 
 
Appendix F: Ballot Initiative  
Study B: Ballot Initiative Study 
Instructions: For this study, we are interested in your political views.  Specifically, we are 
interested in whether you would vote for a ballot initiative for amending your state 
constitution.  Please read the ballot initiative below and indicate if you would vote for it.   
Study 1: Marriage Equality 
1. Ballot Initiative 5: The definition of marriage will be changed throughout the state 
by adding the following phrase to the state constitution: “Marriage shall include 
same-sex couples as well as heterosexual couples”. 
a. Question 1: Would you vote for this amendment to your state constitution? 
i. Yes 
ii. No 
b. Question 2: How likely is it that you would vote for this amendment to 
your state constitution? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very 
Unlikely 
Unlikely Somewhat 
Unlikely 
Undecided Somewhat 
Likely 
Likely Very 
Likely 
 
Study 2: Housing Equality 
1. Ballot Initiative 5: The classes included in housing discrimination protection will 
be changed throughout the state by adding the following language to the state 
constitution: “Private individuals and companies, as well as public organizations, 
shall not exclude sale or rental of housing to others on the basis of sexual 
orientation”. 
c. Question 1: Would you vote for this amendment to your state constitution? 
i. Yes 
ii. No 
d. Question 2: How likely is it that you would vote for this amendment to 
your state constitution? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very 
Unlikely 
Unlikely Somewhat 
Unlikely 
Undecided Somewhat 
Likely 
Likely Very 
Likely 
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Appendix G: Likelihood Conditions Manipulation 
Study C: Political Science Report Study 
Instructions: In this study, we are interested in your reaction to a political science report 
published in 2014.  It was published by experts in the fields of political science and law 
in a highly respected research journal.  Please read the following excerpt: 
Study 1: Marriage Equality 
“Although great change has occurred within the field of marriage, there is a 10% 
likelihood that the entire country (all 50 states) will have same-sex marriage inclusion by 
the year 2016.” (Lowest likelihood condition) 
“Although great change has occurred within the field of marriage, there is a 30% 
likelihood that the entire country (all 50 states) will have same-sex marriage inclusion by 
the year 2016.” (Low likelihood condition) 
“Although great change has occurred within the field of marriage, there is a 60% 
likelihood that the entire country (all 50 states) will have same-sex marriage inclusion by 
the year 2016. (Moderate likelihood condition) 
“Given the great change that has occurred within the field of marriage, there is a 90% 
likelihood that the entire country (all 50 states) will have same-sex marriage inclusion by 
the year 2016.” (Highest likelihood condition) 
 
Study 2: Housing Equality 
“Although great change has occurred within the field of housing, there is a 10% 
likelihood that the entire country (all 50 states) will have sexual orientation housing 
protection by the year 2016.” (Lowest likelihood condition) 
“Although great change has occurred within the field of housing, there is a 30% 
likelihood that the entire country (all 50 states) will have sexual orientation housing 
protection by the year 2016.” (Low likelihood condition) 
“Although great change has occurred within the field of housing, there is a 60% 
likelihood that the entire country (all 50 states) will have sexual orientation housing 
protection by the year 2016.” (Moderate likelihood condition) 
“Given the great change that has occurred within the field of housing, there is a 90% 
likelihood that the entire country (all 50 states) will have sexual orientation housing 
protection by the year 2016.” (Highest likelihood condition) 
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Appendix H: Likelihood Condition Manipulation Check, Emotion measures, Suspect 
class justifications, Marital and Housing justifications, and Second Ballot Initiative 
Instructions: Think about the statement that you just read.  Below are 8 emotions that 
may or may not describe the feelings that you have about this statement.  Please answer 
the following questions based on the way you feel at this moment.  There are no right or 
wrong answers.  We are interested only in your feelings.  
1 2 3 4 5 
Very slightly or 
not at all 
A little Moderately Quite a bit Extremely 
 
Happy, angry, fearful, disgusted and hopeful items (PANAS, Watson & Clark 1994; 
Batson, 1987) 
Happy: 
1. How happy do you feel when you think about the statement?  
2. How cheerful do you feel when you think about the statement?  
3. How joyful do you feel when you think about the statement?  
 
Angry:  
4. How angry do you feel when you think about the statement?  
5. How irritated do you feel when you think about the statement?  
6. How hostile do you feel when you think about the statement?  
 
Fearful: 
7. How fearful do you feel when you think about the statement?  
8. How anxious do you feel when you think about the statement? 
9. How afraid do you feel when you think about the statement?  
10. How nervous do you feel when you think about the statement?  
11. How frightened do you feel when you think about the statement?  
 
Disgusted:  
12. How disgusted do you feel when you think about the statement?  
13. How scornful do you feel when you think about the statement?  
14. How loathful do you feel when you think about the statement?  
 
Hopeful: 
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15. How hopeful do you feel when you think about the statement? 
16. How optimistic do you feel when you think about the statement? 
17. How much anticipation do you feel when you think about the statement? (1 = very 
little or none at all; 5 = very much) (Batson, 1987) 
 
Compassion (Batson, 1987) (1 = very little or none at all; 5 = very much) 
18. How much compassion do you feel when you think about the statement?  
19. How much empathy do you feel when you think about the statement?  
20. How much sympathy do you feel when you think about the statement?  
21. How much pity do you feel when you think about the statement? 
 
Instructions: Please complete the following measures regarding the political science 
report you just read by selecting one response.   
Study 1: Marital Equality 
1. According to the political science report, how likely is it that the United States 
will have country-wide same-sex marriage inclusion by the year 2016? 
(Manipulation check) 
a. 10% 
b. 30% 
c. 60% 
d. 90% 
e. 100% 
 
Study 2: Housing Equality 
1. According to the political science report, how likely is it that the United States 
will have country-wide sexual orientation housing protection by the year 2016? 
(Manipulation check) 
a. 10% 
b. 30% 
c. 60% 
d. 90% 
e. 100% 
 
Sexual Orientation as a Suspect Class Items (Developed by researcher to address system 
justifications for denying suspect or quasi-suspect class status to sexual minorities) 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Disagree  Neither Agree 
nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 
1. _____ Lesbians and gay men have a history of experiencing discrimination in 
the United States.  
2. _____ Sexual orientation is immutable (i.e. it cannot be changed). 
3. _____ Sexual orientation is related to an individual’s ability to contribute to 
society. (reverse-scored) 
4. _____ Lesbians and gay men, as a group, have enough political power to 
achieve their goals through the ordinary political process. (reverse-scored) 
System Justification Marital and Housing Equality Items (Developed by researcher to 
address system justifications used in anti-marriage equality cases and sexual minority 
“special rights” cases) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Disagree  Neither Agree 
nor Disagree 
 Agree 
 
5. _____ Traditional marriage, i.e. heterosexual couple marriage, should be 
protected. (preserving traditional marriage justification) 
6. _____ States should move slowly when deciding whether to include same-sex 
couples within the definition of marriage. (wariness of experimentation 
justification) 
7. _____ Restricting marriage to heterosexual couples encourages natural 
procreation. (natural procreation justification) 
8. _____ Heterosexual, married couples provide the ideal parenting environment 
for raising children. (ideal parenting/ raising children justification) 
9. _____ Lesbians and gay men are a privileged group. (sexual minorities as 
privileged minority justification) 
10. _____ Lesbians and gay men want “special rights” that others don’t have. 
(sexual minorities as wanting “special rights” justification) 
11. _____ Lesbians and gay men try to get “special rights” through undemocratic 
means (i.e. through judge-made law). (sexual minorities as using undemocratic 
means to secure “special rights” justification) 
12. _____ It is wrong to try to get “special rights”. (“special rights” – general – 
justification) 
13. _____ Lesbians and gay men are selfish because they put themselves before 
others. (sexual minorities as selfish – specific – justification) 
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14. _____ In general, lesbians and gay men are selfish. (sexual minorities as selfish 
– general – justification) 
15. _____ In general, lesbians and gay men are immature. (sexual minorities as 
immature – general – justification) 
16. _____ In general, lesbians and gay men are immoral. (sexual minorities as 
immoral – general – justification) 
17. _____ Homosexuality is unnatural. (sexual minority as unnatural item) 
 
Instructions: For this study, we are interested in your political views.  Specifically, we are 
interested in whether you would vote for a ballot initiative for amending your state 
constitution.  Please read the ballot initiative below and indicate if you would vote for it.   
Study 1: Marriage Equality 
1. Ballot Initiative 5: The definition of marriage will be changed throughout the state 
by adding the following phrase to the state constitution: “Marriage shall include 
same-sex couples as well as heterosexual couples”. 
e. Question 1: Would you vote for this amendment to your state constitution? 
i. Yes 
ii. No 
f. Question 2: How likely is it that you would vote for this amendment to 
your state constitution? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very 
Unlikely 
Unlikely Somewhat 
Unlikely 
Undecided Somewhat 
Likely 
Likely Very 
Likely 
 
Study 2: Housing Equality 
1. Ballot Initiative 5: The classes included in housing discrimination protection will 
be changed throughout the state by adding the following language to the state 
constitution: “Private individuals and companies, as well as public organizations, 
shall not exclude sale or rental of housing to others on the basis of sexual 
orientation”. 
g. Question 1: Would you vote for this amendment to your state constitution? 
i. Yes 
ii. No 
h. Question 2: How likely is it that you would vote for this amendment to 
your state constitution? 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very 
Unlikely 
Unlikely Somewhat 
Unlikely 
Undecided Somewhat 
Likely 
Likely Very 
Likely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
271 
 
Appendix I: Situational System Justification scale, Attitudes toward Lesbians and Gay 
Men scale, Global Beliefs in a Just World scale, Realistic and Symbolic Threats scale, 
and Intergroup Anxiety scale 
Study D: General Political Attitudes Study 
Instructions: The purpose of this study is to assess your attitudes regarding a number of 
political issues.  There are no right or wrong answers. We are interested only in your 
attitudes.  Indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following 
statements by writing the number on the scale that you feel is closest to your opinion next 
to that item. 
Situational System Justification Scale (Kay & Jost, 2003) 
Instructions: Please rate the extent that you agree or disagree with each of the following 
statements using the scale provided. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Strongly 
Disagree 
   Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
   Strongly 
Agree 
 
1. _____ In general, I find society to be fair. 
2. _____ In general, the American political system operates as it should. 
3. _____ American society needs to be radically reconstructed. (reverse-scored) 
4. _____ The United States is the best country in the world to live in. 
5. _____ Most policies serve the greater good. 
6. _____ Everyone has a fair shot at wealth and happiness. 
7. _____ Our society is getting worse every year. (reverse-scored) 
8. _____ Society is set up so that people usually get what they deserve. 
 
Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay men scale (Herek, 1988) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Disagree    Agree 
 
9. _____ Male homosexuality is a perversion. 
10. _____ Female homosexuality is detrimental to society because it breaks down 
the natural divisions between the sexes. 
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11. _____ The idea of male homosexual marriages seems ridiculous to me. 
12. _____ A woman’s homosexuality should not be a cause for job discrimination 
in any situation. (reverse-scored) 
13. _____ State laws regulating private, consenting lesbian behavior should be 
loosened. (reverse-scored) 
14. _____ Female homosexuality is a sin. 
15. _____ Just as in other species, male homosexuality is a natural expression of 
sexuality in human men. (reverse-scored) 
16. _____ Male homosexual couples should be allowed to adopt children the same 
as heterosexual couples. (reverse-scored) 
17. _____ I would not be too upset if I learned that my son was a homosexual. 
(reverse-scored) 
18. _____ Male homosexuality is merely a different kind of lifestyle that should not 
be condemned. (reverse-scored) 
19. _____ Female homosexuality is a threat to many of our basic social institutions.  
20. _____ Male homosexuals should not be allowed to teach school. 
21. _____ Female homosexuality in itself is no problem, but what society makes of 
it can be a problem. 
22. _____ Homosexual behavior between two men is just plain wrong. 
23. _____ I think male homosexuals are disgusting. 
24. _____ The growing number of lesbians indicates a decline in American morals. 
25. _____ If a man has homosexual feelings, he should do everything he can to 
overcome them. 
26. _____ Lesbians are sick. 
27. _____ Lesbians just can’t fit into our society. 
28. _____ Female homosexuality is an inferior form of sexuality. 
 
Global Belief in a Just World scale (Lipkus, 1991) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Strong 
Disagreement 
    Strong 
Agreement 
 
29. _____ I feel that people get what they are entitled to have. 
30. _____ I feel that a person’s efforts are noticed and rewarded. 
31. _____ I feel that people earn the rewards and punishments they get. 
32. _____ I feel that people who meet with misfortune have brought it on 
themselves. 
33. _____ I feel that people get what they deserve. 
34. _____ I feel that rewards and punishments are fairly given. 
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35. _____ I basically feel that the world is a fair place. 
 
Realistic and Symbolic Threat scales (Stephan, Ybarra, & Bachman, 1999) – modified  
Please indicate the degree to which you agree to the following statements: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
 
36. _____ The values and beliefs of lesbians and gay men regarding moral and 
religious issues are not compatible with the beliefs and values of most 
Americans. 
37. _____ The values and beliefs of lesbians and gay men regarding family issues 
and socializing children are basically quite similar to those of most Americans. 
(reverse-scored) 
38. _____ The values and beliefs of lesbians and gay men regarding social relations 
are not compatible with the beliefs and values of most Americans. 
39. _____ Lesbians and gay men should not have to accept heterosexual ways. 
(reverse-scored) 
40. _____ Lesbians and gay men get more from this country than they contribute. 
41. _____ Lesbians and gay men are not displacing heterosexual workers from their 
jobs. (reverse-scored) 
42. _____ Lesbians and gay men should be eligible for the same health-care 
benefits received by heterosexual persons. (reverse-scored) 
43. _____ Lesbians and gay men are as entitled to subsidized housing or subsidized 
utilities (water, sewage, electricity) as poor heterosexual persons are. (reverse-
scored) 
 
Intergroup Anxiety scale (Stephan, Ybarra, & Bachman, 1999) – modified  
Please indicate the extant that you would feel the following emotions when interacting 
with lesbians and gay men. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at 
all 
        Extremely 
 
44. _____ Apprehensive 
45. _____ Uncertain 
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46. _____ Worried 
47. _____ Awkward 
48. _____ Anxious 
49. _____ Threatened 
50. _____ Comfortable 
51. _____ Trusting 
52. _____ Friendly 
53. _____ Confident 
54. _____ Safe 
55. _____ At ease 
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Appendix J: Manipulation Check 
1. Does your state allow same-sex couples to marry? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. I don’t know 
2. Does your state provide lesbians and gay men with protection from discrimination 
in housing? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. I don’t know 
3. Have you heard of the US Supreme Court case United States v. Windsor? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
4. What did the US Supreme Court hold in this case? 
a. That the federal Defense of Marriage Act did not violate Ms. Windsor’s 
rights. 
b. That the federal Defense of Marriage Act did violate Ms. Windsor’s 
rights. 
5. How many states currently allow same-sex couples to marry? 
a. 27 
b. 40 
c. 37 
d. 32 
6. How many states currently provide state-wide anti-discrimination housing 
protection for lesbians and gay men? 
a. 32 
b. 18 
c. 25 
d. 21 
7. Are lesbians and gay men protected from housing discrimination by a federal 
law? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. I don’t know 
8. Have you ever voted against same-sex marriage in a state or local ballot initiative 
or referendum? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. I don’t know 
9. Have you ever voted against providing lesbians and gay men with housing 
discrimination protection in a state or local ballot initiative or referendum? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. I don’t know 
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Appendix K: Demographic Survey 
Instructions: Please complete the following questionnaire. 
(1) Please provide your age.   ______ 
(2) Please provide your gender. 
       _____ Man ______ Woman ______ Transgender MTF or FTM 
(3) Please provide your ethnic origin and/or race. (Check one)  
 ___   White, non-Latino/a ___   African American (Black) 
 ___   Asian American  ___   Latino/a    
___   Native American 
 ___   Other Please specify _____________________________ 
(4) Urban vs. Rural: I would describe the location in which I grew up as a: 
 ____ Large city  ____ Medium-sized city 
 ____ Small city or town ____ Very small town 
 ____ Farm outside of town 
(5) Childhood Residence: Which of the following best describes where you grew up? 
 ____ Urban ____ Suburban      ____ Town      ____ Rural 
(6) Do you have a current driver’s license?   ____ yes  ____ no 
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(7) Are you currently registered to vote?   ____ yes  ____ no 
(8) Are you a convicted felon?   ____ yes  ____ no 
(9) Are you a citizen of the United States?  ____ yes  ____ no 
(10) Have you ever served on a jury?   ____ yes  ____ no 
(11) Please provide what best describes your current employment. 
 ____ Employed full-time _____ Unemployed 
 ____ Employed part-time _____ Student 
(12) Please provide your current occupation. 
 ________________________________ 
(13) Religion: What is your religion? 
 ____ Protestant ____ Catholic  ____ Jewish  
 ____ Muslim  ____ None   
____ Other Please 
Specify____________________________________________ 
(14) What is your political affiliation?  
 ____ Democrat ____ Republican ____ Green Party 
 ____ Independent ____ Libertarian ____ No affiliation 
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____ Other Please 
Specify_____________________________________________ 
(15) Please provide your political orientation on social issues. 
 ___ Very conservative 
 ___ Conservative 
 ___ Moderate 
 ___ Liberal 
 ___ Very liberal 
(16) Please provide your political orientation on economic issues. 
 ___ Very conservative 
 ___ Conservative 
 ___ Moderate 
 ___ Liberal 
 ___ Very liberal 
(17) Marital Status: What is your marital status? 
 ___ Single 
 ___ Dating 
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 ___ Cohabiting (i.e. living with another person in a romantic relationship, but not 
engaged) 
___ Engaged 
 ___ Married or marriage-like relationship 
 ___ Divorced 
(18) If you are not currently married, have you ever been married? 
 ___ Yes 
 ___ No 
 ___ Currently Married 
(19) Have you ever cohabitated with another person (i.e. lived with another person with 
whom you have a romantic relationship, but with whom you are not engaged or married)? 
 ___ Yes 
 ___ No 
(20) Do you believe marriage is important? 
 ___ Yes 
 ___ No 
(21) Family Income/ Social Economic Status: I consider my family to be: 
 ___ Upper class 
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 ___ Upper middle class 
 ___ Middle class 
 ___ Lower middle class 
 ___ Lower class 
(22) Do you own or have you ever owned your own home? 
 ___ Yes 
 ___ No 
(23) Have you ever rented an apartment, house, or other dwelling? 
 ___ Yes 
 ___ No 
(24) Do you believe owning your own home is important? 
 ___ Yes 
 ___ No 
(25)  Do you have children? 
 ___ Yes 
 ___ No 
(26) Please provide your highest level of education achieved. 
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 ____ Less than high school diploma 
 ____ High school diploma/ G.E.D. 
 ____ Some college/ In college 
 ____ College degree (Associate’s or Bachelor’s) 
 ____ Advanced degree (Master’s degree, Doctorate, etc.) 
(27) Please provide your sexual orientation. 
 ____ Straight 
 ____ Mostly straight with some same-sex interest 
 ____ Bisexual 
 ____ Mostly gay/lesbian with some straight interest 
 ____ Gay/Lesbian 
(28) Psychology Classes: How many psychology classes have you had in college or in 
high school? 
 ____ 0  ____ 1  ____ 2  ____ 3  ____ 4   
____ 5 or more 
(29) Please provide the first three digits of your zip code. _________ 
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Appendix L: Debriefing 
Thank you for participating in this study.  We ask that you please do not discuss this 
research with anyone, as this is part of a series of studies the Legal Decision making Lab 
will be running throughout the next few years. 
The purpose of this research is to better understand stigma towards lesbians and gay men 
in the marital and housing contexts.  By having participants read that the country is doing 
well or has reached a new low point in the eyes of most Americans, we sought to 
understand how threatening the status quo would impact whether individuals would vote 
for marital and housing equality measures.  Previous research indicates that individuals 
who feel threat to the status quo are more likely to support the current system (i.e. 
inequality).  However, individuals who believe a new status quo is likely to happen are 
more likely to support the new status quo.   
The ultimate goal of this program of research is to better understand what individuals 
think about sexual minority equality.  We sought to understand how thoughts, emotions, 
and attitudes can impact whether one supports equality measures. 
Because this research is currently being collected, we ask that you do not discuss this 
research with future participants.  You have devoted a good deal of time and effort 
completing the materials for this study.  The researchers have also spent a great deal of 
time preparing the materials.  If you discuss these materials with any other students, you 
will have wasted your time and effort along with the researchers’ time and effort.  If you 
discuss the materials with anyone else that might be in this or a related study in the 
future, we will not be able to use the materials or your data from this study. 
If you have any questions or concerns, or would like to know the results of this project, 
please contact faculty member Richard L. Wiener at LegalDecisionLabUNL@gmail.com. 
 Again, we thank you for your participation. 
 
 
 
